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Foreword
This is your opportunity to discover how the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville
District, came to be. These pages detail the
fascinating history of the Corps of Engineers in
Florida and Puerto Rico tracing significant
contributions to the growth of each.
More importantly it lets you capture the
spirit of the men and women of the Corps who
built this district and established the high
standards for professional competence,
personal service and human warmth which we
sustain today. Here is their story and ours in a
single volume. I invite you, your family and
friends to enjoy and share its many treasures.
JAMES

w. R. ADAMS

Colonel, Corps of Engineers
District Engineer
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CHAPTER 1

Early History
THE PosmON OF CHIEF ENGINEER for the newly created Grand
Army was enacted by the Continental Congress on 16 June 1775 in
order to provide military engineering for the nascent movement toward independence. The position was created as a reaction by Congress to the worsening situation between the colonists and the
mother country.
Less than a month later, General George Washington, who
had recently arrived in Cambridge, Massachusetts, to assume command over the Continental forces, appointed Colonel Richard Gridley to the post of Chief of Engineers. In all probability, Gridley was
offered this position because he was serving in that same capacity
for the local militia under a commission from the Massachusetts
Provisional Congress.
Richard Gridley had an excellent background for his engineering duties. He had served in the Provincial units of the British Army
where he had drawn up the plans for the fortification of Lake George
in the New York colony. He had also participated in the construction
of Fort William for the same colony.ln 1 746, Gridley had worked on
his hometown defenses in Boston for the British and had served on
expeditions against the French at Louisburg in 1745, Crown Point in
1755, and Quebec in 1759.
As chief engineer for the Massachusetts militia, he oversaw the
creation of the breastworks on Breed's Hill. He took his place in the
line at Bunker Hill where he was wounded. Gridley, 64 years old
when he was injured, accepted Washington's appointment as Chief
Engineer of the Continental forces although he retired from further
active combat operations; however, he continued to act as the engineer general of the Eastern Department until 1780.1

1

in the necessary branches of mathematics," and that noncommissioned officers "write a good hand." 3 Unfortunately, the resolution
was so poorly worded concerning matters of pay, rank, and precedence with other branches of the Continental Army, that considerable confusion existed among members of the Engineer Department as to their proper place in the military hierarchy. Congress had
to correct this vagueness.
On 11 March 1779, Congress formally established the Corps
when it resolved: 'That the engineers in the service of the United
States shall be formed in a Corps and styled the 'Corps of Engineers,' ...."4 Two months later, it appointed General du Portail
commandant of the Corps of Engineers. After much trial and error,
the Continental Congress seemed to have created a proper organization to handle the duties of the military engineer.
After General Charles Cornwallis surrendered at Yorktown in
1781, combat operations in the United States ceased, although it
was 1783 before the peace treaty with Great Britain officially ended
the American war for independence. Shortly after the Treaty of Paris
was signed, Congress, as part of its military cutback program, dissolved the Continental Army's Corps of Engineers. The immediate
need for military construction was over; the Corps was declared
dispensable.
Between 1783 and 1789, the newly created United States of
America turned to the immediate task of forming a viable government There appeared to be no need for the military engineer. But,
in 1789, the French Revolution broke out and all of Europe was in
flames. When the French and the English renewed their age-old
struggle, the United States had a treaty of friendship and aid with
France. The possibility of Americans having to fight again was a
valid assumption. Secretary of War Henry Knox wrote a letter to
President Washington, calling for a small corps of artillery and engineers. There the matter stood while war clouds rolled back and forth
across Europe.
Four years later, when President Washington turned to Congress for the funds and authority to fortify the nation's coast, there
were no engineers in the military establishment. As an immediate
measure, on 20 March 1794, Washington divided the coast into a
number of districts, making a series of temporary appointments to
provide each district with an engineer.
By 9 May 1794, Congress was ready with an act creating a
Corps of Artillerists and Engineers. The Corps had an authorized
strength of 992 men and a legal life of 3 years. A year later, Congress
extended the life of the Corps of Artillerists and Engineers indefinitely. At its peak, in 1799, the Corps consisted of two full regiments;
but, in spring of 1800, the numbers were reduced once more by Act
of Congress.
·
3

Two years later, the Military Academy at West Point was established and Johnathan Williams was appointed its first superintendent. (West Point was the first engineering school in the United
States; Rensselaer Polytechnical School was not founded until
1824, and its first graduates were not sent forth until the 1830's.)
Williams was a merchant, jurist, and respected scientist who had
worked on some of the nation's fortifications. He was not a professional military man. Under William's guidance, West Point became
the preeminent engineering and scientific school in America. The
Military Academy represented the concept of the citizen-soldier,
trained by the military to pursue both civil and military functions.
From its inception until1866, West Point drew its superintendents
from among the officers of the Corps of Engineers; thereafter, the
command was opened to all branches of the Army.5
West Point classroom.

The same Congressional Act of 16 March 1802 which established the Military Academy, discontinued the Corps of Artillerists
and Engineers and created two separate organizations; the Corps of
Engineers and the Regiment of Artillery.
In addition to establishing a separate Corps of Engineers
charged with educating all of the Regular Army officers, President
Thomas Jefferson sent his engineer officers throughout the nation
to survey, explore, erect fortifications, and build military roads.
These tasks were considered both military and civil because it was
necessary for the country to know its territory before the land could
be protected, settled, and developed.
By 30 April 1824, the need of the civil sector for trained engineers was so great, and the source of these technicians so restricted
to the Corps of Engineers, that Congress established for the Corps
4
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the mission of performing civil functions for the nation at large. That
mission, many times modified, has continued. Today, in Florida, the
Jacksonville District is still engaged in carrying out this charge.
Aorida, first touched by Juan Ponce de Leon in 1513, was the
last territory on the Atlantic coast to become a part of the United
States. Following several centuries under Spanish control, the peninsula was terra incognito to the Americans when it was ceded to
the nation in 1821.
Early Spanish explorers hurriedly tramped over Las Floridas
chasing Indian myths, seeking the fountain of youth, the Seven
Cities of Cibola, and wealthy native empires to conquer. Ponce de
Leon was followed by the Pimfilo de Narvaez-Aivar Nunez Cabeza de
Yaca expedition of 1528 and the Hernando de Soto undertaking of
1539. The conquistadors found two elements in Aorida; hostile Indians and inhospitable swamps. Spain turned its back upon the
peninsula until the French expressed an interest in the land.
At first, the French Huguenots were intent upon founding colonies to escape religious persecution at home. Then, temptation to
attack the wealth-Iadened Spanish ships, sailing slowly up the Aorida coast in the gulf stream toward the higher latitudes where the
prevailing westerly winds could carry them back to Spain, proved
too much for the Frenchman to ignore. First, Jean Ribault visited
Aorida and, then, Rene de Laudonniere attempted to establish a
settlement and fort on the St Johns River in 1564. When Philip II
learned of Fort Caroline, he sent Admiral Pedro Menendez de Aviles
the following year to drive off the Huguenots and to build a military
outpost to protect outgoing Spanish ships. Pedro Menendez carried
out both missions by virtually wiping out all Frenchmen in Aorida

5

and founding St Augustine, the first permanent European settlement in present-day United States.
In the seventeenth century, it was the English who put pressure
on Spain. After the founding of Jamestown in 1607, the English
settlers gradually moved southward. Georgia became a no-man's
land between the two European rivals and their Indian allies. By the
time Spain lost Aorida to Great Britain in 1763, there were few of the
indigenous Amerindians left on the peninsula. White man's war and
disease had decimated the ranks of the Calusa, Timucua, and ApaIachees. When the Spanish departed for Cuba, the few surviving
Indian allies went with them. The English moved into a nearly deserted peninsula.
The English were not the only newcomers to Florida. The land,
nearly desolate of humans, had an appeal to various bands of Indians from the Creek Confederation. Throughout the eighteenth
century, they drifted south from their tribal lands in Alabama and
Georgia. These Indians became known as Seminoles, meaning
"wild people," or "out-settlers," because of their separation from the
Creeks.6 During the English period in Florida, 1763-83, there was
comparative harmony between the two races. The British were neither numerous nor aggressive.
Great Britain created two colonies, East and West Florida, out
of the newly acquired land. When the American Revolution broke
out, both Aoridas cast their lot with the mother country. During the
war, Spain became an ally of the United States at the urging of
France, but primarily to recapture her lost territory of Florida. The
Spanish succeeded and in 1783 East and West Florida returned to
the flag of Spain. Once again, European settlers were uprooted as
the English left and the Spaniards returned.
By this time, Florida was not a necessary military outpost in
Spain's colonial organization. The Amerindian empires had been
looted of their precious metals and the treasure ships no longer
sailed from the Spanish Main along the Gulf Stream to the Iberian
peninsula. It had been a matter of national pride for Spain to retake
Aorida, but once this had been accomplished, there was little incentive for white settlements. The result was that most Spaniards in
Aorida lived in the two small villages of St. Augustine and Pensacola
in the extreme eastern and western portions of the territory. Spanish
control over middle Florida was therefore minimal, and the peninsula became a haven for the Seminole Indians and the runaway
slaves from Georgia, Alabama, and the Carolinas.
Americans living continguous to Spanish Florida were greatly
disturbed by the lawless conditions along the frontier region separating the two countries. Cattle rustling was a way of life on both
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sides of the border. American slaveowners were convinced the
Seminoles were encouraging and even carrying off slaves to the
safety of their villages under the Spanish flag. The Seminoles and
runaway slaves owned cattle and lived a relatively free existence
away from white man's control, which was not the proper life·to
flaunt before the American plantation system. As a further affront,
Spain stationed black troops in Florida, an example fraught with
danger for the institution of slavery.7
The international situation in 1812, with Americans and British
at war again, provided further sanctions to violent acts on both sides
of the line. The Governor of Florida encouraged the Seminoles to
attack Georgia. American troops retaliated by marching into Spanish territory. Meanwhile, the English began taking advantage of the
situation by recruiting Indian allies in Spanish Florida to be used
against the United States. Regardless of the provocative actions of
England and Spain, the Americans looked to the Seminoles as the
primary cause of their border problems.
The end of the War of 1812 did not stop the border strife.
British merchants continued to operate in Spanish Florida, encouraging the Seminoles and former slaves to harry and harass nearby
Americans. These frontier depredations, local in nature, took on the
aspect of a national problem when southern planters considered
the future acquisition of Florida a necessary policy forth~ expansion
of the plantation system and the protection of the institution of slavery. The rest of the nation was beginning to accept as inevitable the
eventual expansion of the United States from Canada to the Gulf of
Mexico and from coast to coast.a
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Under such assumptions, the situation deteriorated to the
point where General Andrew Jackson, at the head of an army, was
sent by President Monroe into Spanish Florida to punish the Semi- .
noles. The action became known as the First Seminole War, 181718. General Jackson exceeded his orders calling upon him to respect all posts flying the Bourbon flag. Indian villages were burned;
the Spanish settlements of Pensacola and St. Marks were occupied;
and two British subjects were captured, tried, and executed. The
South was jubilant, Spain and Britain outraged, and the Seminoles
impressed.
Lieutenant James Gadsden, an engineer accompanying Jackson, was ordered to build a fort on the east bank of the Apalachicola
River in Spanish West Florida. Jackson was so pleased with his
engineer's results that he named it Fort Gadsden. At the end of this
border skirmish, Secretary of War, John C. Calhoun advised General Edmund P. Gaines that the President intended to return
Jackson's conquests to Spain, but he added that "Fort Gadsden...
appears to be a very commanding position, and ought not to be
evacuated. Should you think so, you will retain it, and garrison it with
a sufficient force." Apparently, the fort remained in American hands,
because when the exchange of Florida did take place, Andrew Jackson, as Territorial Governor of Florida, ordered Major Alexander
C.W. Fanning, who was commanding at Fort Gadsden, to take possession of St. Marks.9
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President Monroe promptly returned Jackson's other conquests to Spain, but the Spanish crown was well aware of its inability
to restrain the dynamic, aggressive Americans. The following year,
the Adams-Onis Treaty ceded Aorida to the United States, although
the formal transfer did not take place until July 1821.
Thus was the territory of Florida obtained by the United States.
But, even before the Adams-Onis Treaty took place, Captain Hugh
Young, Corps of Topographical Engineers, who had accompanied
General Jackson during the First Seminole War, submitted a detailed report to the War Department entitled "A Topographical
Memoir on East and West Florida with ltineraries." 10 Young described minutely and distinctly the theater of General Jackson's operation which were bounded by the Georgia border in the north, the
Gulf of Mexico in the south, the Sahwanne [Suwannee] or St. Juan
River in the east, and the Apalachicola River in the west. In a~dition
to topography, Young provided one of the earliest accounts of the
Seminole Indians, their tribes, customs, and manners. He,also included a brief description of the Spanish and Negro settlements,
and some pertinent remarks on the status of trade and commerce.
He admitted that his material was collected on the march during an
active campaign; however, he was able to draw valuable information
from a resident who had lived for some time in Florida. Young
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"to adopt such a line of policy towards them as shall be based on
our own views of beneficial result."ta Young's memoir was more
than a topographical report of a theater of operations; it was an
expression by an Army engineer of the American expansionism
which resulted in the acquisition of Florida.
It was a long time after Florida became a part of the United
States before the creation of the Jacksonville District could take
place. Prior to the Civil War, the Corps of Engineers was not organized along district and divisional lines. Engineers were assigned,
either individually or in groups, to specific projects. When the task
was finished either by completion or the exhaustion of funds, the
officers concerned were reassigned. Often, if the task took a long
time, the original engineer would be succeeded by other officers.
After the war, permanent offices were established, consisting of
a small staff of civilian engineers, clerks, and others, working under
the direction of an officer in charge. Generally, this was the case in
the larger coastal and river cities or at the headquarters for a major
project. Gradually, lesser jobs in the local area were given to that
office. All of this development led to the creation of divisions and
districts. Today, the divisions cover broad geographic regions; the
districts are confined to river basin areas for their civil works activities.
Captain Hugh Young and Lieutenant James Gadsden were
among the first engineers in Florida. Both were attached to General
Jackson's forces during the invasion of Spanish Florida in 1818.
Young's tenure in Florida was confined to the short period of occupation under Jackson. Gadsden returned to the peninsula after it
had become a territory of the United States.
During the 1820's, Gadsden performed numerous engineering services for the Corps in Florida in a civilian capacity. In keeping
with contemporary custom, Gadsden's assignments were directed
to him as an individual. His orders gave no indication that would lead
one to assume that the Chief Engineer had organizational designs,
similar to district functions, in mind when he instructed Gadsden.
It must be remembered that the Corps of Engineers first became a m ajor force in internal improvements through an Act of
Congress on 30 April 1824. The Board of Engineers for Internal
Improvement was established under the direction of General Simon
Bernard to carry out these new responsibilities. From 1824 to 1829
there was a tremendous increase in improvement projects. There
was some indication that regional decentralization was contemplated when Engineer Orders No.9, of 1 August 1828, designated
Captain William H. Chase commanding engineer of the Gulf of
Mexico. Chase was charged with constructing defensive fortifications at Pensacola and harbor improvements at Pascagoula, Mississippi.t9
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River and harbor improvements were resumed when Congress appropriated some $2 million for over 100 projects in 1852.
Most of the allocations were small amounts intended for surveys to
prepare plans for future works. In Florida, a grant was given to survey the St Johns River.
There were no general river and harbor bills passed after 1852
until near the end of the Civil War, but there were several large projects funded by individual congressional acts. The mounting tensions brought on by the country's sectionalism over the institution
of slavery caused the legislators to be wary of providing funds and
projects to rival regions. By 1860, almost all civilian activities had
been stopped and they remained idle throughout the war.24 During
the conflict, military matters were the concern of the day. The only
tasks performed in Florida were for the furtherance of the Union
cause.
In the midst of the war, the Topographical Corps was merged
with the Corps of Engineers. The military engineers were once
again under one corps.
In retrospect, it is easy to see that the pent-up demand for internal improvements would swell to a flood tide after being dammed
up for nearly a decade and a half. The first year of peace saw more
works undertaken, with larger appropriations, than in any prewar
year. The period from 1866 to 1880 was one of expansion. The
startling growth peaked about 1881, but there were annual increases of funds from 1881 to 1901, even during the SpanishAmerican War.2s These years provided the climate for organizational changes to match the growth of appropriations and projects.
The regional concept of engineering works may be discerned
through the various headings used in the annual reports of river and
harbor projects in the 1870's and 1880's. Immediately after the war,
such projects were assigned individually to engineering officers and
noted as such in the annual report For example, the report for 1869
listed the Florida project under the heading of "Survey of the Mouth
of the St. Johns River, Florida." Major General Quincy Adams
Gillmore was listed as being in charge of the project. The wording
was changed the following year to "Atlantic Harbors and Rivers
South of the Cape Fear." The heading was again changed in 1873
to "Improvements of Rivers and Harbors on the Coast of South
Carolina, Georgia, and the Atlantic Coast of Florida."26 This terminology remained consistent throughout the annual reports for over
a decade. During this period, Gillmore was the officer in charge, with
his headquarters in New York City.
It is difficult to assess Gillmore's position with respect to the
issue of district engineer during this decade and a half. His area of
operations corresponded more to the present day division than to
district status. Gillmore was also the officer in charge of projects on
13

the east coast of Florida only. Key West and the west coast projects,
both part of the present Jacksonville District, were under the direction of another engineer.
Captain Andrew N. Damrell might well hold the honor of being
the precursor of a district engineer in Florida. On 7 April 1873, he
became the officer in charge of the "Improvement of the Harbor of
Mobile- ... Removal of Bar at the Entrance of the Harbor of Cedar
Keys, Florida." Throughout the following decade, Captain Damrell's
description varied in the annual reports as more Florida projects
were assigned to his control. By 1884, his description of Florida
works listed "Pensacola Harbor, ... Key West Harbor, ... Appalachicola [sic] River, ... Suwanee [sic] River, ... Caloosahatchee River, ...
Peas [sic] Creek, ... Manatee River, Fla...."27
Regardless of what view one takes with respect to Gillmore and
Damrell, the annual report of 1885 introduced a major change in
the organization of the river and harbor groupings. It was the harbinger of the divisional and district structure presently in use. Colonel
Gillmore's area of concern was reduced and it was so indicated in
the report under the title of "Improvement of Rivers and Harbors on
the Coast of South Carolina and Georgia and part of the Atlantic
Coast of Florida." This was followed by a numerical listing of his
projects. Items 13 and 14 set the southern boundary for his responsibility at the "Entrance to Cumberland Sound, Georgia and Florida," and the "Inside passage between Fernandina and the St.
Johns River, Florida."2a
Captain William T. Rossell relieved Colonel Gillmore of his
southernmost region. Rossell's duties read, "Improvement of Rivers
and Harbors in the State of Florida."29 In the same paragraph listing
Rossell as the officer in charge, there was a new term stating that
Ueutenant Colonel David C. Houston was Rossell's supervising engineer. In another part of the report, Houston's duties were enumerated, including his position as "supervising engineer of the districts
embracing works in charge of ... Russell [Rossell]."30 This was the
first mention of a supervising engineer and of districts. Therefore,
Captain William T. Rossell was the first district engineer in Florida,
and, unlike Gillmore, Rossell's station was Jacksonville.
Florida was in the vanguard of the movement during the
1880's which saw the conception and development of the presentday organization of divisions and districts. Colonel David Houston
was appointed supervising engineer of districts under the charge of
Major Andrew N. Damrell, and Captains Thomas Turtle, Richard L.
Hoxie, and William T. Rossell.31 These officers were in command of
fortifications and river and harbor projects from the St. Johns west
to Mobile, Alabama. They were also the Corps of Engineers inchoate division. There were two supervising engineers listed in the 1888
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annual report; Colonel William P. Craighill, for the districts from Virginia to Florida, and Colonel George H. Mendell, for the west coast
from San Diego, California, to the State ofWashington.32 lt is evident
that this regional and district organization proved satisfactory, for
under new regulations approved by the Secretary of War on 4 February 1889, the country was divided into five divisions. For the first
time, Colonel Craighill was called the division engineer for the
Southeast Division.JJ
Today, the establishment or disestablishment of a district
would be carried out by a general order, but in 1884 when the concept of a district was first utilized, special orders to the officers concerned were used. Thus, in order to observe the creation of the
Florida District, it is necessary to consult the special orders issued to
Captain Rossell. He was instructed to go to Jacksonville, Florida, to
relieve Colonel Gillmore, Major Andrew N. Damrell, and Captain
Thomas Turtle of such river and harbor works and fortifications
under their supervision, as the Chief of Engineers shall designate.34
Rossell's district ultimately covered all of Florida from the St. Johns
River to, and including, Apalachicola Bay.
Ueutenant William M. Black relieved Captain Rossell in April
1886. The following April, Apalachicola River was removed from
Captain Black's control to be placed under Captain Richard L.
Hoxie. His district, entitled "Improvement of Certain Rivers in the
States of Florida, Georgia, and Alabama," is today part of the Mobile
District3s This shift in territory was reflected in the title of Black's
district from 1887's "Improvement of Rivers and Harbors in the
State of Florida," to 1888's "Improvement of Certain Rivers and
Harbors in the State of Florida."36
It was during Captain Black's tenure that the district headquarters was moved from Jacksonville to St. Augustine. It has been a
long-held belief in the Jacksonville District that the move was made
because of an epidemic of yellow fever. However, Black received
orders dated 22 December 1887 to move to St. Augustine. He had
completed his transfer by 14 January 1888, several months before
the yellow fever epidemic in Jacksonville in July 1888.37 The epidemic obviously had no bearing upon the district's change of location.
Moving the district headquarters to St. Augustine and creating
the Southeast Division seemed to be the beginning of a period of
trial and error with respect to the size of the Florida District. In 1898,
First Ueutenant Charles H. McKinstry was ordered to relieve Ueutenant Colonel William H. H. Benyaurd of his duties at Key West.38
Florida was now divided into two districts. The Key West District
consisted of the fortifications at Fort Taylor, as well as the harbor
and entrance improvement projects for the island. Key West did not
15

Maine and New Hampshire." More complex, using the names of the
rivers concerned, was the region covered under "Improvements of
Falls of the Ohio River, of White River, Indiana, of Wabash River,
Indiana and Illinois, and of certain Rivers in Kentucky." Florida's title
was "Improvement of Certain Rivers and Harbors in Florida."42
All of this changed in 1908 when the various regions became
designated by the headquarters' city within the district. Northern
New England became the "Improvement of Rivers and Harbors in
the Portland, Maine, District"; the Falls of the Ohio River became the
"Improvement of Rivers and Harbors in the Louisville, Kentucky,
District"; and Florida became the "Improvement of Rivers and Harbors in the Jacksonville, Florida, District."43 As a result of this new
terminology, Lieutenant Colonel Lansing H. Beach had the distinction of being the first district engineer of the Jacksonville District.
On 3 September 1935, when President Roosevelt set aside the
first construction money for a ship canal across Florida, the Chief of
Engineers was ready with a reorganization to create the Ocala, Florida, District, under Lieutenant Colonel Brehon B. Somervell, to
serve the canal area. After Congress refused a year later to allocate
funds for the canal, the Ocala District was absorbed by the Jacksonville District.44
With the outbreak of conflict in Europe in 1939, the United
States began gearing up its defenses. The first activity to feel the
change was construction. The burden of building, added to the
other tremendous supply problems dumped upon the Quartermaster Corps, was overwhelming. The Corps of Engineers, with a
nationwide engineering organization of trained specialists in construction, found its work dwindling as the nation shifted from peacetime civil river and harbor projects to wartime military tasks. The
answer was to utilize this pool of talent-in-being immediately. In November 1940, all Air Corps construction was shifted to the Corps of
Engineers, relieving the quartermasters of a sizable job and freeing
them to perform their supply functions. This was only the beginning.
A year later, on 1 December 1941, the House of Representatives
passed, and the President signed into law, the transfer of all military
construction and maintenance work of the Army from the Quartermaster Corps to the Corps of Engineers.45
The effect of this law was significant Lieutenant General Brehon B. Somervell wrote that the consolidation of military construction represented "the greatest change of activities of the Corps in its
entire history."46 This massive transfer of engineering projects in all
stages of work, from planning to near-completion, was effected on
16 December 1941, 9 days after Pearl Harbor. Lieutenant General
Eugene Reybold noted that this consolidation of construction activities "had become the first unified command in World War 11."47
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Arecibo Harbor, San Juan Harbor, and Mayaguez Harbor, all in
Puerto Rico. Later, the South Atlantic Division transferred the military construction and maintenance functions of the Panama District
to Jacksonville.49
The district received more overseas territory when Kindley Air
Force Base, Bermuda, was placed under its responsibility on 1 November 1958. This addition was not just a military construction assignment. Harbor improvement dredging operations were also
conducted.5°
The tide of acquisitions turned in 1963 when the Cape
Canaveral space construction works were withdrawn from the Jacksonville District by the creation of the independent Canaveral District. Changes in district functions occurred 30 June 1970 when, in a
consolidation program within the Corps, Jacksonville turned over
all of its military responsibilities to the Mobile District.51 At the same
time, the Bermuda area was transferred to the Navy. The canaveral
District was disestablished in June 1971 , and the Jacksonville District reached its present status.
Today, the Jacksonville District labors in civil areas. Yet, the
earlier days of military tasks, the harbor defenses in the SpanishAmerican War, the massive fortifications in the 1840's and 1850's,
and the Indian wars against the Seminoles, are all part of the warp
and woof of the history of the Jacksonville District Corps of Engineers.
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CHAPTER2

The Territory

of Florida

~3 :304.

WHEN PRESIDENT THOMAS JEFFERSON received the Louisiana Territory from Napoleon in 1803, he immediately sent out survey
teams to study the land so that it might be protected, settled, and
developed. In his Annual Message to Congress in 1806, he clearly
expressed his belief that the nation must develop its roads, rivers,
and canals to promote national economic harmony. 1 The transfer
of Florida to the United States in 1821 placed upon the Corps of
Engineers these same tasks. The first requirement was for a basic
knowledge of the terrain and its inhabitants.
Some prospective settlers perferred to wait for first-hand reports on Florida before embarking upon an enterprise which
would cut them off from the life they knew. Still others, with no
intention of moving, were eager to read about the newly gained
territory and to bask in the glory of the dynamic expanding country
of which they were citizens. The result was a spate of books on
Florida. It was unfortunate that Captain Young's earlier informative
memoir was buried somewhere in the War Department away from
the eyes of an interested public.
In the first two years after the transfer, books about Florida
were published in New York, Philadelphia, and Charleston. Their
lengthy descriptive nineteenth century titles provide the essence of
their contents: James Grant Forbes, Sketches, Historical and
Topographical of the Floridas; William Darby, A Memoir on the
Geography and Natural and Civil History of Florida; and William H.
Simmons, Notices of East Florida with an Account of the Seminole Nation of Indians. Before the decade was over, John Lee Williams and Charles Vignoles added their works to the list of books
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Senate refused to ratify his appointment, he was miffed. He immediately resigned his commission and moved to Florida to start life
anew.
Gadsden remained in the territory for the next 16 years, maintaining continual communication with the Chief of Engineers in
Washington, proposing engineering undertakings,supervising assigned projects, or recommending competent individuals in Florida to act for the Corps. James Gadsden is better known in American history texts for his Mexican activities and for the Gadsden
Purchase than he is for his role in Florida. This is unfortunate, because his services to the Corps of Engineers and the State of Florida are equally deserving of historical notice.4
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While Gadsden was surveying along the east coast, Captain
Isaac Clark, Jr. was in command of a detachment doing the same
task on the west coast. Clark had been ordered to lay out a road
from the Suwannee River south to Cape Sable. He got as far as
Charlotte Harbor before giving up. The captain found the route
almost impassable, reporting that the whole countryside was inundated and crisscrossed with "innumerable streams and bayous."
Although he did find several establishments in Charlotte Harbor
which supported about 50 Spaniards and Indians who fished for
the Havana market, he concluded: "A road through that country
would be, at this time, of little value in a military point of view,...."7
It was over a decade before white men became acquainted
with the interior portion of the southern extremity of Florida, the
Everglades. Even the land in the upper-center of the peninsula was
unknown wilderness. Lieutenant Charles Despinville of the 4th Artillery stationed at Savannah was assigned in 1827 to Joshua A.
Coffee, the commissioner for running the Indian boundary in Florida. While in the field, Despinville became separated from the survey party. The commissioner tried for 3 days to find the lieutenant.
Neither the Indians with the survey group nor those encamped
nearby would aid in the search, even though Coffee offered a $1 0
reward. As time passed, Coffee became more desperate. He kept
raising the reward. On the third day, when it reached $100, 90
warriors turned out to search. The second day of this massive hunt
brought results; two braves returned the lost officer. Mr. Coffee
submitted a claim to Washington for an extra $1 00 to cover the
cost of his reward.s
The territory of Florida was not the only part of the United
States to need the technical engineering services that the Corps of
Engineers could provide. The whole nation was bursting with projects to develop communications systems, open transportation
routes (both roads and canals), and tame rivers- in a few wordsto promote progress! The hue and cry from all parts of the country
was for government participation in these sectional projects; the
local resources were not enough to carry the cost nor supply the
technical talent. Congress reacted in April 1824 to the demand of
its constituents by passing a Rivers and Harbor Act and a Canals
and Road Act which put the Corps of Engineers into the midst of
the nation's expanding civil programs. Henceforth, the Corps performed civil and military tasks with equal facility. The civil features
of West Point's education were so unique and desirable that many
young men accepted appointments to the Military Academy not to
become Army officers, but to become civil engineers.
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commandant of the Corps of Engineers; Major Pierre Charles
L'Enfant, who later laid out the site of Washington, D.C.; Major
Stephen Rochefontaine, who served as commandant of the Corps
of Artillerists and Engineers, and who designed many of the seacoast fortifications.Ia
Long after the Revolutionary War, the idea persisted in American circles that the French trained engineers were outstanding in
their field. Thus, in 1816, when Congress and the Administration
were casting about for a foreign engineer to plan and construct an
up-to-date system of fortifications, the French General Simon
Bernard was chosen. General Lafayette and the American Minister
to France, Albert Gallatin, had highly recommended Bernard to
President Madison.
General Bernard, after graduating from the Ecole Polytechnique, entered the Engineers as a lieutenant in 1797. During 181 012, he designed and built the fortifications at Antwerp. In 1813, as a
colonel, he became the aide-de-camp to Napoleon. He remained
with the Emperor to the end of Napoleon's career.
Simon Bernard was given the pay and courtesy title of brigadier general when he was assigned to the Corps as an assistant
engineer. He sat as a member of the Board of Engineers for F ortifications. With the passage of the Civil Functions Act, Bernard became a member of the Board of Internal Improvements, which
supervised an extensive program to develop the interior communications system of the nation by roads and canals. When Louis
Phillipe became King of France after the July Revolution of 1830,
Generq.l Bernard resigned his position so that he might return to
his homeland. II
By the time Bernard left the United States, the civil functions
of the Corps of Engineers were in full swing, and the greater need
was for civil engineers. The bent for civil engineers in America lessened the influence and the desire for French trained military engineers. Of course, military fortifications were needed still, but, by the
1830's, the Vauban school of military design was understood well
enough by the American engineers that such construction could
be kept under their own control. 12
A year and a half after Congress had acted in 1824, the Niles'
Register, in a plea to increase the Corps of Engineers, eloquently
stated the nation's case. "It is true, there are some distinguished
private engineers in our country, but they are either insufficiently
known, or too limited in their numbers for their talents and services
to be made available in the greater part of the contemplated projects... ." 13
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St. Augustine to await the New York contingent. Huger and Brisbane were met in St. Augustine by another member of the group,
Lieutenant Augustus Canfield, who was stationed there with the
4th Artillery.
Perrault was instructed further to procure additional instruments for his officers in New York, rent one or more vessels for his
project, "observing in all your arrangements the strictest economy
consistent with a proper and faithful execution of your duties," and
to prepare an estimate of the funds necessary for this undertaking.l5
Evidently, either this assignment was not to Perrault's liking or
the preparations were more time consuming than General Macomb in Washington felt was necessary.ln any case, the major was
still in New York in mid-May when he wrote to the Chief Engineer
the reasons for his delay. Macomb's answer was blunt and direct. "I
regret exceedingly to find from it [Perrault's letter] the difficulties
which have retarded your expedition to Florida." However, the
Chief Engineer stressed in strong terms that Major Perrault and his
brigade were to leave New York immediately, "by the first opportunity ... to Charleston, Savannah, St. Mary or St. Augustine or any
other point which may enable you to reach the scene of your intended operations in Florida.'' The general went on to say that if the
sickly season of summer found him inland, he could return to the
healthy places on the coast. While waiting for the fever season to
pass, Perrault was to survey the coasts and harbors. He could not
return north until his task had been completed.16 General
Macomb's letter brought results. Major Perrault left New York at the
end of May 1826.
By July, the brigade had arrived at St. Augustine. Major Perrault divided his group into two parties; the gulf coast detachment
consisted of Lieutenants Swift, Canfield, Smith and Walter Gwyn (a
replacement for Lieutenant Eakin who had fallen ill); the Atlantic
coast group was made up of Major Perrault, Lieutenants Searles,
Huger, Brisbane, and a civilian, Mr. T. Gibbs. (Gadsden had highly
recommended Gibbs to Perrault, stating that he had served as a
surveyor on one of Gadsden's earlier projects and could be useful
in the local area.)
At the beginning of the next year, Major Perrault reported to
the Chief of Engineers that the west coast demi-brigade had informed him that the entrance to the Suwannee River was not satisfactory. Even at high tide the water was no more than 6 or 7 feet
deep. J ust as soon as he could communicate with that group, he
would instruct them to look at Tampa Bay.
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In light of the latter information, it would appear that the Governor was crying wolf in an effort to have the Seminoles removed
from Florida. To fan such fears as the Governor suggested was
dangerous on the frontier. Such were the conditions under which
Major Perrault and his brigade worked.
In the spring of 1827, General Simon Bernard visited Florida
to personally examine the terrain over which Lieutenant Colonel
Perrault (he had been promoted while in the territory) and his brigade had worked. General Bernard's itinerary was exhausting.
Starting on 15 April, he examined the coast from the St. Johns
River to the St. Marys. He then traveled up the St. Marys River on the
route to Apalachicola Bay. He returned to the east coast via the
Suwannee River. The general was back in St. Augustine by 13 May,
preparing to cross the peninsula on the route from the St. Johns
River to Tampa Bay. He arrived in Tampa on the 23rd of the
month. Here, he took passage on the revenue cutter Alabama to
examine the coast from Tampa to New Orleans. 19
When General Bernard returned to Washington, he called
upon President John Q. Adams to report his findings. Bernard
believed that a ship canal across Florida was impracti~able. The
most that could be done would be to construct a canal 6 feet deep
for steamboats and the final result did not justify the expense and
effort. He did recommend a canal between Mobile and Pensacola.
Later, Bernard also recommended the practicality of a canal from
St. Marys to the St. Johns as part of the contemplated inland waterway along the Atlantic coast.2o
In 1828, the first project for constructing an intracoastal waterway was adopted by Congress in the River and Harbor Act of 23
May. Appropriations were made for enlarging the water system
between Mobile Bay and the Mississippi Sound on the gulf coast,
and from the Cumberland Sound to the St. Johns on the Atlantic
coast. The Florida undertaking lasted from 1828 to 1838, and was
revived from 1874 to 1880. A later design to improve the mouth of
the St. Johns River so changed the local transportation conditions,
fuat fue Cumberland Sound- St. Johns River scheme was terminated in December 1880. Work on the waterway has been programmed several times in the twentieth century. The first Florida
project was given to James Gadsden.
Gadsden parceled the work out to local contractors. A year
later, he wrote to the Chief Engineer, Colonel Charles Gratiot, to tell
him fuat fue canal cut near the Amelia narrows was completed;
however, his contract with Zephariah Kingsley had been delayed.
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Not all the work of the Corps was directed to improving transportation systems that would encourage settlement. Even in the
early nineteenth century there was concern with historical preservation. The Castillo de San Marcos, renamed Fort Marion by the
Americans, was constructed by the Spanish between 1672 and
1695. It is the oldest masonry fort in the United States today. The
Castillo was in good repair, serving as a garrison for Spanish
troops at the time of cession. Extending from the fort to the barracks of St. Francis was a sea wall of stone designed to preserve
both the town and the fort from the ravages of the sea. Shortly after
the Americans moved into St. Augustine, some unthinking governmental offical removed a portion of the wall, using the stones to
construct a wharf leading to the barracks. This destruction of part
of the sea wall had grave consequences; the foundation began
eroding away from under the Castillo.
In the fall of 1834, St. Augustine was subjected to severe
northeast gales accompanied by high water. The pounding of the
sea led to a rapid deterioration beneath the castle. The storm
brought fears for the safety of this magnificent edifice to many of
the citizens. The town fathers approached the resident engineer,
First Lieutenant Francis L. Dancy, with a plea for aid. Dancy wrote
to General Charles Gratiot, stating that "should the government
cause a few thousand dollars to be judiciously expended on it, it
would remain for ages a monument, and not an unworthy one, of
the Spanish Nation, by whom it was erected, and a memento of
events more memorable in the history of our country."26 Funds
were forthcoming and the Castillo was saved.
Over on the west coast along the Apalachicola, St. Marks, and
Ocklockonee Rivers, the Corps of Engineers also had navigational
designs. Today, these rivers are in the Mobile District; however,
during the early years when district boundaries were forming, they
were under Jacksonville's control. In addition, their navigational
improvements demonstrate the frontier working conditions under
which the Corps had to contend throughout the territorial days. As
on the east coast, the tasks were performed by both engineer officers and civilians.
The first appropriation was made to clear the Apalachicola
River. David B. Macomb, a civilian, was given the contract. Macomb decided to use two flats, about 50 or 60 feet long, joined
parallel, with Spanish Windlasses placed on them. This equipment
was constructed at the junction of the Flint and Chattahoochee
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his expenses. Colonel Gratiot had to ask Macomb to send more
detailed estimates of expenses on more than one occasion.
The Chief Engineer, who began casting about for some competent person to replace David Macomb, thought of James Gadsden. Colonel Gratiot wrote Gadsden in April 1829 asking him to
take over the St. Marks project. Gadsden declined. In August, Gratiot wrote again, this time sweetening the offer by telling Gadsden
he would have to be an overseer only; he would not be expected to
work in the field. He also suggested that "perhaps the dredging
machine which has been used in deepening the Channel at Mobile
might be procured on very low terms if there is no further use for
it." 31 Gadsden still refused to accept the assignment.
Finally, in February 1830, Macomb was notified that his services were terminated because of his failure to settle his accounts.
GabrielJ. Floyd was given the Apalachicola contract; Jesse H. Willis, the collector at St. Marks, was assigned the St. Marks job.32
Gabriel Floyd lasted one year. Joseph White, Florida Territorial Delegate to Congress, recommended the replacement of
Floyd because he was not a trained engineer. White also submitted
to the Chief Engineer several letters critical of Floyd written by
other Floridians.
Floyd, informed of these proceedings, wrote to the Chief Engineer asking to be kept on his appointment. When this had no
effect, he wrote to the President claiming that White had done this
to him solely on account of his ''adverse vote in the election of [the]
Delegate. "33 Regardless of this counter charge, Second Lieutenant
George W. Long, 4th Artillery, who was on engineering duty at Fort
Jackson, New Orleans, was sent to replace Gabriel Floyd as agent
at Apalachicola on 29 March 1831.
In November 1831, First Lieutenant Long (who had been prom?~ed that September) and Mr. Willis were placed under Captain
Wilham H. Chase, Corps of Engineers. Chase was in charge of
constructing Fort Pickens at Pensacola with the designation of
Commanding Engineer of the Gulf of Mexico.34
First Lieutenant Long's new duties were to be long and busy.
He remained in Florida until he resigned his commission in December 1835. Long's tenure with the Corps in Florida in many
respects epitomizes the experiences of engineers of that day. His
tasks were varied, he had to improvise, and he was drawn into the
private sector because of his engineering skills.
. The first task Long undertook was to continue the excavating
which had been commenced by Gabriel Floyd. He kept his crew
on the job from July through late August until heavy rains caused
the river to rise and effectively stopped all such work. Long then
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readied their load, the wheel and axle was employed, which raised
the diving rig high enough in the ship's well for a platform to be slid
under the bell to remove the stone in the grapple. Then the whole
performance would be repeated.37
Long reported that his bell was a powerful engine with which
to tear up rock from the river bed. Rocks up to 2 tons had been
lifted with greater ease than if they had been taken from a dry
quarry because of the buoyancy of the bell, combined with the
power derived from wheel, axle, and pulleys. He strongly urged the
Chief of Engineers to give serious consideration to employing his
bell on other river tasks.3B
Long went on to say that he had been informed that the Chipola River was to be improved. He was well acquainted with that
river. There was a section of 3 or 4 miles through a cypress swamp
containing large trees in the water. He recommended that the trees
by felled at low water, cut close to the surface, then his dMng bell
could be sunk over the stumps and "a ready means will be had to
accomplish the work of cutting the stumps out of the way-."39
The major difficulty Long encountered while working on the
Apalachicola was with his laborers. In September 1833, a crew of
Negroes rebelled against their overseer, attacked and nearly killed
the man. The entire group then deserted the job and fled to the
sanctuary of the wilderness, undoubtedly to join the blacks living in
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promote a railroad from Tallahassee to St. Marks. In justifying his
acceptance of this work, he wrote the Chief Engineer that this project was of first importance to the territory, and that the expense of
getting an engineer from the north would be prohibitive for the
promoters.42
The Tallahassee-St. Marks Railroad brought forth these comments from Comte de Castelnau when he visited middle Florida in
1837-38: "Certainly [it is] the very worst that has yet been built in
the entire world." Yet, he went on to say that it was a very useful
road for "it would be almost impossible to take a heavy load of
cotton across the sand that covers the country to the south, into
which horses sink at every step." He reported that the train consisted of two mules pulling carts along the tracks and it took about
7 hours to cover the 23-mile route. Several times the company had
tried to put a locomotive on the tracks, but the roadbed construction was so poor that the company gave up on the plan.
Was it really the world's worst railroad? The Comte' s concluding remarks demonstrate otherwise. The Frenchman expressed

Tallahassee Railroad
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The Military Frontier
IN THE FIRST HALF of the nineteenth century, the Corps of Engineers prepared defenses and fought in three Indian wars in Florida.
The relatively minor engagements of the First Seminole War have
been recorded in an earlier chapter. The two remaining frontier
conflicts (the Second Seminole War, 1835-42 and the Third Seminole War, 1856-57) called upon the services of the Corps of Topographical Engineers. Between the Second Seminole War and the
Civil War, the Corps of Engineers was busy erecting fortifications
around the perimeter of the state to bolster the defenses of the
nation's sea frontier.
In both men and material, the Second Seminole War was the
longest, most costly Indian war fought by the United States. It was
brought about as, a direct result of Congress' "Indian Removal
Act," passed in 1830. Under the act, most American Indians east of
the Mississippi River were to be moved west of the river to curb
frontier conflicts between the white and red men.
Prior to the Indian Removal Act, the United States Army had
set up frontier outposts in Florida. In 1823, just 2 years after Florida
became an American territory, James Gadsden was sent to
Tampa Bay to select the site for a post. Fort Brooke was named for
Colonel George M. Brooke, the commander of the troops who had
responsibility for the actual construction. Soon there were several
such military camps scattered throughout the territory, including
Fort King.
These posts were designed to protect the military from the
Indians, who employed unsophisticated weapons. The frontier
forts were generally temporary, rude log structures for quartering
troops. They might be more properly considered cantonments
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after the commencement of the War of 1812. Then Congress created topographical officers in 1813; they were mustered out in
1815 when the war ended. The next year the Topographical Corps
became part of the general staff. In 1818, the Topographical Corps
was placed under the Corps of Engineers where it remained until
1838.ln 1838, it became an independent Corps and was assigned
the functions of surveying roads, canals, lakes, rivers, and harbors.
It was finally merged with the Corps of Engineers in 1863. Thus,
during part of the Second Seminole War, the Topographical
Corps was in existence supplying officers to map the unknown
terrain of Florida.l
Very early in the war, General Abraham Eustis sent scouting
detachments ahead of his main column. One such party consisted
of Colonel James Gadsden, Captain Augustus Canfield (both from
the Corps of Engineers), Captain John T. Sprague, and Lieutenant
J oseph E. Johnston, with 17 men, who were sent "in a miserable
little steamer" to explore the St. Johns River as far as Lake Monroe.2 When the Topographical Corps became a separate unit in
1838, both Canfield and Johnston became topographical engineers. These officers undoubtedly prepared field maps for General
Eustis.
Lieutenant Joseph E. Johnston's case was unusual. A year
after that scouting mission, Johnston resigned his Army commission on 31 May 1837. Later, while waiting for a reappointment, he
volunteered to serve in Florida as a civilian.ln the fall of that year, he
was attached to a unit commanded by Lieutenant Levin M. Powell
of the United States Navy.
Powell had earlier suggested to the Secretary of War that a
specially formed amphibious force, composed of both soldiers
and sailors, might be able to penetrate the watery refuge of the
Seminoles who were hiding in the Everglades. Secretary of War
Joel L. Poinsett accepted the Navy Lieutenant's suggestion and
preparations were made for the unit to enter the Everglades in
December 1837. Powell's command consisted ofthree naval officers, 100 sailors, Lieutenant Henry W. Fowler with Company I, 1st
Artillery, and Joseph E. Johnston, who was the group's civilian
topographical engineer.
Early in January, the group had a sharp engagement with
Indians at the headwaters of Jupiter River. Lieutenant Fowler was
wounded during the fight while the Americans were attempting to
retreat to their boats. Johnston took command of the soldiers,
rallying the waverers and directing the rearguard so successfully
that the unit was saved from almost certain destruction. Lieutenant
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or child. Out of these funds Blake had to pay all expenses, including gifts, bribes, and travel costs to move the Indians. Blake succeeded in shipping 36 Seminoles west. With the failure of his mission in 1852, Blake angrily commented that if the Government
would shut off the supply of powder to the Indians, and harass the
red men by running surveys through their lands, they might be
inclined to move.7
The surveyor general of Florida, John Westcott, proposed
this same policy in his report of 1853, declaring "a gradual and
easy approach by survey, and settlements from the present surveyed lands, would ... soon accomplish peacefully and economically the object so most desired."8 It is difficult to accurately pinpoint whether the invasion by surveyors was the brainchild of Blake
or Westcott.
Captain John C. Casey, the Indian agent who succeeded
Blake, presented the plan which was executed. It was similar to the
suggestions of Blake and Westcott, but the timing was more complex. First, Casey proposed to send surveyors out to study the land
between the Kissimmee, Lake Okeechobee, and Fort Myers. Then
he wanted roads opened in that region. Casey insisted that during
this period there must be many units moving about and scouting
on the roads, in boats, and in the swamp.
Meanwhile, all trade with the Seminoles must stop, especially
that of gun powder. After 18 months of this form of blockade,
Casey reasoned that the Indians would be low on powder. That was
the time, he suggested, to send surveyors into the heart of their
land - the Big Cypress Swamp. This would probably lead to a
violent reaction on the part of the red man, but so what? With little
or no powder, the conflict should be short and one-sided.9
Secretary of War Jefferson Davis accepted Casey's plan. (It's
possible that Davis had his own reasons for accepting the plan. He
was known to favor expanding the control of the United States into
the West Indies to secure more slave-holding states for the country
and, if so, south Florida, well settled with slave owners, would have
been a good jumping-off place.) For whatever reasons, the plan
was approved and, by the end of the year, reconnaissance groups
were sent out into Indian territory.
Lieutenant George L. Hartsuff, 2nd Artillery, was appointed a
topographical engineer on 22 January 1855 and was assigned to
lead a survey party in the vicinity of Big Cypress Swamp in the
Everglades. Colonel Harvey Brown requested that Hartsuff gather
detailed information which would be used by later groups sent out
to cut roads and build forts in the region. The lieutenant was instructed to note the value of the land and its capability of supporting a civilized population.
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W. Gunnison of the Topographical Engineers, and Lieutenant
George Hartsuff, while working for the Topographical Corps in
1855. 15
Although the engineering functions were divided between the
two corps so that the topographical engineers did most of the surveying, there was still much work for the Corps of Engineers, now
concerned almost exclusively with military fortifications. The international situation seemed to Americans to demand strong defenses. The 1830's and 1840's were turbulent years in the life of
the country. The Indian War in Florida did not hold center stage in
the national news.
In 1836, the Texans were struggling for their independence
from Mexico. After the Lone Star Republic was established, there
were Texans interested in joining the United States, but, when
President Jackson refused this overture, some of them began to
court England. Whether this was done sincerely or just to prod the
United States, it nevertheless posed the threat of having England
encircle the country.
Then the Pastry War (Guerra de los Pasteles) broke out in
1838 between Mexico and France. The French Minister asked for
his papers on 20 Apri11838. Before the month was out the French
fleet arrived in the Gulf of Mexico to blockade the Mexicans. A small
number of French troops landed and remained in the country for 2
weeks. 16 lt was a_minor international incident, but it demonstrated
to the Americans the ease with which foreign navies could sail into
the Gulf of Mexico where the southern states and the Mississippi
River lay unprotected.
James ~· Polk was elected to the Presidency in the fall of
1844. His term of office, 1845-49, is considered one of the more
active periods in the expression of American manifest destiny.
During Polk's tenure, the nation confronted Great Britain over the
Oregon question, and engaged Mexico in a war which added
present-day New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, Utah, and California to
the United States. The nation was expanding westward, and the
Corps of Engineers had to create the fortifications necessary to
protect the southern flank. On the Florida peninsula, this resulted
in Fort Clinch on Amelia Island in the northeast, and Forts Jefferson and Taylor in the south. On the western panhandle Fort Pickens in Pensacola Bay was already standing guard. During the first
months of 1849, Polk's last year in office, a board of engineers,
with Captain Robert E. Lee as recorder, examined the general system of defense along the Florida coast.t7
In the fall of 1844 Captain John G. Barnard, Corps of Engineers, was sent to the Florida Keys to survey sites for the proposed
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Bricks were another item often in short supply. Dutton's
prime contractors were in Mobile and Pensacola and he used New
York and New Orleans as secondary suppliers. When Captain
Scarritt arrived to assume command, Dutton was in the midst of
one of his periodic shortages. He had no bricks for the masons to
turn the arches in the first tier.
Most of his artisans and mechanics were recent immigrants
from Ireland and Germany. Captain Dutton employed a New York
agency to keep recruiting these newly arrived craftsmen, none of
whom were acclimated to the climate at Key West. Of course, New
York was not the only entrepot for laborers. In 1856, Major John
Sanders signed an agreement with Baker and Stetson of Philadelphia to transport 100 passengers for the Corps to Key West. The
steamship Henry B. Beach was to have berthing spaces, erected
between decks forward of the engine room, for 70 laborers after
the regular ship's stateroom lodgings were exhausted. The shipping agents stipulated that extra tables would be built, and a "privy
placed on the side of the ship for the accommodations of the forward passengers."1s
William Land of Key West agreed to board Captain Dutton's
workmen at the following rates: mechanics at $14 per month, laborers at $12 per month, and slaves or black laborers at $7 per
month. Dutton had to furnish fixtures for all quarters and provide
fuel. 19
Most of the backbreaking tasks were accomplished by local
slaves, rented to the Government by their owners, and by a few free
blacks. In 1845 John Saville, a free black living in Key West, appointed Benjamin Sawyer, a Key West merchant, his guardian for
1 year so that he might be employed on the works at Fort Taylor.20
Two years later, L. D. Rogers of Key West gave written permission
for his slave Hector to work for the Corps of Engineers as a carpenter.21 These are just two examples of some of the business forms
used when employing laborers.
Stephen R. Mallory, who became Secretary of the Navy in the
Confederate States of America, was quite involved in supplying
slaves for the Fort Taylor project. In 1848 he complained to Captain Dutton that one of the white men working for the Corps had
physically assaulted his slave Mat, while Mat was on the job. The
assailant was not in a position of authority over Mat, and Mallory
accepted Mat's account of the affair because, "I have owned him
about fifteen years and have never had occasion to lay my hand
upon him."22 Three years later, Mallory transferred 14 slaves to
Fernando J. Moreno who was to act as their agent in dealings with
the Corps. Mallory had given the blacks to his wife Angela, and
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Lieutenant Hunt sought near and far for good laborers, but his
search for slave labor away from Key West brought a complaint
from Florida Senator Stephen R. Mallory. The senator objected to
the Lieutenant hiring slaves from the mainland and voiced his objection to the Secretary of War. Actually at fault were the slave
owners of Key West, including the senator, who were preying upon
the local labor shortage to raise their rates above what Lieutenant
Hunt was willing to pay. But, the senator's influence soon was felt
and Hunt was told to give preference to the local labor market.
Two years under Hunt brought exceptional results in the erection of Fort Taylor. The second tier of the seaward curtains was
completed, the soldier's quarters roofed, the parapet in place
around the fort, and many lesser works finished. While it was far
from complete, enough had been done to garrison Fort Taylor if
an emergency arose, and war clouds were gathering over the
United States.25
Although both the sites ofFort Taylor and Fort Jefferson were
selected by Captain Bernard in 1844, a later time schedule for
construction was set for Fort Jefferson on Tortugas. Chief Engineer Totten selected Lieutenant Montgomery C. Meigs to draw up
the plans for Fort Jefferson, which was to be a major military edifice among the nation's defensive fortifications. It was to be a sixsided, three-tiered, fort, mounting 250 guns and housing a wartime complement of 1,500 men.

Fort Jefferson, the
largest masonry fort
ever built in the United
States, as sketched by a
member of the garrison
in 1860. This drawing
appeared in Harper's
Weekly on February 23,
1861.
Courtesy National
Archives.
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On 5 September 1853 Lieutenant Wright reported the continued subsidence of his table. General Totten sent a lengthy reply
describing how to convert the pier foundation t~ a grill~ge b~seP
When Wright's job was completed, Captain Dame! Phmeas
Woodbury relieved him to erect the walls of the fort. This nev: sta~e
of construction called for the erection of 50-foot walls, which Included hundreds of gunrooms with numerous brick arches. Captain Woodbury was an authority on the arch. He had published an
engineering treatise, Sustaining Walls, in 1845, which had a second edition in 1854. When he arrived on Garden Key, his second
manuscript, Elements ofStability in the Well-ProportionedArch,
was at the publishers.2s
Captain Woodbury was succeeded in 1860 by Captain Montgomery Meigs, who had originally laid out the plans for Fort Jefferson. In the fall of 1860, Meigs, while stationed in Washington, D.C.,
had disagreements with several contractors over their contracts.
Secretary of War John B. Floyd, more vulnerable to pressures of
this nature than the captain, banished Meigs to Tortugas. When
Floyd resigned shortly thereafter, Meigs was ~ecalled fr~m exile to
return to his work on the aqueduct at Washmgton. Meigs served
during most of the Civil War as the Quartermaster-General of the
Army where he amassed an enviable record. 29
The war may have disrupted the building program of Fort
Jefferson but it did not retard the subsidence. By 20 July 1863,
headquarters ordered extensive experimental boring and piledriving to be undertaken on nearby Bird Key to locate once and for all,
the elusive bedrock.
The task was begun 24 February 1864 by First Lieutenant
A. H. Holgate. His completion report of 3 May 1864 must have
been an eye-opener. 'There is no solid rock within t?irty feet o~ t~e
surface of the island, and in all probability there IS none w1thm
reach of the longest pile we could procure." Holgate found that the
top layer of sand, down about 18 feet, was firmer than the lower
stratum. He noted that the water channels which criss-crossed the
Tortugas shoal, or bank, varied in depth from 40 to 80 feet and he
concluded that "it may not be unreasonable to suppose, therefore,
that we must penetrate at least to this depth before reaching anything like solid rock." The lieutenant continued: 'The patches of
rock visible at the waters edge on East Key, Loggerhead and elsewhere, and which formerly gave support to an underlying rock are
pretty well proved to be a mere concretion - sand, shells and cor~!
hardened by the action of the waves." F ortJefferson was a castle m
the sand.30
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War and Defense
THE REMAINING DECADES of the nineteenth century were bracketed by the Civil War from 1861 to 1865, and the SpanishAmerican War of 1898. These two conflicts brought dramatic
changes to the engineer's concept of military defense. The former
war saw the demise of brick and mortar harbor fortifications employing smooth-bore guns, while the latter introduced highpowered rifled guns and electrical mine fields to defend the
nation's ports. Both the old and new military installations were to
be found in Florida.
When the Civil War broke out, there were four Federal forts in
the south still in Union hands; Sumter in South Carolina, and Pickens, Jefferson, and Taylor, all in Florida. Fort Sumter, where the
opening shot of the war took place, fell after substantial bombardment. Pickens resisted several assaults and remained under
Northern control throughout the war. Neither Jefferson nor Taylor
were threatened. All three Florida forts remained in the hands of
the Federal Government.
Similar to the Second Seminole War, the Civil War in Florida
did not provide the Corps of Engineers with an opportunity to undertake engineering projects of any note as a part of the war effort.
Yet, once again, engineer officers served during the war in various
military capacities. The actual fighting in Florida was minor. Only
the engagement at Olustee can be properly called a battle. Still,
actions in Florida were part of the overall conduct of the war. A brief
overview will suffice to place the proper perspective upon Florida's
role in the conflict.
Even before the Florida legislature signed the Ordinance of
Secession on 10 January 1861, Governor Madison S. Perry had
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to the west. In September, fatigue parties deepened the ditches
around Jacksonville to 12-foot depths and erected palisades in
them. Their labor also included clearing away the timber near the
works to provide clear fields for observation.
The engineers repaired the docks at Magnolia, south of Jacksonville, during the month of July, in anticipation of an advance
post being established there. Troops occupied Magnolia in August
while the engineers were busy building a temporary fort. September was spent placing entrenchments around the Magnolia post.
Then, on 4 November, Magnolia was evacuated and the fort destroyed.
In March 1865, the engineers erected a large blockhouse on
the St. Augustine Road, 13 miles from Jacksonville, for the safety
and security of couriers traveling between the two towns. Major
Charles R. Suter's terse report on the Florida engineers recorded
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group recruited by Daniels became the United States Second Florida Cavalry (Union), made up of Florida men loyal to the North.
The Navy blockaders also had established contact with disaffected bands of Floridians hiding out in the swamps on the west
coast of Florida around the F enholloway River. The Sailors were
providing these groups with arms and necessary supplies. On several occasions the blockaders joined forces with the Floridians to
strike at railroad bridges, disrupting Confederate communications.2
General Woodbury decided to recruit these men for his Second Florida Cavalry. In March 1864, he sent four of his refugee
soldiers to the USS Tahoma which was on blockade duty off the
coast and in communication with the disaffected bands. A week
later Woodbury visited the Tahoma. The Naval officers took the
general and his party ashore to talk with the Floridians. Woodbury
spent 2 days at the refugees' camp in Confederate Florida, laying
the groundwork for these men to enlist in the Union forces. Woodbury was successful, and the following month, many of these men
shipped over for his refugee unit.3
The Second Florida Cavalry operated along the west coast of
the state, engaging in many minor skirmishes, all of which added
to the burden of defense for the Confederacy. Unfortunately for
General Woodbury, shortly after his refugee unit was formed, he
contracted yellow fever and died at Key West on 15 August 1864.4
His command was taken over by another engineer, Brigadier General John Newton.
The last major skirmish executed in Florida was the work of
General Newton and Rear Admiral C. R. Stribling (who had become commander of the East Gulf Blockading Squadron).lt was a
joint operation, involving 16 ships and about a thousand troops.
The soliders were to land near St. Marks' lighthouse and move
inland to Newport. The Navy was to steam up the St. Marks River to
disembark 600 sailors at Old Port Leon to protect the Army's left
flank. The ultimate objective was the capital at Tallahassee, but,
between the planning and the execution, many things went wrong.
Fog delayed troop landings after the advanced parties had been
sent ashore. The Navy vessels grounded before reaching their objective, and the Florida forces waiting for the Union troops at Natural Bridge were able to stop General Newton's advance. Thus, in
the last days of the war, Floridians celebrated the victory of the
Battle of Natural Bridge, but, before a month had passed, General
Robert E. Lee surrendered and the Civil War ended.5
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By 1867, the number of prisoners at Fort Jefferson was less
than fifty. Four companies of the 5th Artillery were all that was left.
The hurricane of 1874 was the final blow; the troops were withdrawn. The fort's commandant wrote, 'There is not the slightest
probability in my opinion of this fortification being completed
within the next fifty years."a Yet, the engineer force continued to
clean up after the havoc created by the hurricane.
The end of Fort Jefferson, as a mighty brick and mortar fort
important in the military world of static defense, came at the hands
of the man who had created it. Old George Phillips, the master mason who had come ashore on a sandy key 37 years before with
Lieutenant Horatio Wright to commence work, returned to Fort Jefferson in 1883 to pack up the last of the still usable engineering
equipment.
But, the problem of determining the proper defense against
the improved weaponry remained. In the same year that George
Phillips closed Fort Jefferson, President Chester A. Arthur initiated a
modest but widespread military reform throughout the nation's
armed services. In his annual message, President Arthur outlined
what became the first stirrings of this reform.9
The nation's military leaders were seeking answers to the
changing technology. General Emory Upton had completed his
seminal manuscript 'The Military Policy of the United States" in
1880. Although it was not formally published until 1904, it was
widely circulated among the military planners. Captain Alfred
Thayer Mahan, USN, published his most influential book, The Influence ofSea Power Upon History, 1660-1783, in 1890. Bracketed
by these two stellar military and naval critiques, based upon the
study of history, was the report of the Endicott Board, which the
Cleveland administration had set up as a continuation of the military
reforms of the Arthur presidency.
In 1886, the Endicott Board called for sweeping changes to
defend the nation's shores: hundreds of batteries of both heavy and
light ordnance to be installed; searchlights set up to illuminate harbors; an elaborate plan for mining restricted waterways ordered; and
the building of torpedo boats to defeat the enemy's attempt to clear
out mine fields. Of course, the Board realized that it was neither
feasible nor practicable to completely defend the whole coast, but it
did list 11 crucial ports and bays, none of them in Florida.1o
On 29 March 1887, the Corps was instructed to prepare plans
for the defense of the 11 ports and bays. By 30 June 1894, the task
had been completed and new locations were added to the list, including Key West. These military projects settled upon artillery and
mines for protection, under the maxim that "Heavy batteries and
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and a fort keeper. Fort Jefferson was under the Marine Hospital
SeiVice as a quarantine station. The woodwork was decayed in both
installations. In conclusion, Colonel Benyaurd said, "Large sums
could be expended on both advantageously."I4
Some money was forthcoming from Congress for defense,
and with these funds Fort Taylor was cut down to one tier to lower its
profile and to strengthen its structure so that it might accommodate
the new 12-inch disappearing guns. The south curtain was filled in
with concrete. Into the concrete were dumped the old columbiads,
howitzers, and parrott rifles of the 1860's. The offensive weapons of
another age were now strength supports for the new-age defense.
Just as the physical objects of war were changing roles, so too
the tenor of American military thought was in a state of transition at
the time of the Spanish-American War. This conflict projected the
United States onto the world stage as a major power. The war itself
was a brief, minor affair more noted in American circles for the
inadequacies it pointed up in the military organization. The Quartermaster Corps, which had charge of all Army procurement, as well as
the construction of camps and posts, was subject to the most criticism. The Corps of Engineers had military responsibility for building
forts and gun emplacements at home, and laying out entrenchments, military roads, and bridges in the field. Of all the branches of
the Army, the Corps of Engineers was least criticized for its role in
the Spanish-American War.
Captain Charles H. McKinstry assumed command of the new
Key West District 1 February 1898, just 2 weeks before the sinking
of the United States battleship Maine in Havana Harbor. When the
USS Nashville brought a captured Spanish merchantman into Key
West, McKinstry wired the Chief Engineer for permission to plant his
defensive mine fields, to protect the nation's southernmost harbor
from possible Spanish attack.
McKinstry soon discovered that his mines were defective, but
he continued using them because "There was reason to apprehend
that an attack on the place if made at all would be made at once.... It
was therefore determined to proceed with the planting, relying on
'moral [sic] effect to prevent an attack, and on judgement firing if an
attack should be made."Is
All along the seaboard, the citizenry was alarmed at the prospect of war, fearing a naval attack. Insistent demands were sent to
Washington for protection. Nowhere were the demands more insistent than in Florida. Before the war ended, the mouth of the St.
Johns River, St. Augustine, Miami, and Tampa Bay, as well as Key
West, had temporary batteries constructed or under construction,
and mines were planted in the St. Johns, Miami, and Key West waters.
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town, served by a single track railroad, added immeasurably to the
confusion. Money became plentiful for defense, but the engineers
were competing with the other branches of the Army for the limited
railroad space, warehouse construction, laborers, and all of the
other requirements needed to wage a war or defend a state. On 19
April 1898, Colonel Benyaurd was ordered to give all of his tasks to
subordinates, move to Tampa, and take personal charge of the situation there.
Tampa was a boom town. The local labor market had been
drawn off for other works. Benyaurd had to recruit men from Jacksonville, Mobile, and New Orleans. In spite of ample funds, outside
labor, and much pressure from the Chief Engineer, Benyaurd reported that no work on the construction of the batteries had been
made by the end of 1898 because needed material had not arrived,
due to the congestion of the railroad facilities at Tampa. The concentration of troops and Army supplies destined for the embarkation of the expedition to Cuba, swamped the limited storage and
transportation systems in the area. The colonel complained that "it
was in some cases impossible to get material for two weeks after its
arrival in Tampa."J9 Local military defensive needs were submerged
beneath the avalanche of preparations for the overseas endeavor. ·
The work of the Corps of Engineers in Florida during the Spanish-American War was psychological, but the action of bringing
guns to hurriedly constructed sites had a calming effect upon the
civilians. For example, in Jacksonville, when the Florida Times Union and Citizen reported the arrival of the gun carriages and guns at
the railway station, the news drew a number of people to the depot
to view "the mighty machine(s)" 20
The Spanish-American War brought many inadequacies of
the American Army to public notice. Secretary of War, Russell Alger
left office under intense national criticism. In 1899, President McKinley prevailed upon Elihu Root to become Secretary of War. Root was
a New York corporation lawyer, not a military man, but he soon
became well versed in the military institution he had been assigned
to direct. He discovered it was creaky and moss-grown in organization, thinking, and training. There was a need for reform, and Elihu
Root took the lead. Under his guidance, a whole series of enactments changed the Army: the creation of "the Army War College; a
Chief of Staff and the general staff system; the replacement of the
Militia Act of 1792 with the Dick Act of 1903, recognizing the National Guard as the 'organized militia' and bringing it into a more
effective relationship with the Regular Army; improved promotion
and training systems; and an Army-Navy Joint Board, ancestor of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff."2J
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To The Sea
FINDING THE SHIFTING CHANNEL through the bar at the mouth of the
St. Johns River was at times as difficult as passing through the eye of
a needle. The many St. Johns River improvement projects to allow
navigation from Jacksonville to the ocean, were among the more
complex and time-consuming undertakings of the Corps of Engineers in Florida. It was because of these two attributes that, when the
district office concept developed within the Corps, it was located in
Jacksonville.
The first man to seriously study the problem of the moving
channel of the St. Johns was Dr. Abel Seymour Baldwin. Typical of
that day, his profession resulted in his traveling up and down the
valley of the St. Johns River by boat as well as by horseback. Dr.
Baldwin became acquainted with the people living along the river.
He also became familiar with the treacherousness of the St. Johns
bar, which restricted access to the valley to small coastal vessels,
thus limiting the growth of the town of Jacksonville and the region.
Dr. Baldwin became fascinated by this problem of the shifting channel. Why didn't the river bed remain in one place?
From 1850 to 1852, Dr. Baldwin studied the mouth of the St.
Johns River. He held long conversations with people who knew the
river from years of working on and living by the St. Johns. From all
of this study, he concluded that the Fort George Inlet was the culprit
Normally, the sediment, carried down a river by the current, fans out
and settles when the river flows into the ocean where its current is
diffused in the larger body of water. This is part of the creation of
shoal waters about the mouth of a river. However, the main current
from the river, continuing its force longer, has the effect of cutting
through the shoal grounds, creating the channel of the river bed.
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All of these phenomena added to the risks a merchantman
encountered using the St. Johns River. Smaller ships, which were
safe enough in draft, often were too light to be seaworthy in the
Atlantic, especially during the fall hurricane season; large ocean vessels might stand off the bar for days or weeks waiting to enter the
river. Once over the bar, the route to Jacksonville was relatively easy.
With added cargo, the ship might have to wait once again for
enough water to exit the St. Johns. Jacksonville, as a seaport, was a
poor competitor for Fernandina and Savannah, even though it drew
upon the tremendous resources of the St. Johns valley.
The early solution to the shifting channel, and the one promoted by the people on Amelia Island, was to use the deep water
harbor of Femandina. Small coastal steamers could steam from
Jacksonville to Fernandina, by either the protected intracoastal waterway or the outer oceanway, where the goods could be transferred
to the large vessels for destination any place bordering the world's
seas. This was not acceptable, however, to the citizens of Jacksonville, who dreamed of opening the St. Johns River so that their own
city might engage in world trade.
Dr. Abel Baldwin presented his answer to the shifting channel
of the St. Johns River to his fellow citizens in 1852: Close up the Fort
George Inlet. Dr. Baldwin reasoned that the waters of Fort George
River would then be added to those of the St. Johns. Two effects
would result; the elimination of the cross-current over the shoal
ground, and the strengthening of the main flow of the St. Johns
River, which would aid in the creation and deepening of the cut
across the shoal grounds. The logic of his observations resulted in
the town voting to send Baldwin to Washington, D.C., to present his
proposal before Congress to seek Federal aid.
At first, everything went as planned. Florida representatives in
the House presented the doctor's views to Congress, and they received permission to have Dr. Baldwin explain his project to the
engineers of the Topographical Bureau. The bureau accepted and
approved the doctor's plan with a recommendation to Congress to
appropriate money so that it might carry out the plan. Congress
provided the funds in two separate bills of $10,000 each.
Unfortunately for Dr. Baldwin, Congress failed to pass a bill for
fortifications that session; therefore, the funds appropriated in the
Ughthouse Bill and River and Harbor Bill were divided between the
Corps of Engineers and the Topographical Corps. This resulted in
works on the Atlantic being assigned to the Corps of Engineers,
while the Topographical Corps received projects on the Great Lakes
and western rivers. Dr. Baldwin had to start over again with the
Corps of Engineers.

71

~ers, Dr. Baldwin relates:

ry Bureau, General Totposition of my plan, but
1ing the work in various
~rs to listen to me. I was
or confer with the engi•laced."4 The doctor left
s.
·ight arrived in Jacksonstudy plans for the imwas the beginning of a
Corps which was to last
mt Wright informed the
ess were paying for the
According to his inter)posal and the monies
~t. The protest was to no
ed the construction of a
hannel, Dr. Baldwin was
was out to destroy his
Jove the limit Congress
er, the doctor was sure
•remise. It would project
1e pier ended, the same
~re to act as always. He
; in his comments about
His [Baldwin's] project is
required for its accomn its success most sanhim." Wright went on to
:rs both on the north and
one as being most neepulation for Dr. Baldwin
; proposed by the doctor
refer the problem to a
:1ptain, a captain and two
tnd a civilian. Ueutenant
1 the commission. The
)ft subscribed to by the
:1tement signed by Dr.

The formal hearing did not end Dr. Baldwin's fight with the
Corps. In 1857, he obtained another examination of the mouth and
bar of the St. Johns, this time under the direction of Ueutenant
Stephen D. Trenchard, USN, who was serving with the Coast Survey
service. Dr. Baldwin was delighted with the results. A comparison of
the 1853 and 1857 charts showed great changes in the underwater
topography which convinced the doctor that his assumptions had
been justified.6 But, once again, Dr. Baldwin's goal was thwarted,
this time by the outbreak of a major conflict- the Civil War.
After the war, Dr. Baldwin became a member of the Jacksonville Board ofTrade, which was formed in 1867. The following year
he headed the board's Bar Improvements Committee and, in that
capacity, he was back in Washington seeking funds from Congress.? His plea resulted in General Gillmore ordering several more
surveys during 1868 and 1869. The results were no different than
earlier reports submitted by the Corps in rejecting Baldwin's views.
Colonel William Ludlow, in charge of the latest investigations of
the St. Johns, wrote the doctor that Gillmore had discussed with
him the many plans proposed for improving the St. Johns Bar.
Gillmore had considered straightening the river channel above the
bar to increase the scouring action; constructing piers for the same
reason; Dr. Baldwin's plan of closing Fort George Inlet; and, finally,
raking or dredging of the bar itself. This last plan was most agreeable to Gillmore.a
After more thought, General Gillmore submitted his plan to the
Chief of Engineers, suggesting the channel be deepened, "by repeated dredgings or rakings during the strongest stage of the ebb
current, promising, as it does, at least a fair measure of success at
compartively small cost." Along with his letter, Gillmore forwarded a
communication from Charles H. Campbell of New York, who had
been engaged in towing on the St. Johns bar, offering to dredge and
keep the depth at 15 feet for $10,000 per year. Brigadier General A.
A. Humphreys endorsed Gillmore's letter, approving the operation
after stressing that it was a "purely experimental" program which
could not be a permanent solution.9
Dr. Baldwin would have worn a smug smile of satisfaction if he
had read Gillmore's follow-up report on the dredging operations.
The contract, which had been issued on 19 October 1870 "for
dredging, raking or otherwise," was cancelled on 22 May 1871 because of lack of success. 10 In fact, the failure was so complete that
Gillmore made no payment on the contract.
Gen~ral Gillmore was at the end of his resources. He had no
confidence in the practicality of jetties, he did not accept Dr.
Baldwin's proposal, and his own scheme of raking or dredging had
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down with a 200-pound iron frame. Below this, at the mouth of the
pipe, metal teeth were attached to stir up the sand and muck. The
entire pipe length was 50 feet.
As General Gillmore described the Henry Burden 's operations, the steamer would travel outside the bar with its suction pipes
raised. Then, it would turn, lower the pipes, and steam in slowly to
the bar. As soon as it reached the outer edge of the bar, the pumps
would be turned on, the speed reduced to barely maintain steerageway, and the Burden would cross the bar sucking up sand and
water. Once over the bar, the pumps would be stopped, the pipes
raised, and the dredge turned to begin its outwardbound run. The
process of lowering the suction pipes, reducing speed, and dredging the bar would be repeated on the outgoing track. These two runs
would be sufficient to fill the Burden's storage bins. During the outer
turnaround, the side gates to the bins were opened, the pipes raised
off bottom, the pump run of full speed drawing in clear water, and
the storage areas flushed out. It took the Henry Burden 6 minutes
to turn at the completion of each run.B Very little time was lost during the dredging operations.
During 1871-72, Gillmore's Henry Burden removed almost
48,000 cubic yards, cutting a channel 15 feet deep at high tide. But,
the storms which lashed the mouth of the St. Johns during the
winter of 1873-74 deposited more sand than the Henry Burden
could handle. Each time the channel was dredged, another storm
would fill it up. Gillmore became discouraged. He wrote: "The natural and proper port for the shipment of all freight arriving in east
Florida, is Fernandina, and the inside passage should be enlarged.... I doubt the wisdom of expending any more money upon
the bar at the mouth of the St. Johns River." 14 When the appropriations ran out, the Henry Burden was retired from service on the St.
J ohns and the water over the bar was soon a mere 6 feet.
The problem with the St. Johns River bar was a hindrance to
the economic growth of the whole region. Not only did the shallow
bar keep out or delay deep draft vessels from using the port of Jacksonville, but the sinuous channel caused groundings and shipwrecks which drew scavengers, undesirable elements of society, to
the river's mouth. From 1850 to 1868, excluding the war years,
there were fwe sailing ships and two steamers lost while attempting
to cross the bar. 15 In addition to those seven major disasters, there
were innumerable minor mishaps due to piloting errors.
Two ships, the brigs Neva and John, both had their cargos
rifled by crewmen of ships inside the bar and by the local residents
living near the bar, when they grounded after missing the channel.
The result of these and similar events was an increase in insurance
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on the mouth of the Mississippi, came to Jacksonville, studied the
bar, and presented his proposal to the townsmen. He said two converging jetties should be built which would create a stable 20-foot
deep channel out to sea. The price was high, an estimated $1 .7
million. Still, Captain Eads felt it was a small cost to open Jacksonville up to the world, and influential Jacksonvillians agreed. Congress was besieged with pleas from the city.19
General Gillmore, in New York City, felt the pressure. He sent
Assistant Engineer George Daubeney to the St. Johns for yet another survey. Daubeney came up with a plan similar to the one Eads
had suggested. Gillmore, accepting his engineer's proposal, drew
up plans for permanently fiXing and deepening the treacherous, elusive channel. Gillmore favored a low or submerged jetty rather than
the high one proposed by Eads. Of the two jetties, the northern one
was to be the longest, 9,400 feet, while the southern would be 6,800
feet in length. Gillmore felt that if all of the river's waters were trapped
and channeled through the jetties, the force of the current would be
too great, and would result in excessive scouring of the bed. He
designed the jetties so that from the shore out they would be submerged, with the last 2,000 feet being built up to one-half tide level.
This design, with the early sections being submerged, would allow
the waters rushing out during ebb flow to spill over the jetties, reducing both the velocity and volume of water contained to scour the cut.
Gillmore assumed this method would result in a channel of 15 feet
at mean low water. Congress adopted his plan on 30 June 1879
with an appropriation of $125,000 being funded in 1880.20
When work started on the jetties, Lieutenant Walter L. Fisk was
assigned as officer in charge of the St. Johns River project. On 10
November 1880, he opened an office at Fort George. This office
was the beginning of a resident engineer in the Jacksonville area,
and, while not yet the Jacksonville District, the needs of Florida were
better served from this time on.
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Still, there were continual problems cropping up to vex Lieutenant Fisk and his successors. Mr. Ross related: "A very annoying
circumstance arose about 1885, when an individual stopped our
work by an injunction, claiming that he had a patent on the log
mattress that we were using. Fortunately, sometime previously I had
thought out a design of mattress, composed of fascines of brush
and other small growth, that might answer the purpose just as well
as the logs, and save a great deal in the cost. The opportunity to test
it out was now at hand, and shortly afterward we laid the first fascine
mattress foundations. It proved a perfect success, and from that
time the Government used the design in all foundations thereafter,
and the plan is now in universal use wherever jetties are built on sand
or mud base."23
One unexpected result of the south jetty was to route some
water around the south or outer side with enough velocity to scour
the sand from under the foundations. Lieutenant Fisk had to construct several spur jetties perpendicular to the south pier to correct
this fault. Then, very serious erosion took place on the south jetty
because, at times during the ebb flow, the river water was so much
higher than the Atlantic waters that the river flowed over the jetty with
enough velocity to carry away part of the bottom sand next to the
foundation. Fisk solved this by raising the jetty height.
Captain James C. Post. Lieutenant Fisk's successor, was confronted with a new problem. The extra weight added to the jetty
caused appreciable settling of the foundations. In some places the
structure dropped 15 feet. In one night a section sank 6 feet. 24 And,
so it seemed to go for the resident engineers.
The early rock hauled in for the jetties consisted of huge blocks
of granite shipped from New York in seagoing barges. Sometimes
these carriers would arrive during storms, which called for the utmost in seamanship and engineering skills to properly dump the
stone in its proper place. Florida limestone was not as heavy as the
New York product, but, when some of it was used it was found to be
superior. The marine life had an affinity for the local stone, growing
rapidly over the structure, cementing the blocks together naturally.
Eventually, only local limestone was used in the jetty.25
Mr. Ross recalled another innovation during the jetty work: "At
this stage of construction, Captain W. M. Black, engineer in charge
of the work at that time, devised a plan of two ridges of stone with a
space between, built up to the level of low water. The space between
the ridges was then filled in with oyster shell and a layer of stone
placed on top. The shell made a solid hearting when covered over
with stone; being mixed with Florida limestone, they both found
their n?Itural element in the ocean where shellfish had something to
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cling to, thus cementing the whole into a solid breakwater below the
low water level. The oyster shell hearting was used only where the
water was deep and still. This kind of construction has proven satisfactory."26
Concrete blocks of 6 to 10 tons were also used in place of rock.
In 1887, when the coast was lashed by a particularly severe gale,
Ueutenant William M. Black found that some of the 10-ton blocks
had been moved a mile or so out to sea. Of course, this was an
unusual storm, but it certainly demonstrated the energy in nature,
and if man intended to compete, he would have to work on a similar
scale. In the contract written in 1891 , District Engineer Black insisted that the stone topping must consist of a minimum of 1-ton
stone with 50 percent of the stones used being over 4 tons in weight.
When the work was completed, marine life had cemented the jetties
together so that there was, in effect, two huge single obstructions
jutting out to sea from the mouth of the St. Johns River.27
To add to the construction problems, Congress was erratic in
appropriating money for the project. The original plan called for
$1.7 million, and in 1884 the Jacksonville interests had petitioned
for $.6 million. Both sums were on a grand scale compared to actual allotments.
1880
1881
1882
1884
1886

Congress granted
Congress granted
Congress granted
Congress granted
Congress granted

........
........
........
........
........

$125,000
$100,000
$150,000
$150,000
$150,000

The result of this piecemeal funding was to have the engineers
operate from hand-to-mouth. Often, while waiting for more money,
the scouring actions would do so much damage that a major portion of the next appropriation would be spent repairing damage. By
the time the corrections were effective, the project's funds would be
low again.
Colonel Gillmore wrote in 1883 that "The work of improving
the mouth of the St. Johns River has been for sometime past, and is
still, in a critical condition. Ample means should be furnished to
proceed with the work, and to protect it thoroughly."28 Two years
later Captain Rossell stated: "During the progress of the work, from
its commencement on 14 December 1880, up to the present time it
has been idle, through lack of money, for more than a year. The
damage caused by these delays has materially increased the cost of
the work,"29 Again, in 1887, Captain Black complained of the dangers of inadequate funding.3o
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Dames Point were especially hard hit. St. Johns Bluff was set back
several hundred feet within a period of 10 years. This latest problem
called for building retaining walls and throwing up riprap (a sustaining wall of stones put together without any formal order, as in deep
water or on embankments to prevent erosion) at various places
along the river bank. Chaining the St. Johns bar spread construction
upriver.35
The whole concept of opening Jacksonville to the sea became
a growing notion which called for greater efforts to improve the port.
By 1909, the Board of Trade wanted a 30-foot channel. Ships were
growing in size; the 24-foot depth was not enough. According to
business sources of the time, foreign ships could load comfortably
to 27 feet. Therefore, many lines stopped off at nearby deep water
ports to discharge part of their cargo to lighten the ship for a visit to
Jacksonville. It seemed as if the region was always a bit behind in its
efforts to be a first-class port.
In 1910, work began on a 30-foot depth. Several dredges were
employed. The dredging was not without its mishaps. The St. Johns
was destroyed in an accident on the jetties on 5 August 1912. The
stationary hydraulic dredge Jacksonville proved inadequate for the
task, so it was traded for another dredge, the Major J. C. Mallory in
1914. A privately owned dredge, the Atlantic, owned by the Standard
American Dredging Company of Oakland, California, sank in 32
feet of water on 31 August 1916. It was later raised, but not employed on the St. Johns River. The Key West, a hopper dredge,
brought up to work the final portion of the 24-foot channel, remained and turned to on the new project. When the task was completed in 1918, the Key West was still on the job. All the dredging
work was accompanied by restraining walls or rip rap.
Even routine maintenance had its occasional hazards. On 17
September 1928, the pipeline dredge Welatka was working along
the north jetty, dredging and dumping the material around the jetty,
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U.S. Waterways Experiment Station of Vicksburg, Mississippi. Most
of the problems were ironed out before actual construction. Work
began on 10 July 1950 when the dredges Barlow and Philadelphia bit into the muck. More than 15 million cubic yards were removed. By 3 August 1951 the cutoff dredging had been completed.
The dike along the southside was in place by 24 October 1951, the
34-foot channel from Mayport to Fulton was finished by December
1951, and the final blasting to clean up was over by January 1952.
Jacksonville had a shorter, deeper exit to the sea.
The Fulton Cutoff created a large island in the St. Johns River,
first known as Goat Island, then, later, named Blount Island. It became a major industrial site for the city, offering excellent waterfront
facilities for oceangoing vessels. By this time, the Jacksonville Port
Authority was the city's agency responsible for harbor improvement. The Port Authority traces its lineage through the Jacksonville
Chamber of Commerce back to the early Board ofTrade, of which
Dr. Baldwin was one of the prime movers.
When Ribault Bay became the Mayport Naval Station, the
Jacksonville District assisted the Navy in dredging out the carrier
basin. Also, the bar channel had to be deepened to 42 feet to accommodate the giant aircraft carriers.

The Fulton Cutoff and
Blount Island.
Courtesy Corps of
Engineers.

85

The mammoth aircraft carriers were but precursors of the
monstrous commercial vessels being built for world trade. The
River and Harbor Act of 27 October 1965 called for a 38-foot depth
from the Atlantic to mile twenty, which is just beyond the Jacksonville Port Authority's Tallyrand Avenue docks. Everything proceeded
according to plan until the contractors ran into limestone rock off St.
Johns Bluff. When blasting began, there was an uproar from the
residents on shore and from local fishermen. These two groups
went to court to stop the use of explosives. Residents feared damage to their private wells; fishermen feared destruction of marine life
and their economic well-being.
The district instructed its contractors to use smaller amounts
of explosives in order to quiet the demands of the citizens, but this
was not the answer. On 13 July 1972, Judge Charles E. Scott, U.S.
District Court, issued a preliminary injunction order to the Jacksonville District to cease all blasting because the district had failed to
comply with the Environmental Impact Statement, as required by
the National Environmental Policy Act.
In answer to Judge Scott, the district issued a report on 15
August 1972 stating that the explosions brought only temporary
distruption to aquatic life; within a reasonably short time the area
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Jacksonville's desire to reach the sea to engage in the ocean
trade of the world has had great influence upon the Corps of Engineers in Florida. These projects seem to be never-ending tasks as
oceangoing commerce continues to use larger and larger carriers.
Because the taming of the St. Johns River channel and bar was
such a complex, long-term affair, the Corps established a resident
engineer office to supervise the river projects. This office became
the Jacksonville District. Had any other region of Florida had a similar program at an earlier time, that region might have been the site of
the peninsula's district office. Jacksonville's call "to the sea" was the
reason for the creation of the Jacksonville District.
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THE CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN FLORIDA PROJECT is the largest
civil undertaking of the Jacksonville District. The region encompasses most of the 18 southern counties covering some 16,000
square miles. Lake Okeechobee is the heart of this project, but the
area extends northward up the Kissimmee River and includes the
upper St. Johns River Basin, westward following the Caloosahatchee River, an important artery to the Gulf of Mexico, and southward along the Everglades, that river of saw grass, oozing in a
broad arc from the shores of Lake Okeechobee to Florida Bay and
the Gulf of Mexico. (The English surveyor, Charles Vignoles,
named the saw grass area south of Lake Okeechobee the "Everglades" in his Observations upon the Floridas published in 1823.)
Initially, the promoters of south Florida felt it was just a simple
matter of dredging a few canals from Lake Okeechobee to the Atlantic or Gulf of Mexico to drain off excessive waters, leaving an
immensely rich, fertile muckland for man to turn into a tropical cornucopia. The tremendously delicate, centuries-old ecological
balance which had been developed in nature was not understood,
considered, or known by those early pioneers who envisioned tapping this agricultural El Dorado.
In south Aorida, after the area was drained, the soil subsided,
causing new problems, and, as the fresh water supply was depleted,
saltwater intrusion began. By June 1974, the National Government
had spent $206 million, while state and local interests added another $38 million. Yet, it was estimated that to complete the project it
would take an additional $497 million in Federal funds and $117
million in local matching monies. I With hindsight, it is now clear that
there was no simple solution. Still, it would be an anachronism to
fault the early pioneers for errors only recently learned.
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Mer Texas gained its independence from Mexico in 1836, it
encouraged settlers from the southern states to its wide open plains.
The Far West also was calling. In the spring of 1843, a caravan of
over a thousand pioneers jammed the Oregon Trail. It was apparent
to Florida's publicists that something must be done to divert some
of these land seekers to south Florida, and one way to do that was to
publicize the wealth and fertility of a drained Everglades.
No sooner had the territory become the State of Florida in
1845, than the legislature asked Congress to support a program of
reclamation. A resolution on 10 December 1845 called upon the
Federal Government to send competent engineers to investigate
and to survey the Everglades to counteract the prevailing opinion
that the watery, southern peninsula was valueless.
Senator James D. Westcott, Jr., carried Florida's message to
Washington where he enlisted the aid of Secretary of the Treasury,
RobertJ. Walker. On 18June 1847, Walker appointed Buckingham
Smith to gather "authentic information in relation to what are generally called the 'Everglades' on the peninsula of Florida."4
The Buckingham Smith report included a vast amount of information gathered by the very men who had trekked through the
glades during the Florida War. Smith went beyond the role of compiler; he actually entered the Everglades to see for himself the conditions in south Florida. His conclusions were published as Senate
Document No. 242 of the 30th Congress in 1848. On the whole, it
was a favorable report, as indicated by his quote of Colonel Harney
who predicted that the population would jump to "a hundred thousand souls or more" within 5 years of any drainage.5
Senator Westcott immediately introduced a bill to grant to
Florida all lands south of the established survey, on condition that
drainage projects, financed by the sale of public lands at $1.25 per
acre, be commenced by 1851. It seemed assured of passage until
Florida's other senator, David L. Yulee, opposed the measure. Yulee, far more realistic, knew that the state was too poor to finance
such a measure. He pressed for passage of another act whereby the
state of Arkansas was to be granted swamp and overflowed lands
unfit for cultivation. He believed that Florida could be included in a
similar transfer of its swamp and overflowed lands. Yulee was correct; two years later, when the Swamp Land Act was passed, Florida
acquired the Everglades, and the state benefited from the omission
in this act of any specific date for the beginning of drainage.
There were several early attempts at drainage of a local nature
to open inlets to the sea, but these were not designed to reclaim
submerged lands. During the Second Seminole War, old Fort Jupiter was built on the southern shore of Jupiter River, 3 miles inland
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It can readily be observed that the new state had much potential wealth, all of it tied up in land. In 1855 the Internal Improvement
Fund was established to handle these public lands. Its task was to
manage the state's domain and to apply the proceeds from the
sales to internal improvements.
In 1866, William H. Gleason entered into the first drainage project agreement with the trustees on lands near the Everglades. Almost a decade later, Gleason submitted a claim for 3,840 acres. His
action was based upon a small ditch, dug from Lake Worth to the
Atlantic Ocean, which he alleged lowered the lake, thereby draining
six sections of land. His work is now the Lake Worth Inlet and his
labors changed the lake from a fresh-water body to a salt-water
extension of the Atlantic Ocean. At the time of his claim, the trustees,
who were in receivership, refused to accept his allegations. After a
long court battle, the trustees were able to cancel his request for
lands in 1879.a
Four individuals approached the trustees in February 1869
with an ambitious plan to reclaim land along the Caloosahatchee
River, Lake Okeechobee, and Kissimmee River. Half of the lands
drained would be turned over to the promoters, who were to commence the following year and to complete their project within 7
years. Nothing ever came of this agreement, but it established the
pattern for later grants.
The Corps of Engineers became involved in south Florida
when Congress passed an act to survey the Caloosahatchee River.
At that time, the west coast of Aorida was under the control of Captain Andrew N. Damrell, with headquarters at Mobile, Alabama.
Damrell sent Assistant Engineer, J. L. Meigs, with a survey party to
Fort Myers in March 1879 to carry out the congressional instructions.
Fort Myers had a population of about 150 persons and a business district consisting of four stores supplying goods and medicines necessary for the sparse population of the Caloosahatchee
valley. Contact with the outside world was maintained by several
schooners plying between Fort Myers, Cedar Key, and Key West.
The citizens of Fort Myers were interested in the survey being conducted, and they expressed the hope that better drainage could be
effected to render the valley safe and secure from its frequent floods.
The previous year had been particularly difficult. The rains had been
so heavy that the valley was submerged from 6 February to 1 December 1878. Many of the settlers living on the rich, hummock
lands bordering the river, had been driven off by high waters. These
hardy pioneers were eager to volunteer their services to aid the engineers.
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Meigs decided that the waters of Lake Hicpochee were at the
same level as Okeechobee because there was no perceptible current; therefore, he started his line of levels from the south shore of
Hicpochee.
Meigs' line of levels followed the drovers' trail from Hicpochee
to Fort Thompson, then to the old military road, which ran close to
the dividing ridge south of the Caloosahatchee valley, on to Fort
Myers. 'The results of the leveling are," according to Meigs, "interesting as showing the elevation of Lake Okeechobee above tide
water of the Gulf of Mexico, and as, perhaps, the beginning of engineering operations that will one day protect the Kissimmee and
Caloosahatchee Valleys from disastrous floods, and reclaim the
very valuable Okeechobee Margin."ll
At the conclusion of his report, Meigs noted that during periods
of drought, the marsh became dry and it was possible to ride a horse
in the river channel from Fort Thompson to Sugar Berry Hummock. This would be the time to construct a river canal at least 40
feet wide and 6 feet deep, and a similar canal to connect Hicpochee
to Okeechobee. He estimated the cost to be $}48,978 to provide
passage for vessels 40 feet long with 8-foot beams, from the Gulf of
Mexico to Lake Okeechobee.
The assistant engineer realized that neither the sparse population nor the small trade of the region, warranted such an expenditure but he stated that "the principal advantage, however, to be
expected from this improvement would arise from the partial drainage of the wide margin of saw-grass marsh bordering the shore of
the Upper Caloosahatchee and the Lower Kissimmee, and surrounding Lakes Hicpochee and Okeechobee. The soil of these
marshes is a rich black loam, 5 or 6 feet in depth and deemed by
experts admirably adapted to the growth of sugar cane."12
The Meigs report may have been the tocsin of the drainage
mania which soon swept over the Okeechobee region. The 1880's
were the haydays of the Robber Barons, when the moves and machinations of the financial wizards were adulated by the masses.
Florida participated in this era of the nation's history as three tycoons battled and maneuvered for position within the state. Two of
these men were railroad magnates; Henry Flagler building down the
east coast and Henry Plant constructing along the west coast. The
third, in the southern swamp lands, was Hamilton Disston, the drainage king.
Hamilton Disston became president of Disston & Sons upon
his father's death in 1878. He was a millionaire who became interested in land development in south Florida. In February 1881 , Disston entered into an agreement with the trustees of Florida's Internal
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were thankful that their fears of floods were ended. The southern
settlers sent many testaments concerning the benefits wrought by
Disston engineers to the trustees in Tallahassee. 16
Former engineer for the Central and Southern Florida Flood
Control District, Larmar Johnson, writing in 1974, pointed out that
"the limited rainfall records of the period indicate that 1881 to 1884
was a dry cycle." He did not understand how the pioneers living in
that region, so close to nature, could have been hoodwinked by
Disston' s agents. Johnson felt that the Disston engineers soon realized that their work was not the primary cause of the drop in water,
as evidenced by their renewed attempts to enlarge the original canals which had been dug so hurriedly in the first years of the project.
Nevertheless, the trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund agreed
with Disston that over 2 million acres had been reclaimed. Accordingly, they deeded land to the Disston Company. 17
A private survey, more serious than the Times-Democrat's,
was the Ingraham Expedition of 1892, designed to cross the Big
Cypress Swamp and the Everglades from the Gulf coast to Miami.
Ostensibly, it was to investigate the possibility of a railroad from
Tampa to Miami. The expedition left Fort Myers on 16 March and
finally, after undreamed of hardships, emerged in Miami 7 April
1892.18
During this same period of the early 1880's, the Corps of Engineers had been operating along the Caloosahatchee River, deepening the canal for navigation purposes. District Engineer, Captain
William M. Black's annual report of 1887, reflected the changing
attitude of the people of the Caloosahatchee valley. Citizens were
now voicing fears that Disston's Atlantic and Gulf Coast Canal and
Okeechobee Land Company's drainage ditches were carrying too
much water from Lake Okeechobee down their river, flooding their
cultivated lands. The valley people were alarmed over the navigation
work of the Corps in deepening the channel. They believed that it
might add to the drainage flow. They requested that the United
States discontinue improvements to the Caloosahatchee until it was
certain that this would not increase the danger of flooding. 19
However, before this attitude of the pioneers had a chance to
tum against drainage, the Disston project ceased. Disston's empire
was dealt two crippling blows in the 1890's; first the financial depression of 1893 occurred, and second, his untimely death in 1896.
Disston heirs were not interested in his south Florida plans and the
drainage program withered.
When Napoleon Bonaparte Broward ran for governor in 1904,
one of his most potent campaign oratory themes was directed toward draining the Everglades. He argued that all that was needed
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In 1910, under Governor Albert W. Gilcrest's administration,
the State of Florida and the large landowners reached a compromise which ended their long-standing court battles. The owners
agreed to pay up their back taxes; the State's Drainage Commission
promised to spend the money for dredging 200 miles of canals.
The 10 years from 1917 to 1927 were the most active in reclamation. During this period, more than half the excavation of the Everglades took place. Of course, this does not include later Federal
projects concerned with flood control programs. In all, 433 miles of
canal, 54 miles of levee, and 14 canal locks were completed by
1927. Population figures were up, land values quadrupled, acreage
under cultivation tripled, railroads and highways pushed out to the
shores of Lake Okeechobee, and it appeared as if the visions of the
dreamers were a reality.z3
Yet, even visions may have flaws when examined closely. Both
the farmer and the boat operator had an interest in the waters of
Lake Okeechobee. The farmer saw high water in the lake as threat;
the boat operator was more concerned when the lake was at a low
stage. In those early days of reclamation by private and state interests, the men in power leaned toward the farmer's position. As the
lands surrounding Okeechobee subsided, the level of the lake was
regulated downward to balance the agricultural interests. When the
lake outlets began to seriously lower Okeechobee's level, the Corps
of Engineers entered the debate to protect the interests of the navigating sector on public domain.z4
Generally, Lake Okeechobee overflowed its banks when its waters rose 20 feet above mean sea level. In 1912, when the trustees of
the Internal Improvement Fund applied for a permit from the War
Department to connect its four main Everglades canals to Lake
Okeechobee, the Corps of Engineers stipulated that the lake waters
should not be allowed to drop below 14.56 feet above mean sea
level. It was 1917 before the lake level dropped to that depth, and
then it was the result of a prolonged drought, rather than drainage
conditions which caused the drop.25
The opposite situation occurred on 18 September 1926 when
a hurricane came ashore at Miami, crossing the bay and roaring
inland over Lake Okeechobee. Miami was left in a shambles with
over 100 of its citizens dead. The wind, rain, and lake waters of
Okeechobee merged into a massive force which pounded against
the earthen dike of the lake's southwestern shore. Three miles of
levees crumbled, sending floodwaters raging from Clewiston to
Moore Haven. Peak waters, 10 to 12 feet high, swept over Clewiston.
In the storm's wake, almost 400 persons had died in Okeechobeeland.26
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Franklin D. Roosevelt's Public Works Administration, which spent
$4.1 million on the project in fiscal year 1935. To this amount, the
Corps and state funds brought the total to over $5.8 million.
Through 1937, the district's major source of construction funds
came from unemployment relief money from Washington, but, in
fiscal year 1938, funds for the project were cut back. The engineers
were back to their more meager allocations. By this time, however,
the task was 80 percent complete.30
The district constructed hurricane gates, as well as channels
and levees. Hurricane gates are openings in the levees to allow passage of water and vessels through the encircling retainer walls.
When a hurricane approaches, the gates are closed to contain the
high waters generated by wind-tide, and to protect the surrounding
countryside from inundation. As the project grew in physical size,
maintenance, rather than construction, costs, became the greater
expense. By 1940, maintenance costs ran $1.7 million, compared
to $.6 allocated for new work.
The early 1940's were years of drought. When saltwater
seeped into several municipal systems in 1945, conditions became
critical. Fortunately, heavy rains fell during the spring and summer
months of 1946 and 1947, which eased the situation before irreparable damage resulted. Hurricanes passed over Lake Okeechobee
in September and October of 1947, bringing much needed water to
the lake. This sudden change in condition made it necessary for the
district to shift to its flood control system, and for the next 6 months,
the task was to control the rate of discharge from Okeechobee. The
lake reached a peak of 18.73 feet above mean sea level in October.
Had the district not been able to regulate the outflow from the lake,
the equivalent of 26.89 feet would have been reached by December.
Such levels could have caused a flood disaster comparable to those
of the 1920's.31
The saltwater intrustion at the beginning of the decade was a
warning of a new area of concern. It was clear that that something
must be done so that south Florida would not be at the mercy of
such natural phenomenon again. The flood control plan must do
more than drain excess waters from Lake Okeechobee.lt must contain fresh water in volume sufficient to keep out the intruding seawater from the underground water table.
The Jacksonville District developed a plan for a network of
canals, locks, dikes, and levees, designed to draw off flood waters
rapidly, to eliminate overdrainage, and to conserve water for later
use during dry periods. This new program was all inclusive as it
sought to protect farms already developed, add lands which were
suitable for agriculture, set aside terrain which should remain in the
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Once the vast extent of the south Florida water problem was
grasped, continguous areas were brought into the original scheme.
In 1954 Congress added the upper St. Johns and the Kissimmee
River Basins to the Central and Southern Florida Flood Control District. Four years later, 64 square miles, located in Hendry County
west of the agricultural and conservation areas, were included. In
1960, the Nicodemus Slough in Glades County brought another 39
square miles into the project. An area in south Dade County was
added in 1962 and southwest Dade County in 1965, and the flood
control umbrella covered Martin County in 1968.32
Long before the project was completed, it received a severe
test, when, in March 1960, heavy rains fell over the Kissimmee and
lstokpoga river basins, setting records for water levels and discharges. Later in the year, the state was drenched by three tropical
storms. In July, Hurricane Brenda moved in from the Gulf of Mexico
to dump a large amount of rain, followed by Donna in August, and
Florence in September. Rainfall during these latter 2 months was
more than four times the normal amount. More water flowed into
Lake Okeechobee than could be discharged, and it remained that
way until mid November. Yet, the early flood control work proved its
worth and minimized destruction around Lake Okeechobee. Although the work was only 27 percent completed, it was enough to
limit high water damage to minor events along the north shore.
The wet years of 1960 and 1961 were followed by some of the
driest years on record. Evaporation alone exceeded the rainfall by
27 inches on the lake. The water conservation aspects of the program were put into action. More than 400,000 acres of farmland
were irrigated by water drawn from Okeechobee. Large sections of
the Everglades literally began to dry up, threatening the very existence of alligators, birds, and certain fishes.
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while water from the agricultural areas was sent north to Lake
Okeechobee. A swath was cut through the saw grass of the northern
Everglades National Park to increase the natural drainage flow toward the gulf. Finally, traffic was stopped on the levee roadways so
that the deer might use this higher ground; because of these measures, the herd of Everglades deer survived.
During this period of feast or famine for south Florida's water
supply, the Jacksonville District was conducting a long-range study
of the complex problem. When the plan was submitted to Congress
in 1967, the solution consisted of refining many works which had
been done in the past, such as improving canals by deepening navigational channels, and building more pumping stations, secondary
canals, and levees. In addition, the district suggested that the height
of the levees around Lake Okeechobee be increased so that they
could contain waters of 21 feet above mean sea level.
At the present time, the project has "91 7 miles of levees, 950
miles of canals, 30 pumping stations, 192 floodway control and
diversion structures, 57 railroad bridge relocations, and 2 highway
bridge relocations," and the job is 39 percent complete.33
The Jacksonville District's 1975 annual report reads like an ofttold tale: "Fiscal year 1975 started as a severe drought was ending in
south Aorida. Heavy rains began in the last week of June 1975 and
continued through August, causing a complete turn about in the
hydrologic conditions in the lower half of the state. The south Florida area went from a condition of drought to that of an over abun-
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Yesterday's men of vision, who could only see that "water will
run down hill," brought ecological disasters to south Florida; the
Jacksonville District Engineers, studying the multitudinous facets of
nature's balance, are gradually redressing the equation so that
many may live and raise agricultural produce in the region called
Pa-hay-okee (Grassy Water) by the Indians.
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FLORIDA'S INTRACOASTAL WATERWAYS did not come into existence
from one single project. The dredged canals and natural waterways
which gird the state from Jacksonville, south to Miami, with a crossstate route utilizing the St. Lucie Canal, Lake Okeechobee, and the
Caloosahatchee River to Fort Myers, then up the gulf coast to And ote River, are the result of many separately scheduled projects.
By the very nature of the peninsula's terrain, the early settlers
made extensive use of the existing waterways. When James Gadsden surveyed the east coast for the purpose of laying out a military
road south to Cape Florida, he discounted the feasibility of a road
through that desolate countryside, but he did strongly urge that a
canal be bult at the Haulover to join Mosquito Lagoon with Indian
River. He made this recommendation in December 1824, at the end
of his first expedition. His report the following year, after his successful trek, included a map which delineated the Haulover. 1 However,
the territory was settled too poorly for the Government to undertake
any improvement project that far south.
Two years later, the citizens of St. Augustine, Matanzas, and
Tomoka petitioned Congress to alter Gadsden's plan. He had determined that New Smyrna should be the southernmost terminus of
the military road down the coast. Settlers of these three communities felt that the population south ofTomoka was not great enough
to sustain the road. The Floridians requested that the road run from
the Georgia line to Tomoka, but that the funds for continuing the
road south be used to construct a canal, linking the Matanzas with
the Halifax River. Such a cut, about 8 miles long, would provide a
more satisfactory communication link along the coast from St.
Augustine to New Smyma.2 However, Washington took no action
upon this petition.
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Lagoon to Indian River, to be forwarded on to forces operating farther south on the peninsula.
Navy Ueutenant Levin M. Powell's group of sailors and soldiers,
with the civilian Joseph E. Johnston acting as the topographical
engineer for this amphibious detachment, departed St. Augustine in
schooners for Mosquito Inlet. Here they offloaded to break out their
small craft for the sail up the lagoon to the Haulover. Powell spent
the month of December 1837 drilling his conglomerate forces into
a cohesive unit while he moved his boats and supplies across to
Indian River. For many units, the interruption at the portage was a
needless consumption of time.ln Powell's case, the delay was beneficial; it provided the opportunity for the two services to learn to work
together.
Among the troops forced to delay at the Haulover were three
companies of the 1st Artillery. With these soldiers was Army surgeon Jacob Rhett Motte who wrote of Powell's men drilling: "When
drawn up in line they presented a curious blending of black and
white, like the keys of a piano forte; many of the sailors being coloured men. There was also an odd alternation of tarpaulin hats and
peajackets, with forage caps and soldiers trip roundabouts; soldiers
and sailors, white men and black, being all thrown into the ranks
indiscriminately, a beautiful specimen of mosaic, thus modifying
sailor's ardour with soldier's discipline." 7
A year after hostilities ceased, Quartermaster General Thomas
S. Jesup stated in his annual report of October 1843 that: "The
difficulties which I experienced when directing the operations
against the Seminoles in the campaign of 1837-8 in supplying the
division of the Army operating south of the Haulover, on the Atlantic
side of the Peninsula of Florida, enable me to speak with positive
certainty as to the necessity of improving the inland commmunications from Saint Augustine to Key Biscayne." 8 But, despite Jesup's
pleading, no action was forthcoming on the Haulover Canal, probably because the Indian War had ended and the civil traffic was not
significant.
Shortly after the cession of combat, Colonel William J. Worth,
commanding in Florida, sent First Ueutenant Jacob Edmund
Blake, topographical engineer, to the Haulover to make a survey.
Blake considered this protgage to be a waste of manpower when a
canal could join so easily these two waters, eliminating the work of
offloading, loading, and offloading of supplies over such a short
obstacle.9
Blake found that the distance between the two waters was only
725 yards with the highest point of land being 8~ feet above the level
of the water. He recommended that the cut be made. To remove the
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northeaster struck which caused the waters in Mosquito Lagoon to
rise 20 inches higher than the Indian River. The result was a current
of 2.8 miles per hour flowing west through the cut, making it almost
impossible for LeBaron's sloop to stem the current. This flow condition to the west was not normal. The reverse generally was true,
because the Indian River had a greater surface, a smaller outlet to
the sea, and a longer reach from the ocean to its headwaters; the
river was often higher than the lagoon. When Le Baron used the
canal in 1878, the river had been 2 to 3 feet above the lagoon, and
had remained that way for several months. The current under those
conditions had tested severely many of the vessels trying to move
against it.14
Federal construction of the intracoastal waterway was delayed
after LeBaron's survey when private enterprise moved in. The Florida Coast Une Canal & Transportation Company, organized 7 May
1881, was granted a State charter in August 1881 to construct a
continuous waterway from the St. Johns River to Miami. Four years
later, the state granted the company the right to continue from
Miami to Key West, but no work was ever done on this latter portion
and the amendment became inoperative.
The original project was based upon a 5-foot deep, 50-foot
wide channel. The state was to grant 3,840 acres of land for each
mile of canal built. Beginning in 1883, construction continued almost unceasingly until 1912, when the last section of the canal was
finished and the final grant of property was deeded by the state.
Total land awarded to the company was 1,030,128 acres for 268
miles of canal. Yet, seldom during this period, were conditions of the
State charter met by the Florida Coast Une Canal & Transportation
Company. Once a section of canal had been examined and accepted by the state, maintenance became minimal. Jacksonville
District Engineer, Colonel Gilbert A Youngberg noted in 1926 that
tile canal's "dimensions have never been successfully maintained,
and, except by taking advantage of tides and high waters, navigation
witll vessels of more tllan 4-foot draft is practically impossible."1s
But long before Colonel Youngberg's remarks, tile Corps of
Engineers had been called upon to help correct a trying situation for
tile Florida citizens living along tile Indian River. This reach of waterway running 128 miles from Titusville to Jupiter Inlet was tlleir only
highway of commerce and transportation, and it was apparent tllat
tile canal company was not providing a satisfactory outlet. The
citizen's pleas to Congress were heard and District Engineer, Captain William H. Black was instructed to examine the Indian River.
Captain Black found conditions poor due to tile shallowness of
certain sections of tile waterway. He noted that tile area served by
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investigation of sites for an inland route which would become part of
the larger project of a protected waterway from Boston to the Rio
Grande. The district looked at four choices: down the east coast
where the canal company had dredged; follow the St. Johns River,
Dunns Creek, and Crescent Lake before constructing a canal to the
coast just north of Titusville; up the St. Johns through Lake Harney,
then create a cut to a point north of Titusville; or continue beyond
Lake Harney through Lake Shad and Salt Lake before building a
shorter canal to Indian River north of Titusville. While the last route
was recommended by the district, Washington decided to delay
actual construction. It was 1920 before Congress again ordered the
Corps to look into the intracoastal waterways. The River and Harbor
Act of 21 January 1927 finally adopted the project, utilizing the existing private canal, and it was 11 December 1929 before the Corps of
Engineers actually took possession of the waterway. The project
called for a canal 8 feet deep and 75 feet wide.
Ueutenant Colonel Laurence V. Frazier was the district engineer when the Corps assumed control over the east coast waterway.
His operation to clean up the channel was complex, massive, and
efficient. As equipment became available to the colonel, he put it to
work on the project. The United States snagboat D-1 moved into
Pablo Creek from the St. Johns River and headed south, clearing
obstructions from the creek. By the end of the year, it had removed
46,81 0 snags, logs, and other impediments to navigation. A month
later, the U.S. pipe-line dredge Congoree followed in the wake of the
D-1 removing fill from the channel.

The Army Engineer
dredge, Congoree, 1936.
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Palm Valley bridge over
Intracoastal Waterway
at Palm Valley is the
only bridge still
operated by the Corps of
Engineers.
Courtesy Corps of
Engineers.

Work on the east coast section of the Intracoastal Waterway
was in progress during the depression years of the 1930's. The project received funds for emergency relief from the Public Works Administration during the years 1932-35. More than 500 jobs were
provided through the addition of this relief money.
In 1938, an act was passed to increase the channel from
Femandina Harbor to St. Johns River to 12 feet deep and from 90 to
150 feet wide. This work was completed in 1941 , just before the
United States entered World War II. Shortly after the country's entry
into the war, German submarines were prowling the Atlantic coast,
sinking merchant ships in appalling numbers. It became apparent
that the Intracoastal Waterway provided a safe channel for waterborne traffic along the east coast. Additional wooden barges were
built They were used to carry bulk freight at substantial savings in
precious metal, fuel, and rubber which the nation needed for its war
effort23
After the war, the east coast waterways were deepened and
widened to improve the transportation network. Today, the main
channel from Jacksonville to Miami is 125 feet wide. It is 12 feet
deep to Fort Pierce and 10 feet deep from Fort Pierce to Miami.
There is a short reach of channel, 75 feet wide and 7 feet deep,
running south of Miami for 63 miles, which was built between 1935
and 1939. The 1945 act to enlarge the waterways included this
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erglades Drainage District boundaries to the Gulf of Mexico and the
East Coast Intracoastal Waterway, by straightening and dredging
channels 80 feet wide and 6 feet deep. But, he qualified this by
stressing that the state must construct and maintain similar channels from the western to the eastern boundary of the Everglades
Drainage District and must include the necessary dams and locks
for this undertaking. This plan would creat a cross-Florida waterway.25
Before much could be done on Brooke's recommendation,
the hurricane of 1928 struck the lake with even more fury than the
1926 blow. The new district engineer, Lieutenant Colonel Frazier,
presented additional measures to provide for the safety of the inhabitants of this region. The levees were to be raised higher and made
more sturdy. A new belt-line canal should be dug around the south
shore of the lake. The dredged material would be available for the
southshore levee. This was a departure from the previous canals in
Lake Okeechobee which had gone through the center of the lake
from east to west. The belt-line canal would be longer, but it would
also provide the necessary levee to protect cultivated lands south of
the lake.26
Two years later, 53 miles of levee line and right-of-way had
been surveyed along the southshore. Foundation tests had been
made for the construction of hurricane gates at Moore Haven,
Clewiston, Miami Canal, and Hillsboro Canal. Ninety miles of floodway and navigation channel in the Caloosahatchee River had been
surveyed and the district's pipe-line dredges Sarasota and
Congoree were raising muck along the proposed channeJ.27
By 1937, with the benefit of WPA funds, the project was 92
percent completed. A boat-a-cade left Fort Myers on 22 March,
headed east, to officially open the Okeechobee Waterway. The
group reached Stuart on the St. Lucie River the next day. Florida's
east and west coasts were joined at last.
The completed project consisted of four locks (St. Lucie,
Moore Haven, Ortona, and W. P. Franklin) along its 155-mile length.
The main 8-foot channel varies from 80 to 100 feet in width. The
secondary south channel from Clewiston to Belle Glade is
shallower; 6 feet in depth. The Okeechobee Waterway serves both
commercial barges and recreational boats. It has averaged 4 72,000
tons and 14,000 passengers per year from 1963 through 1973.28
As the Okeechobee Waterway developed, extending the east
coast protected water route across the Florida peninsula to the gulf
coast, west coast interests quickened to the idea of creating an extension along their coast. Congress responded to the pleadings of
this group by authorizing the Jacksonville District to examine the
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value of protecting intracoastal waterways is a lesson that should not
be lost upon the nation.
For the future, there are two users of the waterways: recreational boaters and barge carriers. As the threat of reduction of fossil
fuel grows, the value of barge transportation as an energy saving
measure becomes more real and striking.
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CHAPTERS

Building Harbors
COMMERCE, vital to the well-being of any society, was especially nec-

essary to Florida because the natural products of the soil had to be
brought to distant markets rapidly. In the latter quarter of the
nineteenth century, the railroad was beginning to penetrate the peninsula, but railroads running to nowhere were poor risks for investment. Ideally, the rails should terminate at a deepwater port which
would complement and extend overseas the interior transportation
network. Even before the railroads actually arrived, Floridians were
looking to the future, requesting Federal aid to develop useful ports
along Florida's coast.
Assistant Engineer, Gustave Jaenicke arrived in Tampa on 13
July 1871 to survey the region for the development of harbor facilities on the west coast. Captain Andrew N. Damrell instructed
Jaenicke to make a detailed report of his week's work every Saturday night, to be forwarded to him at Mobile, Alabama, whenever the
mail system would allow. Jaenicke was given $1,938.40 for expenditures, which was to include the cost of the draughtsman's plotting
after he had returned to Mobile. Damrell told him: "Your pay will be
at first $150 per month; if satisfaction is given it will be increased to
$200." 1 Jaenicke left Mobile aboard the Lighthouse tug General
Poe for Apalachicola. There, he hired his surveying party, chartered
a sloop, and set sail for Tampa Bay.
Tampa was a city of about 1,000 people, whose only contact
with the outside world was through small, coastal vessels plying the
ports of the Gulf of Mexico. Yet, in spite of its isolated location,
Tampa supported 18 stores, a newspaper-printing shop, blacksmith, tinsmith, harness-maker, and two carpenters. According to
Jaenicke, there was not much money in circulation and most busi-
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ness was on a credit basis. Yet, he expressed the conviction that,
regardless of its isolation or lack of money, the town had considerable trade which would improve if the proposed harbor work were
undertaken and the railroad came into the community.z
The main purpose of Jaenicke's visit was to examined the bay.
Tampa Bay, between 6 and 9 miles wide, runs northeasterly into
Florida peninsula 24 miles before it branches out Y-shape into two
inner bays. Hillsborough Bay is the easternmost and Old Tampa
Bay is the westernmost prong of the upper reaches of Tampa Bay.
The Hillsborough River empties into its namesake at the head of the
bay.
In the midst of Jaenicke's survey, a mid-August northwest gale
set in while his party was working on the bay. By noon, it had become a hurricane force storm, blowing down trees, fences, and
breaking boats from their anchorage. The surveying crew rode out
the storm safely, but all of the beacons, tripods, signals, and many of
the range poles had vanished. Jaenicke began again. He had no
more than repositioned his equipment before another storm lashed
the area, creating more damage. His expenditures were mounting
rapidly from nature's destruction; still, he completed his work and
submitted his recommendation on time.
Tampa Bay was not Jaenicke's problem. There was adequate
water in the bay to meet shipping needs. Jaenicke was concerned
with Hillsborough Bay because he was trying to improve the city's
communications with the rest of the world. When he finished his
work, he presented three estimates: a straight channel200 feet wide
from the 12-foot contour in Tampa Bay up Hillsborough Bay to the
river and the city, at a cost of half a million dollars; dredge the existing sinuous shipping channel from its 5-foot depth to 12 feet, for
$50 thousand more than his first estimate; or, by cutting the width to
100 feet, deepen the present channel for a quarter of a million dollars. Jaenicke thought the project was worthwhile.
Captain Damrell's superior in Mobile, Colonel J . H. Simpson,
studied Jaenicke's survey and recommendations carefully before
reaching a quite different conclusion. Simpson believed there was
not enough business to warrant spending the large amount of
money necessary to make Tampa accessible to the sea. It would
cost far less (about $180,000) to build a short line railroad the 9
miles from Tampa to Passage Point than to dredge the channel. If
the city truly desired to reach the sea, he recommended that it build
a railroad and use Passage Point as Tampa's port.3 With this negative recommendation, no action was taken on the Tampa project.
By the end of the decade, local interests once more prevailed
upon Congress. Assistant Engineer J . L. Meigs had to spend the
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Captain Black's recommendations and Henry Plant's actions
had repercussions on the harbor work. Another survey in 1888 determined that the Hillsborough project should be modified to remain at the then dredged depth of 8 feet, while attention should be
paid to improving Port Tampa on Old Tampa Bay. The River and
Harbor Act of 11 August 1888, accepting the earlier recommendations, called for dredging a 20-foot channel to Port Tampa to bring
deep water to Plant's South Florida Railway terminal.8 By 1893, as a
result of these various modifications, the channel to Port Tampa had
been completed to the 20-foot level; work had ceased in Hillsborough Bay, leaving a channel 100 feet wide and 7 feet deep; and the
Hillsborough River stood at a 9-foot depth. Thus, the terminal facilities along the river's edge of the city of Tampa exceeded the bay
entrance channel's ability to provide traffic.9
No real action was taken to relieve Hillsborough Bay's problem
before the Spanish-American War occurred in April 1898. Tampa
was selected as the major port for embarkation because of its proximity to Cuba. The terrible limitations of a port 9 miles from the city,
served by a single-track railroad line, need not be repeated. Conditions were abominable, but, at least they highlighted the necessity of
improving the port facilities of Tampa's Hillsborough Bay, as well as
Port Tampa. Both areas were subject to new legislation under the
River and Harbor Act of 3 March 1899, which called for widening the
channel and deepening it to 27 feet at Port Tampa, while improving
Hillsborough Bay to 12 feet.l o
The development of the two inner bays became more than just
an engineering problem of the most economical method of serving
the city of Tampa. The improvement of each one became part of the
economic struggle between the railroads and other business interests. Captain Herbert Deakyne reported the situation to the Chief of
Engineers in 1902 when he informed him that the single railroad
line controlled the docks of Port Tampa, and that the only way to
move goods from the wharves to Tampa was over South Florida's
tracks. Deakyne went on to say: "It is stated that the rate for moving
certain kinds of merchandise from a ship at Port Tampa to Tampa is
about equal to the rate on the same merchandise from New York to
Tampa direct by water."11 A year later Colonel Charles J . Allen, senior
member of a board of engineers studying the Tampa situation reported: "It was clearly shown at the public hearings ... that, owing to
excessive wharf and freight charges, it is practically impossible for
the shippers of Tampa to do business through Port Tampa." 12
Therefore, these merchants depended entirely on the Hillsborough
channel for their economic well-being.
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YBOR CITY

HILLSBORO BAY. FROM T URNING BASIN TO HE:AD OF
THE: ESTUARY IN THE: DIRECTION OF YBOR. FLORIDA.

Hillsboro Bay, from
turning basin to Ybor
City.
Courtesy Corps of
engineers.
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Captain Spalding estimated that at least 12 thousand more
feet of docking facilities were needed. It was a question of where the
wharves could be built. An extension of the Hendry & Knight channel eastward would provide somewhere on the order of 2,000 feet.
The low-lying bedrock in the Hillsborough River eliminated any river
work. The only additional area available was the estuary just east of
the Hendry & Knight channel which ran north towards Ybor City, a
subdivision of Tampa. That was the region selected by Spalding as
the next expansion of Tampa's harbor.
The Jacksonville District engineer was deeply concerned that
his proposal should benefit the public. Therefore, he offered some
rather unusual suggestions. He felt that the Ybor Estuary should be
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The city submitted satisfactory evidence of its purchase of waterfront property, for a depth of 700 feet from the water's edge along
Ybor Estuary, to the Secretary of War 18 April 1911. When the development plan for the estuary was approved 8 August 1913, the project was activated, creating the present day facilities.17
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District Engineer Major Thomas H. Handbury's preliminary examination of Biscayne Bay in February 1895, reported that the bay
was 26 miles long with an average width of 6 miles. Half of the bay
had a low water depth of 6 feet or less. The remaining portion ran to
less than 10 feet, with occasional holes with soundings of 13 feet.
The mean tide rose and fell a foot. The west shore was coral rock,
rising at times to 10 feet above water level and running back to the
Everglades about 6 miles inland from the coast. Among the several
short streams flowing from the glades into the bay, the most significant was the Miami River. Four miles upstream from the mouth of
the Miami River there was a quarter-mile rapids, with a fall of 4 feet,
marking the boundary of the Everglades.
The east side of the bay was bounded by coral reefs along its
entire length. Most of the reefs were above high water, with the soil
upon them supporting a thick growth of mangrove, saw palmetto,
and similar vegetation. The rest of the reefs were covered with sand,
which was exposed only at low tide. Throughout this chain of coral
were openings or cuts, connecting the bay with the ocean beyond.
Three miles to seaward, another reef ran parallel to the first which
was awash during high tide. Between these two strips of coral lay
Hawk Channel, permitting an inside passage with 12 feet of water
from Cape Florida to Key West. Unfortunately for sailors, there are
numerous rock formations scattered throughout Hawk Channel.
Following this overview of the region, Major Handbury described in detail the three principal cuts permitting access to the
ocean. The northernmost was Norris Cut, separating Miami Beach
from Virginia Key. This channel, almost opposite the mouth of the
Miami River, was the most direct route for exit from the Miami
settlement.
Bear Cut was a mile and a half south of Norris Cut, dividing
Virginia Key from Key Biscayne. Bear Cut was twice as wide as
Norris, yet it also had 4 feet on the bar. However, Handbury was told
that Bear Cut had 4 feet of sand over the coral at its bar, making it
possible to dredge an 8-foot channel without using explosives.
The southernmost opening was Cape Florida, traversing the
lower end of Key Biscayne. Actually, there were three narrow channels exiting the bay across the low sand flats which covered the coral
reef. Two of these outlets carried 10 and 12 feet of water. The difficulty was that vessels using Hawk Channel had to make a twisting,
tortuous course over the shoal flats before reaching the exit channels. This route could be dredged to a depth of 11 feet, but the
exposed position on the shoal buffeted by drifting sands and prevailing storms, could not be maintained except under constant care. It
was concluded that Bear Cut offered the best approach to Biscayne
Bay and Miami.
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extensive use of explosives. For simple dredging down to coral rock,
however, Colonel Benyaurd recommended that the Cape Florida
Cut be used, because it was the only route which could be dredged
to near 12 feet. If a harbor deeper than 12 feet were to be developed,
Benyaurd felt that Norris Cut would be the most practical exit.22
When Assistant Engineer James H. Bacon began the third survey, 15 August 1899, he pushed his crew in a race against time.
Yellow fever had broken out in Miami and he knew that it was only a
matter of days before the city would be quarantined. Bacon was
right; the quarantine suspended all work on 30 September and it
remained that way until 17 January 1900. He finished his survey a
month later.23
By 1900, Miami had 2,500 inhabitants, supported by a rather
large hinterland population which had followed the railroad building
south, establishing settlements all along the fertile land and now
opened to northern markets. Flagler's arrival in Miami had done
everything that Major Handbury had predicted. Winter vegetables
which used to go to Key West for transshipment were now sent
directly to New York by rail. Flagler built a large hotel at Miami and
another at Nassau, and he joined the two by a tourist-carrying
steamship line. It was soon apparent that the original wharf on the
Miami River was too restrictive, so he built another on Biscayne Bay
and extended his tracks to it. Because of this growth, a board of
engineers was set up to examine the feasibility of creating an 18-foot
harbor at Miami.24
Of the three natural cuts in Biscayne Bay, the Board felt that
Norris Cut was the most practical. Yet, as they studied all of the
factors noted by James Bacon, it became apparent that a better
route would be to cut through Miami Beach, about a mile north of
Norris Cut. Here, the 18-foot contour line bent in closest to shore,
offering the shortest distance to deep water. Because this cut would
interfere less with the littoral current, the length of the jetties needed
to keep the channel free from the shifting sand would be shorter.
The Board made its decision to strike out directly for the sea, cutting
into the southern portion of Miami Beach.25
The result of all these surveys was the River and Harbor Act of
13 June 1902, which stipulated that the Corps of Engineers would
create an entrance to Biscayne Bay and build a refuge basin near
the entrance on the bay side of the cut. All of this was contingent
upon the Florida East Coast Railway Company constructing, at its
expense, a turning basin 1,600 feet long and 500 feet wide adjacent
to the wharves, and digging a channel 85 to 100 feet wide across the
bay to connect the two basins.
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Ships waiting off
Government Cut to enter
Miami harbor, 1925.
Courtesy State
Photographic Archives,
F.S.U.

'Prins Valdemar'
overturned in Miami
harbor January 10,
1926.
Courtesy State
Photographic Archives,
F.S.U.
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close proximity of coral rock stopped that operation. Blasting could
have been employed, but it would have been too dangerous in such
a restricted area with the heavy concentration of ships held in port by
the disaster. Finally, salvage crews took over, before freeing the Prins
Valdemar from her unwelcomed resting place.
Many of the vessels arriving after the incident dropped anchor
at sea to offload their cargo onto lighters to be carried ashore; a very
costly, time-consuming procedure. Those ships not yet committed
to Miami's port were sent elsewhere; the ships in port sat gathering
barnacles and marine growth, and losing business. The Valdemar
effectively ended Miami's building boomP
The Valdemar was the first of three disasters to visit Biscayne
Bay. The hurricane in September of that year swept in from the
Atlantic, bringing destruction and death to south Aorida. A section
of the north jetty, as well as huge portions of the revetment along
Government Cut, crumbled before the onslaught of the sea. But, the
Jacksonville District returned to the task, and by the end of the fiscal
year, the project was 61 percent completed. The hurricane of 1928
was not as destructive to the port projects. The full brunt of its fury
was reserved for the Lake Okeechobee area, inland. Still, it was 1933
before all the earlier projects in Biscayne were completed.
As the nation slowly recovered from the Depression, a new
interest developed at Miami's port- cruise ships carrying tourists to
the Caribbean and Bahama islands. Hardly had this trade begun
before World War II stopped such luxury traffic. During the war years,
while Tampa and Jacksonville boomed with defense shipping, Miami languished. It had no war-related industry to sustain it. With the
coming peace, the traffic in Biscayne Bay picked up again.
Post war shipping brought with it larger vessels and more problems. Miami's bar pilots complained of the constant hazards they
faced in bringing these ships into port. The first bone of contention
was the 500-foot bar channel. Although the bend approaching the
channel was 850 feet wide, the course change was about 45 degrees, which necessitated bringing large ships around to their new
headings in shallow waters. The pilots had to line up with the jetty
entrance, without the benefit of range lights to help align the ship
properly. Usually, ships approached this turn under crosswind and
crosscurrent conditions, and the limited water under the keel made
the vessels respond sluggishly. There had been a number of
groundings or near grounds to emphasize the dangers.
The second hazard occurred just as the ships entered the jetty
channel. Once again, the normal southward flowing current and
crosswinds pushed against the vessel as it approached the protected channel. When the bow entered the 300-foot channel, the
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current at ebb tide from Meloy Channel. This current had the effect
of pushing the vessel onto the south side of the channel where, once
again, a pilot often had to rely on increased speed to gain control to
keep his ship tracking correctly. 28 The situation needed attention
before shipping interests left Miami for better ports.
District Engineer, Colonel Paul D. Troxler listened to the pilots'
views before he presented his recommendations. The Chief of Engineers accepted Troxler's report asking Congress to widen the ship
channel and to enlarge the turning basin. The River and Harbor Act
of 14 July 1960 was the result of Troxler's plan, and his project was
completed in October 1964.
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District Engineer, Colonel Elmer K. Kirkpatrick recommended
modifying the San Juan Harbor project in November 1955, so that
the ocean entrance channel would have a 45-foot depth, the Army
Terminal Basin 36 feet, and a new channel to be cut from the Army
Terminal Basin to the eastern end of Graving Dock Channel. At the
juncture of these latter channels, Kirkpatrick requested an additional anchorage be constructed about 3,200 feet long, 1,550 feet
wide, and 36 feet deep. His program was authorized on 3 July
1958.31
Four years later, the general and detail design work had been
completed and dredging commenced. During 1963, four dredges
were at work in San Juan harbor; Gahagan No. 18, Jamaica Bay,
Allan Judith, and Crest. These four vessels removed 7,340,253
cubic yards in 1963. The following year, the dredge Cartagena was
added to the project, and 98 percent of the work was completed.
The project was finished 10 May 1965.32
rarther east at Christiansted Harbor, St. Croix, Virgin Islands, a
project had been authorized, a year before the Jacksonville District
became responsible for the island, to provide an approach channel
25 feet deep and 300 feet wide from the Caribbean Sea to the turning basin just offshore. However, funds were not provided and the
project languished. An economic restudy in 1957 reported that
there was no justification for a 25-foot approach depth, and in 1961
the plan was modified to 16 feet. It was 1962 before the dredge
Trident was employed on Christiansted Harbor, and the task was
completed 5 April 1963.33
Seaports are gateways to world commerce. The Jacksonville
District's harbor building activities opened these gateways for the
people of its region, and brought economic well-being to remote,
isolated communities. Of all of the tasks performed by the Jacksonville District, this endeavor touched the lives of all inhabitants more
directly than any other.
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CHAPTER9

Ship CanalBarge Canal
THE LONG AWAITED MOMENT arrived on 19 September 1935. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt pressed a telegraph key in his Hyde
Park, New York, home, detonating an explosive charge in Florida,
and officially opening construction on the Cross-Florida Ship Canal.
The event was received with mixed emotions by Floridians. Generally, those living along the proposed route in the northern part of the
state were jubilant; but, south Floridians were worried that the venture might turn their land into a desert by damaging their water
supply. 1
Of all the engineering projects undertaken in Florida, none has
had a longer, more turbulent, or emotional history than the CrossFlorida Canal. Time after time, Congress, at the pleading of local
interests, had the Corps of Engineers conduct surveys for a feasible
water course across the peninsula. In all, 28 routes were examined.
Even before the territory traded hands from Spain to the United
States, James Gadsden wrote to John C. Calhoun recommending
an investigation of a route from the St. Marys River in Georgia to the
Suwannee River in Spanish Florida.2
Immediately after the exchange of the territory, Americans began to think and write of a waterway connecting the Atlantic with the
Gulf of Mexico. All three authors (mentioned in Chapter Two) writing
about Florida in 1821 and 1822, presented proposals for water
transportation across the peninsula. James Grant Forbes suggested a canal from the St. Lucie River to Lake Mayaca. William
Darby's book contained a letter from a supporter for a canal project
to his friend in Charleston, South Carolina, proposing that the St.
Johns River be united with either Tampa Bay or Apalachicola Bay.
William H. Simmons wrote of the desirability of connecting the St.
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Federal Government, then Washington should at least invest some
proportional amount in conjunction with a private joint stock company.8 Of course, the company would have access to the information gathered by the engineers.
Two days after appointing Gadsden, et al, to investigate the
possibilities of a canal, the Florida Legislative Council wrote to Congress once again on the subject. The memorial asked for a canal
wide and deep enough to accommodate Mississippi River steamboats so that these vessels could extend their travels to Savannah or
Charleston.9
Floridians were not the only Americans interested in the water
connection. Congressman Daniel Webster submitted a resolution
asking for an examination of the peninsula to determine the feasibility of a project so beneficial to the nation as a whole. 10
This barrage of requests bore fruit. On 3 March 1826, Congress passed an act providing for a survey for a canal across Florida.
The Board of Internal improvements drew up the plans which Major
Paul H. Perrault executed when he commanded the survey brigade
discussed in Chapter Two.
Joseph White and James Gadsden were political enemies,
even if they were on the same side with respect to the Florida canal.
White complained to the Secretary of War in the spring of 1827 that
he had been informed that one of Perrault's officers had been electioneering in a St. Augustine tavern for James Gadsden. Among
other things, the officer was supposed to have said that the canal
would never be completed unless Gadsden was elected as Florida's
delegate to Congress. "Such gross improprieties, which bring into
disrepute the government, and its officers, will! am sure ... meet your
decided disaprobation," White told the Secretary.11 Whether this letter helped or not, the final outcome was White's election by two to
one over Gadsden.
Early in 1827, General Simon Bernard and Captain William Tell
Poussin visited Florida for a whirlwind tour of the two routes examined by Perrault. They considered the St. Johns and the St. Marys
Rivers. Both routes were to link up with St. Marks on the Gulf of
Mexico. It was the treacherousness of the St. Johns Bar which precluded the construction of a ship canal. Between the current, winds,
and shallow bar, sea-going vessels were not certain of gaining entrance, and an inaccessible harbor in wartime could prove disasterous. But, if all goods in transit had to be transshipped by boat or
barge anyway, then, they felt that the St. Johns River provided the
best waterway for a barge canal because it would only be 25 miles
long, as opposed to 45 for the St. Marys route.12 However, based
upon his personal investigation, plus the data from the survey bri-
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of the Ohio, was ordered to go to Florida as soon as possible after
completing his Ohio work.
Major Poussin concentrated first upon running the survey lines.
In July 1831, he left Florida on furlough to visit his home in France,
and UeutenantJohn Pickell replaced him in charge of operations.1s
Pickell spent much of his efforts trying to determine if a canal would
lose water through filtration, or gain water by the process of infiltration and perculation. He sank a series of wooden shafts 7 feet
square, 20 or more feet into the ground. These shafts were drained,
then observed as they filled with water. From his experiments, which
were reported to the Chief Engineer, he concluded that a canal cut
might gain water through the infiltration properties of the terrain, but
the money ran out before enough shafts were sunk to be certain. 16
With nothing decided by this latest survey, Congress put aside
the ship canal project. Two years later, the Florida Legislative Council reconciled itself to the fact that the Government probably would
not provide a ship canal across Florida. The council petitioned Congress to consider constructing a railroad from Jacksonville via Tallahassee to St. Marks.J7
Even James Gadsden recognized the futility of the ship canal.
As he put it: "Had the Report of the Engineers been favorable as to
its practicability, an intercourse across the Peninsula of Florida
might long since have been secured." 18 In 1838, he sent a memorial
to Congress, seeking to incorporate the Florida Peninsula Railroad
and Steamboat Co., to create a link across the territory.
It was 1852 before Congress again took up the question of
Florida's ship canal. This time, the terminal points were to be the
headwaters of the St. Johns River and Tampa Bay. UeutenantMartin
Luther Smith, topographical engineer, was the officer in charge.
Martin Smith followed the line from the St. Johns River to Tampa
Bay, while Ueutenant W. F. Smith made a reconnaissance of Charlotte Harbor and Peace Creek. W. F. Smith soon abandoned his
survey when he realized that these waters were too shoal.
Martin Smith used data obtained from Ueutenant Pickell's earlier work in 1831 to expedite his own task. Based upon Pickell's
report, Smith believed that there was no reason to worry about the
water loss from infiltration. His concern was with the approaches to
the ship canal on both the east and west coasts of Florida. Smith
ended his investigation inconclusively, stating that there were four
likely places to cut through the peninsula. Because he had funds
and instructions to survey only two of the lines, he felt there was no
possibility of reaching a conclusion until the other two routes had
been fully explored. For the survey made by his group, Ueutenant
Smith noted that the routes were too circuitous, and the depths of
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field by November of that year. The primary purpose was to establish, if at all possible, the capacity of Okefenokee Swamp to supply
the water necessary to feed the long summit reach of the proposed
canal. To answer this question his engineers spent 5 months in
the field. Transit and level lines were run from Fernandina and Jacksonville to Lake City. These lines were the base lines for all other
observations.
Next, U. S. Civil Assistant Engineer, S. L. Tremont had his men
push inland to the swamp itself. They ran lines all around the border
of the Okefenokee. This was followed by offset lines into, and some
across, the watery lands. Side trips were made to surrounding lands
to examine the many lakes and ponds which could become part of
a feeder system to support a canal. Then, the engineers moved
down the Suwannee River to the gulf, locating and recording several
good lines for the proposed project. From April to December 1879,
the field work was recorded, examined, and mapped.2 1
Tremont's final report delineated his canal route. The eastern
terminus would be Camp Pinckney, 29 miles above the town of St.
Marys on the St. Marys River. The cut would pass through the Okefenokee Swamp on a heading of 248°, then cross the Suwannee
River near Blount's Ferry to Ellaville, a reach of 77 miles. Here, the
canal would turn to a heading of 260° 15' for the remaining 64
miles to St. Marks. The total distance from St. Marys to St. Marks was
170 miles, 60 of which would be along the summit level. The engineer calculated it would take 11 locks (350 feet long, 80 feet wide,
and 24 feet deep), five on the eastern end and six on the western
end, to lift and lower the ships utilizing this waterway.
In his conclusion, Tremont said, "I believe I have shown conclusively that the Okefenokee swamp, with its contiguous water sheds,
is capable of supplying all the water that may be required to operate
a ship canal to its full capacity during the entire year." 22
Lieutenant Colonel Gillmore, as was his custom on all major
projects, went back to the records of previous surveys to add to his
engineer's field reports. He noted that the loss of water by filtration
had never been satisfactorily calculated. Gillmore pointed out that
the 1826 survey had not come to grips with that particular problem;
that the Board of Internal Improvement had suggested another examination, which had resulted in Lieutenant Pickell's expedition.
The Board, and later, Lieutenant Martin Smith, accepted Pickell's
conclusions that filtration would not be a problem. As Gillmore
viewed the results, the weakness of Pickell's work was twofold; first,
the head under which his infiltration experiments took place had not
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With regard to the purpose of his survey, Le Baron felt that
there was much work left to be done before any positive recommendations could be made. "From this rather uncertain data, I am
inclined to believe that a small canal without locks can be easily
and economically constructed at a probable cost of less than two
million dollars, on the general route indicated."26 John W. Sackett,
who accompanied LeBaron, prepared the expedition's maps.
John Gartland recorded some of his hardships: "I experienced
great difficulty as well as delay in discovering the section lines, the
blazed trees denoting merely the direction the line had taken, while
the posts set by the Land Office to mark corners had all disappeared... It was only by a reference to the deeds of settlers residing
near the survey that I was enabled to locate position of lin~ with
reference to the State survey."27
Gartland reached a different conclusion than Le Baron with
regard to the necessity of employing locks. He noted the different
levels of various lakes in his region, and felt a series of cuts would
soon drain the higher waters off. "The difference in level between
where it [Bowlegs Creek] emerges from Lake Buffum to where it
enters Peace Creek, being 65.125 feet. It is therefore evident that any
improvement of those streams for the purpose of steam navigation,
is impracticable without the use of locks." 28
A year later, Colonel Gillmore issued his findings. Again, he
discussed reports of earlier expeditions. The J . L. Meigs report of
1879 was especially singled out for its information. Gillmore concluded that the route could not be employed without the construction of locks. Such a canal would have a cost "plainly unwarranted
by the amount of traffic and the extent of population that would for
many years to come be accommodated by it"29 This was the fifth
major survey made by the Corps of Engineers in almost 60 years.
There seemed to be no prospect for a waterway across the state.
Some Florida proponents of a canal attempted to turn to private enterprise. The Atlantic and Gulf Transit Canal Company was
chartered in 1878, with capitalization of $30 million to build and
operate a canal across the state.3o Nothing concrete came of this
venture. Several private surveys were undertaken, but the task
was too large and costly to be considered without tremendous
governmental aid. Realistically, this was a project for the National
Government
In 1909, when Congress authorized the sixth survey, the project
was a barge canal. This endeavor did no better than the previous
examinations; the recommendation was unfavorable. The canal
backers met the same results in 1924 when the report was reviewed
and its negative findings confirmed.31
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General Charles P. Summerall as president. He applied to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation for funds, but was not successful
in obtaining any money. The RFC rejection was followed, in rapid
order, by similar refusals on the part of the Public Works Administration and the Department of Commerce when these agencies were
approached for funds. 34 Next, General Summerall persuaded President Roosevelt to appoint another board to study the matter. The
Interdepartmental Board of Review, created by the President in April
1934, finally recommended a 30-foot sea-level ship canal to the
President.35
It was evident that Franklin Roosevelt had made up his mind as
to the value of the canal's construction to relieve some of the unemployment problems of the nation. On 30 August 1935, at a news
conference, the President mentioned that he would probably spend
$4 or $5 million as a relief measure on the canal. Four days later, a
natural disaster gave Roosevelt his springboard to the construction
of Florida's ship canal. A hurricane swept over south Florida and
dashed the cruise ship Dixie onto French Reef in the Florida Keys.
Franklin Roosevelt, a master of political timing, announced the very
next day that he was allocating $5 million in relief money for a canal
which "would forever make it unnecessary for seagoers to risk their
lives in circumnavigation Florida's long, hurricane-blistered
thumb."36 At long last, the trans-Florida waterway was funded; although the source of the money did not come from the normal
congressional appropriation. This initial allocation of $5 million was
nowhere near the amount needed to complete this project, but it
was a start.
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would not use any more relief money for the Florida project.39 Instead, the President planned to ask Congress for the money. This
was obviously a sound move on Roosevelt's part. It allowed him to
divorce himself from the project while putting the burden of proceeding upon Congress. The appropriation went down in defeat in
the Senate by a vote of 39 to 34.
The Ocala, Florida, Engineer District was discontinued 1 September 1936, and the Jacksonville District had to secure work on
the canal after 1 year of operation.4oThe project was 3 percent completed. The remains of this first building attempt included several
sections of excavated canals, four massive bridge piers south of
Ocala, jutting skyward with no roadway built above them and no
water below, and Camp Roosevelt. Camp Roosevelt was turned
over to the WPA, then transferred to the University of Florida to serve
as an extension campus. In 1937, the Camp Roosevelt campus had
over 4,000 students enrolled in the piney woods of central Florida.
Even as the district engineers were closing project activities,
the numerous proponents for the canal were working for its reinstitution. The Chief of Engineers appointed a new board of officers to
review all previous reports. This Board presented a favorable report
to the public on 16 April1936.lt suggested a 33-foot deep, 250-foot
wide canal be built to benefit the nation as a whole.
A year later, Chief of Engineers, Major General Edward M.
Markham reported to the Secretary of War his justification of the
project "The following matters have weight in the balance; the great
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After the relief funds were exhausted, the Corps of Engineers
sought $12 million from Congress to continue its work. On the floor
of the Senate, Arthur Vandenberg led the fight to withhold such
funds. When he was successful, the canal was doomed; the project
was set aside for the time being.
World War II changed the situation, and interest in a crossAorida waterway was revived. Now it was a military project, especially after German U-boats stalked the east coast shipping lanes in
wolf packs. Early in 1942, Congress asked the Corps of Engineers
to review the project in the light of the latest military actions. The
engineers suggested a 12-foot deep, 150-foot wide, waterway along
the 13-B route. 'The value of the barge canal in time of war... is
sufficient to warrant its construction," concluded the Corps' report.43
The comments were well placed; during the war about 165 ships
were sunk in and around Aorida.
On 16 July 1942, when the Senate debated a bill for both a
pipe line and a barge canal across Florida, Senators Claude Pepper
and Arthur Vandenberg squared off to renew their argument Arthur
Vandenberg objected to the barge canal being funded under the
guise "to promote the national defense and to promptly facilitate
and protect the transport of materials and supplies," when it had
been stated that it could not "be completed until the fall of 1945 at
the earliest" 44 This time, Florida's Senator Pepper was victorious.
Seven days later, the President signed a new law, authorizing a barge
canal. Unfortunately for the proponents, the bill carried no appropriations. In some respects, the result was a tie, but the stalemate
worked to the disadvantage of the promoters of the waterway.
There was never disagreement as to the military advantages of
the canal. The Chief of Engineers told a House subcommittee in
1946 that "If this canal had been finished during the war time it
would have paid for itself several times over."45
The opponents stuck to their position, without qualms of giving aid to the enemy, because the engineers had stated that the
construction time would be at least 3% years - leading to the possibility that the war would be over before the canal was completed.
Further, building this waterway would add to the manpower and
material shortage already in existence in wartime America.46 To their
way of thinking, opposition to the canal was not disrupting the war
effort.
As soon as the war ended, the Chief of Engineers proposed
early construction of the waterway, with a request for $20 million. It
was not approved by the House committee, nor did it reach the floor
of Congress for a vote. By 1949, the annual report listed the project
under the Intracoastal Waterway section, rather than as a separate
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Once the task was approved and funded, it did not take the
J acksonville District engineers long to start moving earth. A section
of canal, running from Palatka to the St Johns Lock, was begun 24
February and completed by 4 August 1964. Another section, from
the St Johns Lock to Rodman Pool, was under construction during
1964. On the western end, there was more work as a dredge began
excavating a canal from the Gulf of Mexico toward Inglis Lock. The
dredge labored from November 1964 almost to the end of January
1965, before giving way to dragline operations. In addition to the
digging, there was bridge construction as the overpass for U. S.
Highway 19 began. The first lock work started in December 1964 at
the site of the eastern St Johns Lock; 4 months later, work began on
the Inglis Lock.so It seemed as if the district wanted to make up for all
the lost time.
By 1969, the project had created three new lakes; the Rodman
Reservoir became Lake Ocklawaha; Eureka Reservoir was changed
to Eureka Lake; and Inglis Reservoir became Lake Rousseau. In the
early months of 1969, the engineers held the levels of Lake Ocklawaha to 14-16 feet while the final clearing of trees and limbs took
place. Then, during June and July, the discharge outlets were regulated to allow the lake to fill to its operational level of 20 feet mean
sea level.
The Jacksonville District maintained responsibility for regulating Lake Ocklawaha. During the period from July 1969 to June
1970, when rainfall was above average, the engineers estimated that
the increase in water amounted to 2,181,000 acre-feet Of this total
net increase, 19,000 acre-feet were needed to bring the lake level to
20 feet; 22,000 acre-feet were employed for lockages for Buckman
Lock (formerly the St Johns Lock); and 2,140,000 acre-feet were
directed through Rodman Spillway.st
Among the construction tasks performed by the Jacksonville
District were such unlikely items as boat ramps and campsites. The
days when engineering projects were just for economic gain were
over. Today, the engineers play a major role in providing recreational
service and facilities wherever possible. The United States has
reached the stage of development whereby its society is highly industrialized and urbanized, and it demands activities for satisfying
the emotional and aesthetic needs of its people. The nation's wilderness areas belong to the people as a whole; therefore, in answer to
the public's need for recreational areas, the Corps included this factor in the planning of its projects. Hand in hand with the desire for
leisure time activities, is the growing awareness that our environment must be preserved and set aside for future generations. Ueutenant General FrederickJ. Clarke, Chief of Engineers, observed the
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public change in attitude in 1971 when he said: "Our efforts in the
Civil Works Program are changing somewhat in emphasis to reflect
the public's growing desire that the development of our natural resources for economic benefits no longer be the sole criteria for our
work. Rather, people seem willing to forego, or to pay more for their
immediate needs so that the quality of their environment may be
preserved and enhanced for the future. In that light, environmental
values are now being given full consideration along with economic,
technical, and social and other factors when we study alternate
means of meeting human demands. We are attempting to keep
resource options open for future generations as far as it is possible
to do so."52
There were other groups, with the same goals, who felt that the
Cross-Florida Barge Canal was not compatible with the desire to
preserve the natural state. The Florida Defenders of the Environ-
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ment called on President Richard M. Nixon to halt construction on
the project. They, and others, put great pressure upon the President
Nixon finally ordered construction stopped on 19 January 1971, on
the basis that the canal "could endanger the unique wildlife of the
area and destroy this region of unusual and unique beauty."53 Work
was suspended immediately. In March 1971, three of the four major
contracts were ordered completed, either for safety or environmental reasons. When all work had been properly secured, the project
stood at 28 percent completed.
For over 100 years, the Corps of Engineers surveyed for a
cross-Aorida waterway without being able to justify crating such a
project. The first successful funding of the plan was by Presidential
decree as a step to relieve unemployment in the 1930's. The first
time the engineers found the canal economically justified was 1958,
and, by the time construction began, opposition centered upon the
environmental dangers of such an undertaking. Immediately after
construction on the canal was halted, new environmental impact
studies were begun by the Jacksonville District at Congress' direction. Meanwhile, the Cross-Aorida Barge Canal remains suspended
in limbo once again.
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CHAPTER10

Twentieth Century
Military Activities
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR in 1898 ended military activities of the
nineteenth century; the new century had a different task for the
Corps of Engineers in Florida. In the earlier period, Florida had been
the locale for actual fighting; in the twentieth century, conflicts
moved to overseas theaters. World War I did not directly affect the
J acksonville District. The United States' participation in the struggle
was confined to a 19-month period. The Secretary of War established the Cantonment Division within the Quartermaster Corps as
the agency responsible for training camp construction. None of
these camps were located in Florida.
When war clouds rolled over Europe in 1939, the United States
began to take stock of its military posture. The country needed to
rebuild its army. In the initial phase of creating a large, modern army,
the tasks included the erection of training facilities, the gathering of
war materials, and the stockpiling of supplies to support any desired
troop movements. All of these jobs, functions of the Quartermaster
Corps, placed an overwhelming burden upon that organization. In
the streamlining reorganization which took place during 1940-41,
various functions were taken from the Quartermaster Corps and
given to the Corps of Engineers, such as the Air Corps construction
in November 1940, and all military construction and cantonment
maintenance work for the Army on 1 December 1941. Ueutenant
General Brehon B. Somervell, one of the leaders in the plan to consolidate construction work under the Corps of Engineers, issued his
assessment of the merger in September 1941 , warning that "Under
no circumstances should the less important, slow moving, civil
works be permitted to dominate the reorganization for vital, fast
moving and extensive requirements" for the defense effort.l

177

led to Somervell's remarks
population shot up from 30
1 27 May 1941, construction
i to the Jacksonville District.
:o ok over the task of building
)30 enlisted men. The reser) acres held the cantonment
milding the temporary living
1is base. He had to provide
oads, streets, runways, taxilpport active air base operaand electrical systems could
Base had facilities for 1976
)Sed warehouse space held
aircraft operations included
8,300 lineal feet of dispersal
ones 75 feet in diameter, in
;pecialized construction was
dging, which had been the
1petently and professionally.
!nter of a cluster of military
5, all of them supported the
)rdnance reservation of 584
r field, housed the munitions
~et Cantonment held 1,000
! Coast Artillery Searchlight
It Orlando Air Base to utilize
t may seem incongruous to
center of the Florida penintivities to provide more effits were:

Orlando was not the only Air Corps establishment in Florida.
The state, enjoying excellent flying weather, drew many air installations to the peninsula, both Army and Navy. MacDill Air Base at
Tampa was another base taken over from the Quartermaster Corps
and constructed by the district. During 1941-42, four short connecting runways were built, including perimeter taxiways and two large
parking aprons. In 1943, a larger instrument runway was built along
with its parallel taxiway system.3
It is sometimes difficult, in retrospect, to grasp the sense of
urgency which underlay most activities during the hectic period just
prior to and during World War II. Time has a way of masking emotions more completely than actions. Everyone concerned with developing the nation's preparedness felt that their task was crucial,
that their demands were reasonable, and that their solution was the
only answer to a critical problem. It was the obligation of the district
engineer to build well, rapidly, and as economically as possible.
Thus, when the commander atMacDill Air Base requested "Coolite"
glass be installed in his hangars to lower heat and glare, District
Engineer Colonel William C. Weeks solved the problem with $50
worth of blue paint, sprayed over plain window glass, for a substantial savings over the $3,000 cost of Coolite originally requested.4
Just a little over 7 miles north of MacDill Field was Drew Field.
This airport had formerly been Tampa's municipal airport, with one
hangar and a sod field. Originally, the Air Corps planned to use this
base as an auxiliary field to house 150 enlisted men in a tent camp.
By the time the Jacksonville District assumed responsibility for
Drew Field, the planners had transformed it into an installation
housing 421 officers, 9,615 enlisted men, and a hospital. So many

1orthwest of Orlando, 16.5
l,

:of Orlando, 9 acres, 16 offist of Orlando, 12 acres, 240
>f Orlando, 15.5 acres, 120
·orlando, 9.5 acres, 240 ened facilities at eight separate
! complex.

Inside hangar no. 3,
Macdill Field.
Courtesy National
Archives.

179

>er, brass, pipe fittings, and
of Drew Field was delayed
; completed in 1943, Drew
37 officers and 26,069 env>ere living structures for 96
; officers, and 150 Woman
rhe air field had three contd er 5,000 feet.5 The Jackonstruction rapidly in the
uction was Morrison Field
>rrison had been a municileased by the Government
he end of each fiscal year.
r 1940 under the Quarterplace before Morrison was
December 1940.
iary installations grew up
and transmitter station ocMorrison Field. This propemnation on 6 June 1941.
1ed under the same proceas a training base for nine
pplemental troops. Living
rs and 3,206 enlisted men,
Jlace, the Army Air Corps
to 207 officers and 1,897
te d the cantonment layout

of water and sewer systems so that if the Air Corps returned to its first
estimate, there would be no need to disrupt the completed construction in order to accommodate the increased numbers.6Jn the
hectic days of early mobilization, it was necessary for the district to
think ahead of the latest directive received.
The largest and most controversial military task in Florida
during World War II was Camp Blanding, near Starke, 30 miles
southwest of Jacksonville. Its history has all the ingredients which
epitomize the rapid war time construction: the site had been selected at an earlier time for a different purpose; the principal contractor, Starrett Brothers & Eken, a successful northern company
that built the Empire State Building in New York City, was on unfamiliar ground building in the swamp and pineland of Florida; northem labor unions moved south with Starrett Brothers & Eken to
jostle with independent southern labor, creating additional tensions;
and the installation dwarfed the rural town of Starke. Throughout all
of this was the pressure of time - to build facilities to store and use
the materials - to build quarters before the troops arrive. It was a
pressure-laden situation from the start.
The site was initially selected in 1939 by the Florida National
Guard to replace Camp Foster, the former guard camp near Jacksonville which had been transferred to the Navy. Brigadier General
VIVian B. Collins, Aorida National Guard, selected a 27,000 acre site
in Clay County on Kingsley Lake.lt was an excellent site for a country
plantation type retreat for hunting and fishing. When the plans were
drawn up, the layout was modest. The state estimated about
$700,000 would be necessary to create a summer camp for Aorida
guardsmen. The Fourth Corps Area Commander, Ueutenant General Stanley D. Embick, was as impressed as General Collins with
Camp Blanding, and soon the camp was placed on the Protective
Mobilization Plan list.
When the national defense program accelerated in the spring
of 1940, rumors began circulating that Blanding would be more
than just a guardsmen's summer camp. In mid-year, the War Department plans were released indicating that Blanding would house
the 31 st Division from Aorida, Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi
for a year's training cycle. The Quartermaster Corps had to move
fast to create a major training base out of virgin terrain. Then it was
announced that the 43rd Division from Maine, Vermont, Connecticut, and Rhode Island was scheduled to move in 50,000 troops by
the next spring. An installation of this size caused construction estimates to soar to $27.5 million, and the labor population to create
this camp rose to 21 ,000.
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luxury hotels. Patterson broached his idea to War Department officials upon his return to Washington. Major General Walter R. Weaver
accepted the idea, and, after he became head of the Army Air Corps
Technical Training Command, he decided to utilize hotels in Miami
Beach for his operation. In answer to initial criticism, General
Weaver replied; 'The best hotel room is none too good for the
American solider."I3
At the peak of the tourist season, the Corps of Engineers received the directive putting it in the hotel leasing business. Morris A
Spooner, later chief of the real estate division for the Jacksonville
District, was assigned to this detail at its inception. The timetable for
this, as for other related defense operations, was brief. By the end of
January 1942, the Army Air Corps asked representatives of the Miami Beach hotels to report on its facilities. Early in February, the
Dade County Defense Council and Hotel Men's Association met
with the Corps of Engineers to draw up plans. By 20 February 1942,
the first of 400 enlisted men arrived in Miami, followed in the next
few days by 500 officer candidates.
In the fall of 1942, more than 200 additional hotels in Miami
had been taken up by this program. The Army then expanded the
program to other resort areas to do the same thing. Atlantic City,
New J ersey, leased 4 7 hotels; Daytona Beach, 48; and St Petersburg, 58, before the year was out. The procedure was fairly standard.
Upon completion of negotiations, the hotel owners would evict the
guests, take down the draperies, and remove the rugs and objects of
art as the servicemen moved in. The WMC's utilized Daytona
Beach, the Breakers at Palm Beach became a general hospital, and
an Army Air Corps radar school was located in a leased club at Boca
Raton. At the peak, around October 1942, 348 hotels in Miami
Beach held 78,000 servicemen.I4
By the summer of 1943, the great need for training facilities
began to slacken. Trained troops were being shipped overseas, and
the permanent cantonments were completed and able to handle
more of the training population. The pressing necessity was over.
Most of the Government leasing contracts included a 30-day cancellation clause. On 19 June 1943, the War Department released
information that 109 of the 340 hotel leases at Miami Beach would
be terminated at once. More hotels were closed in November, followed by another group in January 1944. It had been a unique plan
which had succeeded admirably.
The success of this program can be measured in many ways.
In dollars, the cost savings were impressive. The rental bill was about
$12.5 million, with an average cost of $170 per man. Camp Polk
had been constructed at a cost of $1 ,263 per man, averaged out at
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rubber compound had been tested earlier in the cold climate of
northern New England, and Homestead became the hot weather
station used to complete the experimentJ6
Among the major peacetime military construction projects
were the many contracts to build Capehart housing for military families in Puerto Rico and the Panama Canal Zone. Paul B. Schultz
inspected the $5.4 million contract for living units being erected on
the west coast of the Canal Zone. In January 1960, he reported that
the 134 units of Area One were 93 percent finished, Area Two's 100
domiciles 67 percent completed, and Area Three's 96 units 9 percent completed.
Capehart housing was basically the same in Puerto Rico and
the Canal Zone, but the different climatic characteristics necessitated some building changes. For example, the outside stairways on
the four-family buildings in Puertq Rico were not satisfactory in the
Canal Zone because of the excessive rainfall in that region. The long
rainy season, with over 120 inches annual rainfall, meant adding
electric clothes dryers to the unit design. The parking area for Fort
Davis had to be placed continguous to the housing to accommodate family living under these wet conditions. The soil laboratory
reported swelling tendencies of 3 to 4 percent, which caused the
district to abandon terrazzo flooring at Fort Clayton in the Canal
Zone. In spite of these differences, the division's building program
kept pace with the initial construction schedule.J 7
In addition to military housing, the Jacksonville District performed the usual construction and maintenance for the Army and
Air Force. The erection of a crypto room at Fort Buchanan, Puerto
Rico, in 1964, called for a work space surrounded by 8-inch masonry walls, with a reinforced concrete floor, and all reinforcing bars
grounded to the crypto room ground (a ground bar embedded in
the wall encircling the room about 6 inches above the floor). The
standard commercial metal-clad door was set in a 16-gauge
frame.1a
District engineers in Puero Rico were involved in several projects at Ramey Air Force Base, improving apron lighting and building a new jet fuel storage farm, when the 2 July 1964 issue of the
San Juan Star carried a headline, "Navy Public Works Office to
Handle Caribbean Jobs." That same morning, the area engineer in
San Juan sent a dispatch message to the district engineer quoting
extensively from the newspaper report. Subsequently, in July 1964,
the district turned over its Caribbean military construction to the
Navy.J9
The Jacksonville District participated directly in the Vietnam
conflict through the employment of one of its dredges, the Hyde, in
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Willie J. Williams, civilian cook on the Hyde and one of the
three men injured in the mine explosion, transferred to the
Davison, the Hyde's replacement, and he remained in the war
zone. On 16 January 1969, Williams was fatally injured in another
mine explosion while he was riding a launch back to the Davison.
On 14 July 1969, District Engineer, Colonel John F. McElhenny
presented Williams' widow his Purple Heart and Vietnam Civilian
Service medal posthumously.22
In June 1970 the Jacksonville District turned its military construction projects over to the Mobile District. This change in tasks
placed the district in the same status it had prior to 1940. However, if
the need arose, the Jacksonville District has demonstrated that it is
capable of moving into a pressure ladened situation and producing
the desired results in military construction.
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CHAPTER 11

Cape Canaveral
CAPE CANAVERAL Is LOCATED on the east coast of Florida almost
midway between Jacksonville and Miami along the Intracoastal Waterway. The Florida coast trends generally south-southeast, but,
about 50 miles north of the cape, the shore begins to veer to the
east This change in direction projects a long, curved coastline out
into the Atlantic Ocean. At the cape there is a sudden reversal as the
beach turns westward. This is followed by a long arc, trending first
southwest, then south and finally, south-southeast, rejoining the
general alignment of the peninsula's shoreline some 30 miles south
of the cape. A shoal extends southeasterly from the cape farther into
the Atlantic for 7 to 8 miles, with water depths varying from 3 to 16
feet The shoal and the recurving south shoreline of the cape enclose the area of deeper water, known as the Canaveral Bight,
wherein water depths of 20 to 40 feet are found.
The northwest tip of the bight, which is approximately 3 miles
west-southwest from the cape, is known as Canaveral Harbor.
Knowing of the protection offered by the Canaveral Bight, mariners
have sought shelter at Canaveral Harbor from storms at sea for
many years. The anchorage provides a relatively safe haven from
the most common storms approaching from the north and east;
only the occasional tempest from the southeast threatens a ship
anchored at Canaveral Harbor. I
As early as 1889, local interests were advocating the construction of a deep water harbor along the shore of the Canaveral Bight
But, the area, sparsely settled, did not command the backing necessary for such a project WhenJ. Francis LeBaron traveled through
the region in 1869, he reported that there were only a dozen settlers
within a radius of 20 miles of the haulover, which was about 35 miles
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prime movers in placing plans for a port at Canaveral before Congress and the Corps of Engineers. Their plans for the new port were
more complex than the earlier projects. It was no longer just a channel from deep water to a dockside terminal on the shores of
Canaveral Bight Now, the plan envisioned a dredged cut through
the barrier beach to Banana River. On the river there would be a
turning basin with terminal facilities, and the seaward approaches to
the cut would be protected by jetties. A tributary canal was requested
to link up the seaport facilities with the intracoastal canal to the west
This canal would cut through Merritt Island, which separated Indian
River from Banana River.6
District Engineer, Colonel Lewis H. Watkins held a public hearing at Cocoa on 13 February 1939 to discuss this project. There
were about 300 persons at the meeting representing many civic
organizations and municipalities from the eastern and central sections of Florida. The Canaveral Harbor District, in existence at the
time, submitted its economic survey prepared by the New York consulting engineering firm of R. S. MacElwee. On behalf of the Atlantic
Peninsula Corporation, C. C. Kirkpatrick, traffic analyst, presented
data substantiating the harbor district's survey. Colonel W. C. Weeks
was the district engineer when the district finally submitted its evaluation of the project in 1941. Concluding that the project was not
feasible at the time, Weeks recommended that no action be taken
by the Federal Government
Division Engineer, ColoneiJarvisJ. Bain reversed Weeks' decision. He thought that Weeks had overestimated construction costs
and had underestimated the freight tonnage to be generated by
such an enterprise. Bain recommended an entrance canal, guarded
by two jetties, through the barrier land from the 27 -foot contour line
in the Atlantic to a 27 -foot turning basin in the Banana River. The
basin would be enclosed by a dike, with a lock constructed through
it leading to an 8-foot deep barge canal running west to the Intracoastal Waterway.7 Of course, the local interests had to obtain the
right-of-way, spoil disposal areas, etc., and had to demonstrate that
public facilities would be created in furtherance of the project before
the Corps of Engineers would begin construction. Complying with
these stipulations required time on the part of the local organizations.
The State created a governing body known as the Canaveral
Port Authority to oversee the non-Federal aspects of the program.
Five million dollars in revenue certificates and bonds were authorized to carry out local responsibilities. On 22 February 1947, the
Canaveral Port Authority informed the district engineer, Colonel Willis E. Teale, that plans and specifications for the proposed port had
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adjacent beach areas. Almost immediately a sand spit formed, extending about 150 feet into the channel from the south shore of the
cut The U.S. hopper dredge Hyde worked on the entrance channel
the first 3 months of 1952, but the lack of progress halted its operations until conditions could be stabilized. From that time on, seaward dredging efforts were employed only to maintain the channel.
During fiscal year 1953, the entrance channel was dredged four
times to keep the waterway open.
Emergency construction was initiated on a south groin in June
1953, in an effort to halt the shoaling of the channel. It consisted of
an 813-foot shoreward section with a 445-foot revetment. This
groin work was underway before the seaward extension of the south
jetty had been made. Both tasks were under construction from June
to November 1953. Between December 1953 and June 1954, the
north jetty was built it was 1,150 feet long with a 300-foot revetment
attached. Gradually, conditions improved as the north jetty took
shape; by early September 1954, the work was complete.
At the end of fiscal year 1958, port construction work had been
completed, except for the lock connecting the turning basin with the
Intracoastal Waterway. This task was deferred for further study.
By this time, the military services utilizing the missile complex
at Canaveral needed greater depth at the entrance channel and in
the turning basin. Service funds were transferred to the district to
dredge a 33-foot basin with a 36-foot outer channel. Later, in 1961 ,
as the military required additional depths, the outer channel was
deepened to 37 feet, the entrance to 36 feet, and the turning basin to
35 feet At the same time, the barge canal lock was authorized and
constructed with enlarged dimensions of 125 feet wide, 600 feet
long, and 12 feet deep.9
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Nearby, Patrick Air Force Base was being renovated. The base
had originally been the Naval Air Station, Banana River, during
World War II. In the post-war years, it had deteriorated rapidly after
being phased out of operational use. When the Air Force acquired
the installation, the district had the task of renewing the base. In the
first 6 months of its existence, the Patrick Area Office expended
almost $1.7 million in construction contracts.
In 1951, the district began building a skid-strip which was a
7 ,000-foot long, 300-foot wide landing strip, designed for the recovery of SNARK, a winged missile. This was a time of transition in the
air age from the pre-ballistic weapons to the ballistic. The SNARK
was one of the last of the winged missiles to be phased out as strategic plans shifted to the ballistic carriers of nuclear weapons. The
SNARK had a 6,000 mile range at cruising speeds of 600 miles per
hour. Its landing gear consisted of skids; therefore, the ski-strip was
surfaced with compacted limerock fill. During the test phase of the
SNARK operations, some of the missiles were flown downrange,
then returned to land, which saved considerable funds through recovering and reusing the missile.1 1 In 1955, the skid-strip was
lengthened to 10,000 feet with a 1,000-foot overrun at each end.
Later, the whole area was hard-topped with asphalt concrete to attain its present status as an all-weather airfield.
Missile science developed rapidly during the 1950's and
1960's, and the district's knowledge of space structures advanced
with the hardware. After the Bumpers came the LARK, first
launched in October 1950. The engineers constructed the original
scaffolding to service this missile on the pad. By present day standards, this early service tower resembled a painter's scaffold. The
lARK's blockhouse was an army tank pressed into service.
REDSTONE's service tower was the forerunner of the now
famed gantries so familiar to viewers of launchings of the nation's
manned space vehicles. It was designed to provide access to all
levels of the missile while it stood in an upright launch position. The
service tower was constructed on an A-frame mast which rose 140
feet above the pad. On the mast were cantilevered work platforms
which could encircle the missile, allowing access to all stations on
the vehicle. Elevators brought technicians up and down the mast to
the desired level, from the ground to the 15-ton hammerhead crane
at the top, or to any intermediate level. The structural steel base
which supported the mast was mounted on railway tracks. This
massive, self-propelled unit was designed to move to the missile or
back away from it The Noble Company of Oakland, California, built
the REDSTONE service tower and transported it to the cape in 14
railway cars. Seven of the company's men re-assembled the tower

197

at the launch site within 5 days after delivery. The service tower was
available almost immediately thereafter for REDSTONE's maiden
flighl 12
The shift to ballistic missiles demanded new construction designs for the launching complex. These new vehicles generated tremendous forces thrust down upon the pad. The engineers had to
design structures to carry off the high heat and flame produced
during ignition and launch. Then, too, this new technology required
complex communication systems between the vehicle and the control area. The engine~rs had to design and construct the physical
systems to carry the myriad parts of the overall launch to their
proper places.
Yet, the problems were not as divergent as one might expect
The missiles being developed were similar to their predecessors;
thus, the various component parts of the launch resembled those
which had gone before. There was the missile assembly and checkout building, the transportation system to the launch area, the
launch pad, the service tower, and the blockhouse. Although each
new missile made different demands upon these stations, the similarities narrowed the variations to matters of degree.
The Jacksonville engineers built 21 missile assembly buildings, which resembled hangars, before the Saturn, Apollo, and Titan
Ill vehicles were introduced. It was in these buildings that the component parts of the missiles were gathered to be assembled. Unlike
aircraft hangars, the missile assembly buildings were honeycombed with covered trenches, below the ground floor, which carried the myriad power circuits, testing devices, compressed oxygen,
and other gasses necessary to launch a missile.
Overhead, the buildings all housed cranes for lifting and moving the huge sections of the missile as it was assembled. The cranes
were unlike ordinary industrial cranes. Because the interior space of
the missile assembly building had to be free from all encumbrances, the crane bridges were of an underslung design, moving
on rails suspended from roof trusses. Each bridge covered half the
main bay, but interlocked with another bridge on the other half. This
arrangement allowed the crane to cover the whole bay.D Learning
from the earlier structures, the Jacksonville District built the last 16
missile assembly buildings utilizing a basic design, which allowed
the standard frame to be fabricated, even as the special design features were being planned for the specific missile series programmed to undergo tests.
From a construction point of view, the most individual and
complex portion of the missile assembly building was the emplacement of utilities supporting each missile series. The missile determined, with great exactitude, where and what services were
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During the era of the intermediate range ballistic missiles, the
igloo had base walls of 2-foot reinforced concrete. The dome of the
structure was much more solid, beginning with a 5~-foot thickness
at the base, and increasing to 8 feet at the crown. Three layers of 4inch armored glass provided viewing ports. The degree of protection provided varied with the potential explosive force of the missile.
Atlas complexes numbers 11 through 14, had inside walls 10~-foot
thickness, then 7 feet of sand held in place by a gunite-concrete
shell.1 5 The Atlas blockhouse was a far cry from the early sandbagged army tank.
To track the missiles after launch, the district engineers have
built everything from periscope mounts to complex buildings housing radio and radio installations necessary to monitor all aspects of
space flight To interconnect all of these various forms of communication data, the district engineers have laid about 400 miles of underground ducting, just within the 9 square miles on the cape
proper. To include Merritt Island, Titan Ill, and Apollo Saturn complexes, would add greatly to the total mileage.
In addition to the space structures at the cape, the Corps spent
over $8 million on conventional military base construction at Patrick
Air Force Base. The old World War ll buildings were renovated or
replaced. One new and unconventional building was the technical
laboratory built at Patrick. This massive structure, with 455,000
square feet of floor space, is a dominating structure on the base. It is
here that the data are collected, collated, and displayed to the scientists and technicians working on America's newest frontier space. 16
Commensurate with the growth of the space program, was the
growth of the Jacksonville District personnel attached to the Patrick
Area Office. The first three engineers arrived at the cape in May 1950
where they immediately went to work on the Bumper 8launch pad.
It was September before they had a chance to move into their offices at Patrick Air Force Base. From that meager beginning, the
Patrick Area Office grew as it designed and constructed the launch
and support systems of the Thor, Redstone, Vanguard, Pershing,
Jupiter, Atlas, Polaris, Minuteman, Titan, and Saturn I missiles. All of
these programs called for new designs to be met under exacting
timetables.
By January 1963, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was ready for the Apollo, and the Air Force was
ready for its Titan Ill programs. The Chief of Engineers decided that
these projects demanded closer administrative and support organization than could be provided from a distant district office, even one
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Interoceanic Canal

Study
ON 22 SEPTEMBER 1964, Congress authorized President Lyndon B.
Johnson to appoint a commission of fwe men to make a complete
study of the feasibility of a sea-level canal across Central America.
The Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal Study Commission was empowered to conduct on-site surveys for selecting the most suitable
route, to determine the type of construction to be employed (conventional or nuclear excavation), and to estimate the cost of the
proposed project. It was authorized to utilize the facilities of any
agency of the executive branch of government, and to expend up to
$24 million in the process. 1
Almost a year later, the Commission requested that the Chief of
Engineers be its engineering agent. He, in turn, delegated to the
Jacksonville District Engineer the responsibility of collecting data in
the field, and of conducting the engineering studies. The district
engineer entrusted this task to Mr. Edward W. Eden, Jr. However,
nuclear aspects did not come under the district engineer's control.
The Atomic Energy Commission supervised the nuclear operations
and safety while the U.S. Army Engineer Nuclear Cratering Group
had charge of the nuclear excavation design.
District Engineer, Colonel R. P. Tabb established his Interoceanic Canal Studies Field Office in the Canal Zone on 22 July 1965.
His field director, Colonel Alex Sutton, Corps of Engineers, supervised the on-site data collection and was the United States' representative on the Joint Canal Study Commissions created in both
Panama and Colombia. He served in this capacity until his office
was abolished on 31 July 1969.
There were so many supporting organizations involved in this
project that the Commission created the Canal Studies Coordinating Committee, composed of the Atomic Energy Commission, the
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Rico Nuclear Center, the Smithsonian Institution, the Stevens Institute of Technology, the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey,
the United States Naval Ship Research and Development Center,
the University of Florida, the University of Michigan, and the Waterways Experiment Station of the Corps of Engineers.2
The United States has been interested in an interoceanic canal
since the mid-nineteenth century. Since the Panama Canal was
opened to traffic on 15 August 1914, many studies have been conducted by the Government to plan for the time when the canal
would reach its maximum ship transit capacity. The 1947 report of
the Governor of the Panama Canal listed 30 possible routes, from
the Isthmus ofTehauntepec in Mexico to the northwestern region of
Colombia, as potential locations for alternative crossings. The Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal Study Commission used the 1947
route numbers for its own investigation.
Initially, the Commission contemplated investigating the following proposals:
-Route 8 was a sea-level canal along the Nicaragua-Costa
Rica border to be built primarily by nuclear procedures.
-Route 14 was the present lock canal converted to a sea-level
canal using conventional excavation.
-Route 17 was a sea-level canal crossing the Darien Isthmus
to be constructed by nuclear methods.
-Route 25 was a sea-level cut traversing the Atrato-Truando
region of northwestern Colombia to be built by a combination of
conventional dredging across the Atrato Flood Plains and a nuclear
excavation across the Choco Highlands to the Pacific.
It was determined that only Routes 17 and 25 would be subjected to an in-depth field study, and that existing records were adequate for the other proposals. The Commission later requested a
review and update of cost estimates for improving the present Panama Canal while maintaining the lock system of transit (Route 15),
and for building a new lock canal (Route 5) in Nicaragua. Some
months later, in 1966, it was determined that a new sea-level canal,
near the Panama Canal yet distant enough so as not to interfere with
present canal operations, was preferable to Route 14 (the conversion of the Panama Canal to a sea-level waterway). This led to the
addition of Route 10 as a sea-level canal to be constructed by conventional methods south of Routes 14 and 15.
Eventually, eight routes in four different geographic regions of
the American Isthmus were chosen to be studied: two traversing
Nicaragua and Costa Rica; three clustered about the present Panama Canal; one crossing the Darien Isthmus; and the final two near
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lowest point in Central America). There are a number of active volcanoes in this locale. Tropical moist forests, having both evergreen
and deciduous trees, cover much of the area. Temperatures seldom
rise above 95! F. or fall below 70! F. Rainfall averages 250 inches per
year on the Atlantic coast, decreasing to 60 inches annually on the
Pacific side. Population density is as varied as the rainfall, but in an
inverse proportion with the eastern jungles, holding fwe persons per
square mile. The Pacific slopes and the shores of Lake Nicaragua
and Lake Managua average 25 persons per square mile.
The district engineer survey teams plotting the canal alignment
east of Lake Nicaragua worked through the underdeveloped,
sparsely inhabited, thick jungle. Even on the more densely settled
western portion of the proposed routes, the population centers of
both Nicaragua and Costa Rica were over 100 miles from the
planned canal.
The east coast jumping-off place was the small town of San
Juan del Norte at the mouth of the San Juan River, where cargo
ships could not approach closer than 3 miles to shore. Supplies for
the surveyors had to be brought off in lighters. Much of the surface
travel inland was performed in native dugouts powered by outboard
motors. Even this method was painfully slow because of the snags
and blowdowns which closed the jungle streams. The survey lines
were cleared by native labor whenever possible. Work camps, often
supplied by Air Force helicopters, were set up along the way.
In the next region, the Panamanian Isthmus is both low and
narrow. Routes 14 and 15 (this is the present Panama Canal, modified by improving the present locks, Route 15, or converted to a sea
level route, Route 14) cross the Continental Divide where its altitude
is 300 feet above sea level. Route 10, to the south, would traverse a
slightly higher elevation. This region is serviced by the two urban
centers of Colon (population 85,000) on the Atlantic and Panama
City (population 415,000) on the Pacific coast The two terminals
are linked by a railroad and a two-lane highway, as well as the
present canal.
Route 10 provided the most primitive conditions for survey
teams in this region. Most of the ground cover consists of tropical
moist forests with multi-storied canopies. In the southern portion of
the zone, small savannas are scattered about throughout the jungle.
The area has a rainy season from mid-April to mid-December. Annual rainfall varies from 130 inches on the Atlantic side to 70 inches
on the Pacific.
Of course, the surveyors were not continually hacking their way
through Panama jungles. The rolling hills on the Pacific slope have

to a proposed canal, but much more on-site information was
needed. Between 1966 and 1969, the Jacksonville District conducted extensive field surveys as it studied all aspects of the locale.
The country of Panama has four major types of forest, and all
four are to be found along the Darien crossing. The Caribbean
coastline has a narrow strip of sand beach along Caledonia Bay.
Almost immediately, the tropical moist forest, with its tall deciduous
trees shading the lower evergreens and palms, cover the terrain. Ten
m iles inland is the Continental Divide where the lowest suitable
crossing for nuclear excavation is Sasardi Pass, at an elevation of
1,000 feet Here, the vegetation is premontane wet forest Thereafter, Route 17 runs south-southwest toward the Gulf of San Miguel.
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instrumented rockets launched almost daily from Battery McKenzie, Panama Canal Zone. All of this information was crucial to understanding the region.
The Interoceanic Canal Studies Field Office was interested in
more than the basic physical properties of climate and land along
the proposed route. The indigenuous cultures were studied for
knowledge of the social and agricultural organizations of the Indians
to be affected by a canal. Such information was a vital element in the
engineering decision about to be made. Marine and terrestrial plant
and animal life were studied to assess their relation to the Indian's
food chain. To protect the lives of the many construction personnel
necessary to create the project when a favorable decision is
reached, insect and animal specimens were collected along the
way. Animal blood samples were analyzed to determine the types of
potential human illnesses residing in nature's living reservoirs of diseases. All of this data was painstakingly gathered from 1966
to 1969.
The Atrato-Truando region of northwestern Colombia is probably even less known than the Darien Isthmus. Route 25 in the
Atrato-Truando area is, in many ways, a mirror image of Route 17.
The Atlantic terminal would be located in the Gulf of Uraba. The
canal alignment would follow the Atrato valley through marsh-type
soil. The flood plain is covered with impenetrable thickets of tall
grasses, cane-like palms, and bush-type plants. As the route leaves
the marshes, the rolling uplands of the Choco Highlands are encountered, consisting of multi-storied hardwoods. In this region the
Continental Divide shifts to the Pacific side lying within 20 miles of
the coasts. The divide is covered with dense, low evergreens, mixed
with epiphytes and woody vines. Passes range in altitude from 900
to 1,000 feet The proposed canal would terminate at the mouth of
the Curiche River, which empties into Humbolt Bay. It is the Pacific
coast which has the sandy beach in this zone. The rainfall ranges
from 80 inches at the Gulf of Uraba to 200 inches on the Pacific side.
The Jacksonville engineers had to make the same extensive
investigation of the Atrato-Truando region as that made in the Darien Isthmus. A base camp was established on Curiche Beach for
the Pacific operations. It was supplied by Army LCM's and the beach
was used as an airstrip by small aircraft. From here, a 78-mile baseline ran from the Pacific coast across the Choco Highlands to the
Atrato River. In all, 160 miles of cross sections were surveyed. Using
aerial mapping, 540 square miles of the surface were plotted.
Along the Atrato River the marshlands provided very little solid,
dry ground for base camp operations. Therefore, the district had to
employ barges to be used as a floating base camp.
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Water Hyacinths
IN ALL HISTORICAL PROCESSES there is a problem of continuity and
change. Seldom is there a complete break with the past, particularly
so with institutional history. Often, times change so gradually as to
be imperceptible to those living through the process. The district's
struggles to contain the spread of the noxious weed called the water
hyacinth, is an excellent example of the growth and development of
the services rendered by the Corps during the last decades of the
nineteenth century and throughout the twentieth. The project arose
as a result of the direct appeal of private commercial interests requesting governmental aid against a natural phenomenon which
was disrupting river communications along the St Johns River. By
the third quarter of the twentieth century, the struggle had led the
district into a new frontier - the science of biological engineering to serve not a limited group of shippers, but all of the people.
The water hyacinth is a beautiful, free-floating, freshwater plant
Its dark green leaves rise above the water's surface from its bulb-like
base, while in the center of the plant towers a spike of lavender
flowers, presenting an attractive appearance. The plant's beauty is
undoubtedly the reason for the water hyacinth's rapid spread
throughout the southeastern states. When the flower fades, after 24
to 48 hours of bloom, the stalk bends in the middle, thrusting the
flower spike with its seed pods under water. Upon the completion of
the ripening process, the seeds are released to settle on the bottom
or to become entangled in the roots of the plant, for beneath the
water's surface lurks a bushy mass of fibrous roots, from 6 to 24
inches in length, extending away from the leaf bulb. The seed retains
its powers of germination for seven or more years under water.
Throughout the year, two crops of plants will mature during the
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On 3 June 1896, 2 months after Handbury wrote the above,
Major James B. Quinn received an appropriation of $1 ,000 to rid
the Tickfau River in Louisiana of the pest. At that time, water hyacinths were confined to the southern waters of Louisiana and the St.
Johns River in Aorida.
The following year, Lieutenant Colonel W. H. H. Benyaurd,
stationed in St. Augustine, and Major Quinn, were appointed a twoofficer board to investigate the hyacinth menace. They were interested in the origins of this plant as a function of their duties, and they
recorded all the information they could gather. Assistant Engineer
John Warren Sackett (who later became one of two civilians to hold
the position of Jacksonville District Engineer) told the Board that the
water hyacinth was "a native of Venezuela and [it] was introduced
into this country as an ornamental plant many years ago." The
Board also recorded that "It has been stated and very generally
believed that the plant was introduced from Europe some seven or
eight years ago and planted in a small pond near Palatka. Here it
flourished to such an extent that ... the plants were taken from the
pond and thrown ... into the river." It then offered yet another story:
"Other opinions have been given that years ago the hyacinth was
known on the lower St. Johns. It is further stated that the extensive
marsh between Lake Harney and the source of the river is, and has
been for years, the hiding place and nursery of the plant."3
The basis for the Palatka tale was derived from a newspaper
article read by Colonel Benyaurd while he was in New York City in
1896. The 20 September issue of the Sun carried a lengthy article
and photograph concerning the hyacinth ·infestation of the St.
Johns River. Benyaurd clipped the item and sent it to Chief Engineer, Brigadier General William P. Craighill.4
The Sun reporter had interviewed Mr. J. E. Lucas, owner of
several steamboats, operating on the St. Johns, who said: "I know
the man who brought the first plant to Florida, ... and he thought
that he did the State a favor. I have it from his own lips, and I've
known him since long before that time, for I used to carry him up the
river in a launch year after year to his orange grove. He was Mr.
Fuller, father ofW. F. Fuller of Brooklyn, owner of Edgewater Grove,
... seven miles above Palatka ... I understand that he brought them
from Europe."5
In discussing the situation in Louisiana, the Board noted: "No
definite statement has been made as to the length of time that the
streams in Louisiana have been affected. It may be stated, however,
that one of the members of the Board, when in charge of certain
river and harbor improvements in the State some twenty years ago,
had the plant and its peculiarities described, and it is believed that it
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the water's level. The only clear opening was the draw in the center.
Between wind and current, the plants began gathering at the bridge.
This halted their journey north down the river to the sea and destruction. The growing plant became formidable. Not only did it impede
water traffic, but, when the wind blew the tangled growth against the
town docks at Palatka, the steamers had to spend hours fighting
their way from the dock to midchannel against the relentless pressure of the living green mass.
The bridge was being rebuilt in the summer and fall of 1894
with the same low clearance as the earlier bridge. The citizens of
Palatka became alarmed; they called upon one of the town's leading
citizens to remedy the situation. President E. S. Crill of the East Florida Savings and Trust Company, wrote to Florida Representative C.
M. Cooper in Washington for aid. If the structure were raised above
the water to provide sufficient clearance, the plants could float
downriver to the Atlantic and extinction. If no changes were made
on the bridge, then the inhabitants of the St. Johns River valley could
look forward to annual occurrences of plant blockades. President
Crill told his representative that "no one can realize how fast this
plant multiplies and spreads; and when I say acres, I mean acres and
hundreds of acres."1o Crill's communication made the rounds from
Representative Cooper to the Secretary of War to the Corps of Engineers, to Major Thomas Handbury in St. Augustine, and back to the
Chief of Engineers, between 9 February and 10 April 1895. The
major said that he would talk with the railroad officials about the
bridge, in the hopes that they would voluntarily provide some relief.

Bridge at Palatka,
showing three small
steamers attempting to
make their way through
a mass of Hyacinths.
Courtesy U.S. Senate.
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percent of the water. Tests made by Sackett on the crushed pulp did
indeed prove his speculation to be accurate; crushing effectively
killed the weed. But, it was a very slow and laborious process. Sackett left John E. Harris in charge of this phase of work at St. Francis
while he went upstream to experiment with gathering and towing
the weed to areas for destruction.
For this new project, Sackett had a net built of three-sixteenths
of an inch cotton line, with one lead and one cork border. The complete rig was 200 yards long. He discovered that the tow boat could
encircle a mass of the hyacinth by proceeding slowly, and, if the
wind and current were favorable, he could move the plants about
However, too great a speed, adverse wind, or the wrong current
would put a heavy strain on the net When this happened, the plants
crowd up to the net, sink the cork line, and tumble free. It was not a
very practical solution.
Next, the district tried chemicals. Muriatic acid, sulphuric acid,
and carbolic acid were used in varying strengths with negative
results. While the tops of the plants suffered from the acids, the
bulbs and roots were not damaged, and soon they had put forth
growth as high as that which had recently been destroyed. The engineers tried jets of steam, at 70 pounds of pressure, with similar
results. When kerosene was sprayed on the weed there was no reaction at all- the plants continued to grow.
Sackett and the Board discarded the idea of employing some
animal or parasitic growth against the water hyacinth in view of earlier disasters caused by the introduction of rabbits into Australia and
the Australian lady bug into Califomia.J3
In February 1899, John Sackett visited Louisiana to check on
the progress of Assistant Engineer P. H. Thomson, who was
engaged in the same work in that state. Thomson had tried a saturation solution of salt mixed with quick lime. It was fatal to water hyacinth, but the cost was prohibitive.
Sackett returned to Florida to recommend to the Board that
two sternwheellight-draft steamers be built, fitted to gather hyacinths from the bow to feed to crushing rollers. His plan was accepted and funded. The vessel's design was carried out, but,
because the frost during the winter of 1899-1900 destroyed much
of the hyacinth on the St. Johns River, it was decided to hold up
construction to await the results from the steamer being built in
Louisiana. The next year, Sackett again visited Louisiana where it
was determined that the steamer, while effective in killing the weeds,
could not keep pace with the vigorous growth of the hyacinths.
Meanwhile, the Harvesta Chemical Compounding Company
of New Orleans had developed a chemical spray which seemed to
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Captain Shunk continued to spray until January 1904 when
funds ran out and the Le Reve was laid up at Jacksonville. From
November 1902, a total of 1,178,602 gallons had been used to
destroy 14,144,018 square yards of the plant. This program had
relieved hyacinth congestion and had promoted river traffic. The
captain noted that after the shift to bicarbonate of sodium, there
were considerably fewer complaints from the cattlemen and he was
confident that in none of the complaints had it "been clearly shown
that the injury could be traced to the compound." 15ln reality, it may
have been that the cattlemen shifted their grievances from the district to Washington, for the River and Harbors Act of 3 March 1905
singled out Florida as the only state where "no chemical process
injurious to cattle which may feed upon the water hyacinth shall be
used." 16 Spraying in Florida came to an end, although other southem states were free to use chemicals.
In 1896, when water hyacinths were first brought to the attention of the Corps of Engineers as a menace in Florida, John Sackett
wrote: 'The subject is a novel one."I7 Almost a decade later Captain
Shunk could well have replied "Amen!" to Sackett's remarks. In November 1905, Headquarters in Washington authorized him to hire
cattle to probe further into the problems connected with spraying.
Shunk set up his operation at Riveria, 2 miles below Palatka on the
east bank of the St. Johns.
The crudeness of his experiments, and his frustrations as an
engineer turned experimenter, are best expressed in his final report.
He tried numerous mixtures which he sprayed on the plants to keep
the cattle from eating the hyacinths. Captain Shunk tried aloes, a
very bitter substance, but the cattle ate the plants without pause.
Next he used whale oil soap. The animals didn't notice the solution,
nor did they stop eating. Finally, he applied a mixture of badly decomposed eggs, dissolved in water. That horrid spread turned away
the cattle. Even after a heavy drenching rain the animals refused to
touch the plants. At the end of 8 days it was still effective, but a storm
carried away the sprayed plants before Shunk could determine how
long it would remain effective.
Just as victory seemed near, Captain Shunk failed. When he
added to his solution the compounds of arsenic and copper to kill
the hyacinths, the killing compounds eliminated the putrefactive organisms of his mixture. Within a few days the cattle were eating as
before. Shunk decided that the only answer was to return to the
mechanical method. Ia
The district was not concentrating exclusively upon spraying to
eliminate the water hyacinths. In March 1900, the district engineer
became aware of a patented invention of Joseph Allan of Macon,
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shredded area away from the mat, while the two inner ones opened
the center for the hull of the boat In all, the three axles, with saws
spinning at 1,000 rpm, would cut a 10-foot swath through the hyacinth. Behind the sawboat would be a channel of shredded leaves
and rhizomes, which would decompose and sink in about 2 weeks.
Generally, the area cut would be passed over four different times to
macerate the debris; if the rhizomes were not materially damaged
there was the possibility of regeneration. During an 8-hour day, a
sawboat could cut about 8 acres. The cost varied between $3.50
and $35 an acre, depending on plant size and ease of access of the
boat
The sawboat's propulsion depended upon the same cotton gin
saws revoMng in the water. In clear areas it could achieve speeds of
4 or 5 mph, but this speed was reduced considerably among the
hyacinths. The sawboat was limited to rather open reaches of water
carrying at least 18-inches depth because there was no reverse to
the propulsion system.
To keep a creek from emptying its plants into the main stream,
the district sometimes built booms to hold back the hyacinths. In
some places, elaborate booms were designed to open when the
tide was running out, to hurry the plants on to the sea; when the tide
shifted, the booms closed to check hyacinth drift upriver.
Water hyacinths spread southward into Lake Okeechobee.
During the reclamation era, when drainage canals were connected
to the lake, the ubiquitous weed followed the man-made waterways
to the coast South Florida has ideal growing conditions for water
hyacinth and the plant prospered. The infestation of the canals began with their link-up to Lake Okeechobee about 1918. By the midtwenties, it was necessary to employ a clamshell dredge with a
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were helpful, though, because they dispersed the sprayed mats
along the river. The rains also flushed out many of the river's tributaries, bringing more hyacinths into range of the spraying crews. In
spite of the weather setbacks, the project was completed in 50 days
with over 3,000 acres sprayed.21
Meanwhile, experimentation continued with other methods of
weed removal. One under investigation was biological control,
which began in 1959. Earlier success with the Argentine flea beetle
to combat alligator weed, led to the introduction of the Argentine
mottled water hyacinth weevil (neochetina eichhorniae). Adult insects were brought into the country, quarantined briefly in California,
then transferred to the quarantine laboratory at Fort Lauderdale.
Water hyacinth leaves and stems were used for feeding the adult
weevils who soon placed eggs in the plants. The eggs were carefully
removed, washed in a 0.5 percent hypochlorite solution to eliminate
any fungus spores which might have been accidently transmitted
from the adult weevil, and the cleaned eggs replaced in new plants.
These eggs were then moved into the field to be placed among the
healthy hyacinths.
The eggs were released on 23 August 1972 at Collier Estates
in Fort Lauderdale. It requires 7 to 10 days for emergence of the
larva. Three months in the larva stage is followed by 2 weeks in the
pupal stage in an underwater cocoon. The final cycle is the emergence of the adult weevil. The new adult begins feeding on the plant
immediately, producing many feeding spots on the hyacinths. In
southern Florida, the weevil, which normally lives about 1 year,
should be able to produce overlapping generations. It will take several years before the impact of the hyacinth weevil can be determined in the field. It is not the final answer, but it is expected to keep
the weed down to more manageable levels. Undoubtedly, all three
methods- mechanical, chemical, and biological- will continue to
be employed.22
Puerto Rico's aquatic weed problem is limited to water hyacinth but the island faces a different set of circumstances. There is
very Httle fresh water navigation within the island; most commercial
and private boaters use the ocean. The dangers presented by the
weed include the clogging of the hydroelectric plants, the aqueducts, and sewerage pumping stations. The green menace also
blocks irrigation systems when it fills the canals and ditches. In the
past, Puerto Rico has relied heavily upon 2,4-D spraying in the reservoirs supplying water to hydroelectric plants. There has also been
some experimentation with water snails which feed upon the hyacinths. Similar to the mainland, Puerto Rico will have to use all three
methods to control the plant23
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CHAPTER14

~

For The
Commonweal
IN RECENT DECADES, there has been a subtle shift in the district's
projects from those works requested by private vested interests to
broader undertakings for the benefit of the commonweal. Several
court decisions rendered for the Jacksonville District help demonstrate the changing philosophy.
In the United States v. Standard Oil Company, 384 U.S. 224
(1966), the question before the Supreme Court was whether the
statutory expression "refuse matter of any kind" included discharges of commercially valuable matter. Standard Oil (Kentucky)
had spilled 100-octane aviation gasoline into the St. Johns River
and it had been charged under Section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors
Act. The District Court dismissed the charge, believing that valuable
matter did not constitute refuse. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the
Supreme Court opinion that the statutory word "refuse" did incude
valuable matter and reversed the District Court's ruling. 1
In another case, Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (1970), two landowners wanted to dredge and fill their land riparian to Boca Ciega
Bay on the gulf side of Pinellas Peninsula, north of the entrance to
Tampa Bay. The Pinellas County Water and Navigation Control Authority refused to issue a permit. The Florida Supreme Court reversed the lower court and ordered the Authority to issue the permit
When the owners applied for a Federal permit, Colonel R. P.
Tabb, District Engineer, recommended that the request be refused.
He conceded that the permit would not affect navigation, but, because it was not in the best interest of the public, it should not be
granted. His decision was upheld by the division engineer, the Chief
of Engineers, and the Secretary of the Army.
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believe that the increased water level along the east coast may be
due to the deceleration of the Gulf Stream. The earth's rotation
causes the stream's water to be higher on the left side, nearest the
shore, than on the right side. The deceleration of the river in the
Atlantic allows more of its high water to escape from the flow along
the left bank to flood the Florida coast. But, all of these answers look
to the long-term changes of climate or geography.3
On a shorter time base, District Engineer, Captain W. M. Black
and his assistant, Second Ueutenant D. D. Gaillard, rank among the
pioneers who concerned themselves with the movement of sand
along the coast. Their report in 1887 occurred long before the
terms "ecology" and "beach erosion control" entered into the
engineer's working vocabulary. Gaillard's task was to examine St.
Augustine for a deep-sea channel on the outer bar, but his survey
delved deeply into the phenomenon of the movement of sand
along the shore. Gaillard and Black's final reports became the basis
for later studies by others concerned with erosion control.4
Gaillard worked on the site from 23 May to 26 July 1887. He
was aided by Assistant Engineers F. W. Bruce and J . H. Bacon, and
he completed his work in Jacksonville in mid-November. During his
survey, Gaillard noted that, although a strong current flowed directly
along the sand bank, there was no erosive effect, but, whenever
there was wave action breaking against the shore, the sand would
wear away rapidly. He also noted that the ebb flow influenced sand
movement more strongly than the flood tide.
After his field work was completed, Gaillard studied earlier
maps to gain perspective concerning St. Augustine's past condition
and the long-term changes. He began with a facsimile of an early
map of St. Augustine showing Francis Drake's assault in 1586. The
outline of the coast was too imprecise to be of value, but the map
was important because it indicated that the channel ran close
aboard Anastasia Island. Next, a facsimile of Herman Moll's map,
made in London sometime in the seventeenth century, depicted the
channel in basically the same position as in 1887. A facsimile of
Thomas Silver's map, made in 1740 during Oglethorpe's siege of
St. Augustine, had the channel in the same position as in 1882.
Other maps used by Gaillard were: The Spanish engineers' map of
1791; Ueutenant Colonel Perrault's two maps, one in 1826 and the
other in 1829; and the United States Coast Survey maps of 1862
and 1882.
Gaillard made a comparative chart of the shorelines and sailing lines from the 1791 , 1826, and 1887 surveys. This chart showed
a continual erosion of both the north and south beaches. He concluded that "the wear of the north beach is doubtless due to storms,
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beach the situation changes. When the water depth equals the wave
length (the distance from one trough to the next) the wave begins to
change shape, becoming more elliptical until, in shallow water, it
tumbles or breaks. The breaking wave has little or no support beneath its crest, causing the water to drop vertically. That portion of
water rushing forward up the beach is called the swash; the water
flowing back to the sea, down the slope of the beach, is the backwash. The impact of the falling crest dislodges particles from the
bottom, putting them in suspension. The swash, having more force
behind it than the backwash, carries the sand up on the beach to
remain when the water runs back down the slope. Thus, the swash
can be the beach building portion of the wave. However, this is so
only if the wave approaches the shore perpendicular. If the waves
strike at an oblique angle, the swash's energy is not directly up the
beach, but is glancing so that part of the suspended sand, and
m ore, may be carried back to the sea in the refraction. Under this
condition, the swash erodes rather than builds the shoreline. 8
This refraction is more commonly called littoral drift Most of
the time, the east coast of Florida is subjected to a southerly drift;
although, during times of southeast winds, the drift will reverse to
run northward. Between 9 June and 9 July 1936, an investigation of
ocean currents and sand movements off Miami Beach revealed a
northward littoral drift Ueutenant Colonel E. J. Dent, senior member of the Beach Erosion Board, noted that this direction was
contrary to earlier information available to the Board, and to the
physical evidence revealed by the sand accumulation on the north
side of jetties and protective works in the area.9

Jacksonville Beach
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through routine harbor maintenance, but this source is limited because many dredged areas are already so deep that the bottom
material is no longer sand. Therefore, offshore borrow areas are
being investigated. The Fort Pierce beach erosion control project
used this latter method during sand replenishment in 1971.12 The
Virginia Key and Key Biscayne projects called for the construction of
groins and the use of an offshore borrow area to renew the beaches.
That project was 47 percent completed by 1975.13 Similar work is
being planned for Pinellas County on the west coast
Revetments have been used by the engineers in their all-out
attack upon erosion. During the Florida land boom of the 1920's,
extensive bulkheads were built along the east coast as far north as
Mayport Duval County suffered a severe northeast storm in 1925
which destroyed many of these walls. They were rebuilt only to be
demolished a second time in a 1932 storm. With Federal aid, Atlantic Beach, Neptune Beach, and Jacksonville Beach constructed
concrete seawalls as replacements. Many concrete bulkheads were
damaged in the hurricane of 1944; others were destroyed in the
intense northeast storm of 1947. Until 1962, these battered walls
were replaced by similar concrete structures. After the storm of
1962, emergency granite revetments were constructed in place of
concrete seawalls. These structures were more effective in dissipating wave energy without creating extensive erosion problems. Further, 320,000 cubic yards of sand fill was used to replenish Neptune
and Jacksonville beaches. At the same time, the Mayport Naval Station was given a protective beach from dredged fill removed from
the carrier basin. The damage wrought by Hurricane Dora in September 1964 resulted in an additional 25,750 linear feet of granite
revetment along all three beaches.J4
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the Central and South Florida Flood Control project, the early efforts
at flood control were the result of the Corps being asked to rectify
private and state efforts at land reclamation in the Everglades. The
more recent flood control projects grew out of this first effort, but
later projects have been initiated from a broad base to protect the
commonweal through proper techniques of water management.
The Four River Basins project encompasses a 6,000-squaremile area in central and southwest Florida. The heart of this region is
the Green Swamp, a vast wilderness of swamps, lakes, streams,
marshlands, and prairies. By Florida's standards, the Green Swamp
is located at a high elevation- about 200 feet above mean sea level.
Four major rivers originate in the swamp: Withlacoochee, Oklawaha, Hillsborough, and Peace. When heavy rainfalls occur, the
whole region is quickly inundated because the streams are inefficient at draining off excess water.
Until this locale had a population boom, the periodic flooding
did little damage. Earlier settlers developed the better, higher
ground first. But, with additional people, the lowlands were brought
into use. Flooding became a serious problem as the population
density increasedAt first, the solution seemed to be to construct
drainage ditches to draw off water to the next lower zone. All this did
was concentrate the flow peaks which accentuated downstream
inundation.
The urban sprawl around Tampa added to the problem by
withdrawing holding areas for excess water. There is no way residential and industrial areas with roofs, pavements, and parking lots can
hold rainfall. As the development of the urban regions increased, so
did the runoff. In fact, the man-made cover actually kept the water
from entering the underground water table. The result was twofold;
flooding during the rainy months, and droughts during dry months,
all because of a decrease in the natural storage capacity of the region. As more subdivisions were built along desirable shorelines of
lakes, rivers, and the bay, the problem of flood and drought increased dramatically. The urban sprawl was matched by an agricultural development in the rural areas which removed more lands
from the water storage role. Finally, the Flood Control Act of 2 October 1962 was enacted to prevent a recurrence of the serious flooding of the past, and to create a storage system for the excess water.
The result of this act was the Four River Basins project. The
Jacksonville District's solution was to design a water management
control around the construction of eight reservoirs, and to improve
the capacity of several lakes to hold water. The Green Swamp will
contain three storage reservoirs; the Hillsboro River will have four,
and the Withlacoochee River will have one. These storage centers
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was 21 percent completed. Emphasis has been placed upon building the Tampa Bypass Canal, which is designed to bring flood relief
to this highly urbanized region.
In the extreme eastern end of the Jacksonville District, there is
another flood control project being constructed on the Portugues
and Bucana Rivers in Puerto Rico. These two rivers drain 54 miles
on the south side of the island. The drainage area varies from 4,000foot elevation down to sea level in the short distance of 14 miles
from peak to sea. Ponce, the second largest city in Puerto Rico, is
located on the coastal plain of this region. The topography and rainfall pattern is such that there is an extremely high water runoff rate
which produces flooding with very little warning. As was the case
with Tampa, as Ponce grew in population, the urban spread encompassed more land which was subject to damage by the periodic
floods rushing down from the mountains.
In contrast to the Florida rivers which flow through flat land, the
Portugues and Bucana Rivers drop more than 750 feet per mile
near their source. Even on the coastal plain the fall is 25 feet per
mile. Overall, the two drainage basins average a descent of 300 feet
per mile from source to sea. The present project is the first flood
control program scheduled for the island of Puerto Rico. It is similar
to the Four River Basins project in that it was brought about by
urban development
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the area into a bustling self-contained waterfront community of
34,000 people. In 1964, the company dug its first canal, after a
waiting time of only 9 days for its dredge permit from the district
Deltona intended to lay out its channels so that all lots would front
on the water, a venture well received by the buying public. The second permit was received in 1969, after a considerable wait In 1974,
the company was back to the district for a third permit to dredge and
fill another 2,200 acres of wetlands. By this time the sides were
sharply drawn between the environmentalists and Deltona. The difference was that the Corps of Engineers was now concerned with all
waters in the country, not just navigable waters.
Colonel Wisdom had the task of deciding whether to grant the
request. The Jacksonville District Office was flooded with written
arguments from both sides. Deltona produced enough documents
to fill a 6-foot long bookshelf. The environmentalists presented an
impact statement of more than a thousand pages. Both sides had
experts speak on their behalf. The whole preceding was emotionally
argued before the district engineer.
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CHAPTER15

Conclusion
TODAY, THE JACKSONVILLE DISTRICT CORPS OF ENGINEERS is one of
the subgroups within the South Atlantic Division based in Atlanta,
Georgia. The district covers all of the Florida peninsula, juts into
southern Georgia along the lower portion of the Suwannee River
basin, and reaches 1,150 miles southeast of Jacksonville to include
Puerto Rico and the American Virgin Islands. The Florida panhandle, from the St. Marks River basin west, is in the Mobile (Alabama)
District Districts are confined to natural watersheds for their civil
works activities, while divisions cover broad geographic regions
containing major river basins. Military construction is a separate activity from the civil works groupings. Therefore, not all districts of the
Corps of Engineers are responsible for military tasks within their
particular district, and such construction in Florida is now under the
control of the Mobile District
Very broadly, the major functions of the Jacksonville District
consist of navigation improvement projects, flood control, and
beach erosion control. Among the newer tasks, promising to be
both exciting and vital to the future, are water pollution control, urban studies programs, and environmental projects.l
It will seJVe a useful purpose to divide the district into its natural
regions and briefly point out a few engineering works in each. Georgraphically, the state of Florida may be segmented into five areas for
easy reference:
1. Lower St. Johns River and North Coastal area,
2. Central and Southern Florida area,
3. Southwest Florida area,
4. Suwannee River Basin, and
5. Northwest Florida area (most of this region is in the
Mobile District).
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The Lower St. Johns and North Coastal area includes that portion of the St. Johns river basin from Lake Harney to the sea. The St.
Johns originates in the swampy region west of Fort Pierce, about
300 miles from its mouth at Mayport. Lake Harney is slightly more
than mid-way, 164 miles upstream. The principal tributary of the St.
Johns is the spring-fed Oklawaha River, which lies to the west
Uke the rest of the peninsula, the St. Johns river valley is a
relatively level expanse of terrain. The river's fall from origin to the
Atlantic is only 25 feet; therefore, the river has a perennial tide to
Lake George, 106 miles upriver, and, under certain circumstances,
tidal affects have been noted as far as Lake Monroe, 161 miles from
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New economic and environmental studies are now underway to
determine the feasibility of the project. Meanwhile, the 30 percent of
the barge canal completed, remains suspended in limbo while the
engineers wait for the final determination.
The Central and Southern Florida area runs south of Cape
Canaveral-Orlando, down the center and east coast of the peninsula, to include the northern portion of the Florida Keys. This region
is geographically dominated by Lake Okeechobee, which embraces the drainage area flowing east of the summit ridge along the
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tourist, has sprung up in south Florida. The spectacular sight of the
graceful passenger vessels, steaming close by the high-rise buildings on the shore, is striking.
The most impressive work of the Jacksonville District in this
region is the Central and Southern Florida Flood Control project.
This is a comprehensive flood protection and water conservation
program, embracing about 16,000 square miles, and touching 18
counties. The project has two phases. Phase One calls for a protective levee from the Homestead area, north to Lake Okeechobee,
close by the St. Lucie Canal. Phase Two concentrates on the western
portion, and although it, too, is of a flood control nature, it is more
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Continuing one's travels around the district, one may utilize the
Intracoastal Waterway from Caloosahatchee to the Anclote River,
just north of Tampa Bay. However, Tampa Harbor, about midpoint
on the peninsula on the gulf coast, serving the second largest metropolitan center of the state, ought to be mentioned. At the present
time, the channel dredged by the engineers is from 34 to 36 feet in
depth. In 1970, authorization was granted to deepen the channel to
44 and 46 feet, while widening it from its present 400 to 500 feet to
the newly proposed 500 to 700 feet Work has not yet begun on this
project Already, Tampa Harbor is the largest port in Florida, and it is
eighth in the nation with respect to tonnage passing through its
facilities.
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has been suspended. An economic study has indicated that, without the Cross-Florida Barge Canal, there would be no justification
for the Intracoastal Gulf Waterway. The channel through Derrick
Island Gap, created to connect the Suwannee River with the gulf for
safer navigation, is also considered nonessential, although it is 25
percent completed.
In the Antilles, the historic harbor of old San Juan is maintained
by the Jacksonville District On the south side of the island a new
flood control project is planned for the Portugues and Bucana river
basins. This latter task will relieve Ponce, the second largest city of
Puerto Rico, from the perils of periodic flooding.
A more detailed study of the Jacksonville District's undertakings shows that the district is undergoing a shift in emphasis. Urban
studies are in the incubation stage, although the population growth
in metropolitan areas is a harbinger of its future importance. Water
pollution control, beach erosion control, and environmental protection are in early stages of development, and all three will become
increasingly more important2 Today, it is flood control. Yesterday, it
was navigational projects. The day before that, in the midnineteenth century, it was coastal fortification. In the earliest days of
the Corps of Engineers in Florida, it was surveys and map making.
Regardless of the emphasis, the Jacksonville District and its predecessors have functioned to serve the nation and its citizens.
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APPENDIX A
EARLY ENGINEERS WHO PLAYED A SIGNIFICANT
ENGINEERING ROLE IN FLORIDA
James Gadsden

Horatio G. Wright

Quincy A. Gillmore

1822-1830
1831-1839

1846-1856

1869-1884

FORMATION OF DISTRICT AND LIST OF DISTRICT ENGINEERS
MN.ANDREWN. DAMRELL

Cwr.THCI'IASTURTI.E

LR:oL

Improving:
Apalachicola Bay
Apalachicola River
Suwanee River

Forts:
Fort Jefferson
Fort Taylor

Improving:
Bar St. Johns River
Upper St. Johns River

QuiNCY A. Gll.L'IORE

VolusiaBar

Withlacoochee River
Manatee river

Examination or Survey:

Caloosahatchie river
Pease Creek
Cedar Keys Harbor
Tampa Bay Harbor
Key West Harbor

St. Augustine Harbor
Mosquito Inlet
Canal from St. Johns

River through
Mosquito Lagoon

and Indian River
to Jupiter Inlet and

Examination or Survey:
Anclote Harbor
WekeivaRiver
Charlotte Harbor

I

Lake Worth

15August 1884

I

20 August 1884

30 AU3!_USI 1884

Lt. William Trent Rossell
First District Engineer

I

26April1886
Lt. William Murray Black

I

20 November 1891
Maj.J. C. Mallery

I
20June 1893
Lt. Albert M. D'Arrntt

I

15May 1894
Maj. Thomas H. Handbury

I

15July 1895

Lt. Albert M. D 'Arrnit

I
17 August 1895
Capt. Frederic Vaughn

Abbot

I

21 October 1895
Maj. Thomas H. Handbury

I

4 January 1896
Lt. James J. Meyler

I
8January 1896
Lt.Col. William H. H.
Benyaurd

KEY WEST
1 February 1898
Capt. Charles Hedges
McKrtry
TAMPA
I April1899
Capt. Henry Jetvey
31 May 1 8 9 9 - - - - 3 1 May 1899
Capt. Charles Hedges
McKinstry
18Jan ary 1900
Capt.
omas Henry
Rees
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OCALA, FLORIDA,
DISTRICT

lt~~nr;~~0~5 -----lt~"df.t~r;:,~e;nl935
Somervell

r - - - - - - - - - - - 1 September 1936
14July 1938
Col. Lewis H. Watkins
I
23 October 1940
LtCol. Tatnall D. Simkins

I

5 December 1940
Col. W. C. Weeks

I

I October 1941
LtCol. Alvin G. Viney
I
16 December 1942
LtCol. Herbert C. Gee

I

3March 1943
Col. David W. Griffiths

I

9 January 1944
LtCol. L. E. Reed

I

II February 1944
Col. Albert B. Jones
I
14 November 1946
Maj. Blase Nemeth

I

IOJanuary 1947
Col. Willis E. Teale

I
17 July 1947
Col. Richard W. Pearson
I

15 February 1952
Col. Herman W. Schull, Jr.

I

8May 1955
Col. Elmer E. Kirkpatrick
I
18June 1957
Col. Paul D. Troxler
I
31 July 1960
Col. Julian V. Sollohub

I

22 December 1962
Col. Harold R. Parfitt

CANAVERAL
DISTRICT
I May 1963
Col. G. A. Finley
I
I September 1964
Col. W. L. Starnes

I
May 1966
Col. N. A. Lord

I
27 January 1969
Col. G.H. Newman

I

Lt~~ry,~~K k_~_;Po_a
30June 1971

3June 1965
Col. R.P. Tabb

I
17 May 1968
Col. John F. McElhenny

I

I January 1970

_ _ _ _C_o_I._A__Jr ""'"""
·
February 1972
Col. Emmett C. Lee, Jr.

I

8July 1975
Col. Donald A. Wisdom
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AppendixB
The growth of civil works projects within the Jacksonville District can best be
realized by comparing the projects listed in the first Jacksonville District annual
report for 1908 with the 1975 compliation.
1908
1. St Johns River, Florida
2. St Johns River, Florida, opposite the
city of Jacksonville.
3. St Johns River at Orange Mills flats,
Florida
4. Volusia bar, Florida
5. Oklawaha River, Florida.
6. Indian River, Florida
7. Biscayne Bay, Florida
8. Harbor at Key West, Florida, and entrance thereto.
9. Kissimmee River, Florida
10. Orange River, Charlotte Harbor, and
Caloosahatchee River, Florida
11. Sarasota Bay, Florida
12. Manatee River, Florida
13. Tampa Bay, Florida
14. Hillsboro Bay, Florida
15. Crystal, Anclote, and Suwannee Rivers,
Florida
16. Wtthlacoochee River, Florida
17. Removing the water hyacinth from
Florida waters
1975
Navigation
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Aquatic Plant Control
Arecibo Harbor, P. R.
N.WW Norfolk to St Johns River
Canaveral Harbor, Fla.
Charlotte Harbor, Fla.
Cross Florida Barge Canal.
Fernandina Harbor, Fla.
Fort Myers Beach, Fla.
Fort Pierce Harbor, Fla.
Intracoastal Waterway, Caloosahatchee River to Andote River, Fla.
Intracoastal Waterway, Jacksonville to
Miami, Fla.
Jacksonville Harbor, Fla.
Mayaguez Harbor, P. R.
Miami Harbor, Fla.
New Pass, Sarasota, Fla.
Okeechobee Waterway, Fla.
Oklawaha River, Fla.
Palm Beach Harbor, Fla.
Ponce de Leon Inlet, Fla.
Ponce Harbor, P. R.

21 . Removing the Water Hyacinth from
Navigable Waters in the State of
Florida.
22. St Augustine Harbor, Fla.
23. St Lucie Inlet, Fla.
24. San Juan Harbor, P. R.
25. Tampa Harbor, Fla.
26. Navigation Projects on which Reconnaissance and Condition Surveys only
were Conducted during Fiscal Year.
27. Other Authorized Navigation Projects
28. Navigation Work under Special
Authorization.
(1975 Continued)
Beach Erosion Control
29. Brevard County, Fla.
30. Broward County, Fla., Beach Erosion
Control and Hillsboro Inlet, Fla., Navigation Project
31. Dade County, Fla.
32. Duval County, Fla.
33. Palm Beach County, Fla., from Martin
County line to Lake Worth Inlet and
from South Lake Worth Inlet to Braward County line.
34. Pinellas County, Fla.
35. Virginia Key and Key Biscayne, Fla.
36. Other Authorized Beach Erosion Control Projects.
37. Beach Erosion Control Activities Under Special Authorization.
Flood Control
38.
39.
40.
41.

Central and Southern Florida.
Four River Basins, Fla.
Portugues and Bucana Rivers, P. R.
Inspection of Completed Flood Control Projects.
42. Other Authorized Flood Control
Projects.
43. Flood Control Work under Special
Authorization.
GENERAL INVESTIGATIONS
44. Surveys.
45. Collection and Study of Basic Data.
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Lt. Horatio Gouverneur Wright

BVT Maj.Gen.Quincy Adams Gillmore

Capt. William Trent Rossell

1852-1854

1869-1884

1884-1886

Col. Dan Christie Kingman

LTC Lansins Hoskins Beach

Capt. George Redfield Spalding

Major John Rodolp h Slattery

1906-1906

1907 - 1908

1908-1911

1911 - 1913

Col. Spencer Cosby

Maj. William C. Lemen

LTC Gilbert Albin Youngberg

LTC Mark Brooke

1920-1920

1920-1922

1922-1926

1926- 1928

Col. W. C. Weeks

Col. Alvin G. Viney

LTC Herbert C. Gee

Col. David W. Griffiths

1940-1941

1941-1942

1942-1943

1943- 1944

Col. Juliam V. Sollohub

Col. H. R. Parfitt

Col. R. P. Tabb

Col. J o hn F. M cEihenny

1960 - 1962

1962 - 1965

1965-1968

1g68- 1970

Col. A.
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Trent Rossell
-1886

Capt. William Murray Black
1886-1891

Capt. Frederic Vaughan Abbott
1895-1895

Capt Henry Jervey
1899-1900

dolph Slattery
-1913

LCT William Baker Ladue
1913-1917

Major James Franklin Bell
1917-1917

Mr. John Warren Sackett
1917-1918

Mr. Jaquelin Marshall Braxton
1918-1919

LTC. Laurence Verner Frazier
1928-1932

LTC Beverly C. Dunn
1932 - 1935

Capt. Peter A. Feringa
1935-1935

Col. Earl North
1935-1938

Col. A. B. Jones
1944-1946

Col. Willis E. Teale
1947-1949

Col. Richard W. Pearson
1949- 1952

Col. Herman W. Schull, Jr.
1952- 1955

Col. Elmer E. Kirkpatrick
1955-1957

Col. A. S. Fullerton
1970 - 1972

Col. Emmett C. Lee, Jr.
1972- 1975

Col. Donald A. Wisdom
1975 - 1978

Col. James W. R. Adams
1978 - present

•Brooke
-1928

V. Griffiths
1944

••!

Tabb
1968

Col. Glen Edgar Edgerton
1919-1919

Col. Lewis H. Watkins
1938 -1940

~

Col. John F. McElhenny
1968 - 1970

LTC Tatnall D. Simkins
1940 - 1940

